Pamela Miehls

The defendants brought a motion to lift a stay imposed in 2001 pending determination of a right-to-sue application before the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal and sought dismissal of the action for delay.

The self-represented plaintiff requested that the stay continue while she pursued reconsideration or judicial review of the tribunal decision.

The court held that the stay should be lifted because the tribunal decision constituted a final determination and further proceedings should not delay the civil action.

However, despite the long history of delay, the court declined to dismiss the action, finding that the existing documentary record would permit a fair trial and that the defendants had consented to the stay and delayed bringing the motion.

The action was restored to the trial list with expedited pre-trial and trial dates.

The plaintiff sought a declaration that she held a beneficial one-half interest in a Toronto property formerly owned by her deceased husband as tenant-in-common with his brother.

The defendants argued the property was held in trust for the brothers’ mother and that the plaintiff only held title as trustee rather than beneficial owner.

After reviewing the family’s financial contributions, tax filings, and historical dealings with the property, the court found no evidence of an express, resulting, or constructive trust in favour of the mother.

The evidence showed the brothers were the true beneficial owners who funded and maintained the property and consistently declared rental income on their tax returns.

The plaintiff therefore succeeded to her late husband’s beneficial half-interest, and the court ordered partition and sale of the property with proceeds divided equally.

During a trial concerning ownership of residential property and whether a resulting or constructive trust existed in favour of an estate, the plaintiff brought a mid‑trial motion seeking production of the deceased’s wills.

The court considered the principles of relevance and admissibility under the Rules of Civil Procedure and common law evidence authorities.

The wills were found to be potentially relevant to the intent of the deceased regarding the property at issue.

The court rejected arguments that family conflict created undue prejudice and held any risk could be controlled in a judge‑alone trial through appropriate weight.

Production of the wills was ordered subject to a confidentiality order sealing them from the public record.

The mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a mortgage and dismiss the borrowers’ claims that the debt had been discharged.

The borrowers asserted that they had paid the mortgage using purported electronic fund transfer instruments or bills of exchange marked “Not For Deposit” and “Without Recourse.” The court found that the documents were drawn on a closed bank account and that there was no evidence of actual payment.

Concluding that the borrowers failed to provide evidence establishing any genuine issue requiring a trial, the court held that the instruments were worthless and did not constitute payment of the mortgage debt.

Summary judgment was granted to the mortgagee and the borrowers’ claims were dismissed.

Following an earlier decision striking the plaintiff’s statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The defendant sought partial indemnity costs after being completely successful on its motion.

The self-represented plaintiff responded by focusing on the merits of the underlying claim rather than the costs issue.

The court held that the defendant was entitled to costs under Rule 57 and found the submitted bill of costs reasonable.

Two applicants sought judicial review of municipal by-laws implementing a volume-based solid waste user fee and associated rebate program introduced by the City of Toronto.

The applicants argued that the waste collection charge was in substance an unlawful tax affecting provincial tax ratio rules and that the rebate constituted an impermissible redistribution of property taxes contrary to the City of Toronto Act, 2006.

The court held that the waste charge was a valid user fee because a sufficient nexus existed between the amount collected and the cost of providing waste services.

The court further held that the rebate was properly characterized as a municipal grant authorized under s. 83 of the City of Toronto Act, 2006 rather than a tax rebate.

The applications to quash the relevant by-law provisions were dismissed.

The defendant brought a motion under Rule 21.01 to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and as an abuse of process.

The self‑represented plaintiff alleged professional negligence against a counselling services provider whose counsellor had allegedly advised his partner in a manner that ended their relationship.

The court held that neither the counsellor nor the employer owed a duty of care to the plaintiff, applying the principles articulated in Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd. and Syl Apps Secure Treatment Centre v. B.D. The court further found that the substance of the claim alleged interference with a familial relationship, a tort not recognized in Canada.

The statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

The defendants brought a motion in Toronto for leave to appeal an interlocutory order made in Milton (Central West Region).

The court raised a preliminary issue regarding whether the motion was properly returnable in Toronto.

After reviewing the Courts of Justice Act and the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court determined that a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court must be filed and heard in the region where the appeal is to be heard, which in this case was the Central West Region.

The court ordered the motion transferred to the Central West Region.

The appellants sought leave to appeal costs awards.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the costs awards.

The court allowed the cross-appeal in respect of the motion to re-open the argued costs award, reducing it from $7,500 to $1,500.

The cross-appeal was otherwise dismissed, with costs of the cross-appeal fixed at $3,500 awarded to the respondents.