Court of Justice

The appellant appealed her conviction for failing to stop for an amber light contrary to s. 144(15) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The central issue was whether the Justice of the Peace erred in refusing an adjournment and proceeding with trial where the appellant received disclosure on the trial date.

The appellant had delayed requesting disclosure until five weeks before trial, despite receiving clear instructions in the Notice of Trial and online guide.

The court held down the matter twice on the trial date to allow the appellant to review the disclosure, including officer's notes and in-car camera video.

The appellant agreed to proceed with trial after reviewing the materials.

The court found no error in proceeding and dismissed the appeal.

The accused, a 28-year-old Indigenous Canadian man with a history of substance abuse disorder and intergenerational trauma, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault and breach of probation.

In August 2018, while intoxicated and without provocation, he stabbed his cousin repeatedly in the face and back with a large knife.

The court imposed a joint submission sentence of 40 months imprisonment less pre-sentence custody, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA order.

The court acknowledged Gladue factors and the accused's background while emphasizing the need for specific deterrence and public protection given his violent history and repeated breaches of court orders.

The appellant appealed his conviction for disobeying a stop sign contrary to section 136(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant claimed he had stopped one to two metres behind the stop line, but the trial Justice of the Peace found, based on officer testimony and in-car camera video evidence, that the appellant had only slowed but did not come to a full stop at the marked line.

The appellate court found the findings of fact were reasonable and supported by the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of sections 8 and 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, seeking exclusion of evidential breath sampling results.

The defendant argued that the arresting officer lacked subjective grounds to believe the defendant was impaired by alcohol, and alternatively, that there were no objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest and evidential breath demand.

The court found that the officer had both subjective and objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest based on the defendant's dangerous driving, poor judgment, incoherent speech, bloodshot eyes, strong odour of alcohol, wet pants, and an open beer can in the vehicle.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with driving with an excess blood alcohol concentration under the Criminal Code.

The defendant brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

The defendant challenged the legality of the roadside screening procedure, the pat-down search conducted prior to the screening, the delay in administering the screening, and the delay in providing rights to counsel.

The court conducted a blended voir-dire and ruled on the Charter application.

The court found no violations of the defendant's Charter rights and dismissed the application for exclusion of the evidential breath testing results.

The accused was charged with drug trafficking offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act arising from the execution of a search warrant at his residence.

The accused brought a Garofoli application challenging the validity of the search warrant, alleging that the information to obtain (ITO) was deficient in reasonable grounds and violated his Charter s. 8 rights against unreasonable search and seizure.

The court granted leave to cross-examine the affiant and found that multiple passages in the ITO were materially misleading, including misrepresentations regarding outstanding charges, the alleged discarding of heroin upon arrest, and the inference that the accused walked to the drug transaction from his home.

After excising these passages, the court found that no reasonable grounds remained to support the issuance of the warrant.

The evidence was excluded pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the accused ultimately pleaded guilty to a lesser charge.

The accused pleaded guilty to trafficking cocaine and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

Over a three-year period, the accused developed a serious cocaine addiction that led him to sell cocaine to an undercover officer on four separate occasions, totalling approximately 30 grams, with additional cocaine found in his residence.

The accused successfully completed a residential addictions treatment program prior to sentencing and demonstrated genuine rehabilitation.

The court imposed a sentence of 90 days incarceration to be served intermittently, along with one year of probation, finding that while incarceration was necessary, the accused's exceptional rehabilitative efforts and demonstrated sobriety warranted a departure from the standard sentencing range for cocaine trafficking.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 milliliters of blood contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown sought to rely on breath sample analysis results.

The defendant challenged the positioning of the police cruiser, the placement of the defendant in the police vehicle for testing, and the adequacy of the right to counsel.

The court found no Charter violations regarding the cruiser positioning or placement in the vehicle.

However, the court found that the Crown failed to produce the required certificate from an analyst attesting to the accuracy of the alcohol standard solution used to calibrate the breathalyzer device.

Without this certificate, the court could not rely on the breath sample readings and entered an acquittal.

The defendant applied for a declaration that section 60.1 of the Provincial Offences Act (victim fine surcharge) was unconstitutional, alleging violations of sections 7 and 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The defendant had been convicted of operating a motor vehicle without insurance, a second conviction within six months.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the surcharge is administratively imposed rather than court-imposed punishment, and therefore does not engage section 12.

The court further found that even if the surcharge constituted punishment, it would not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and that there was no violation of section 7 security of the person interests.

The accused was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, trafficking in cocaine, and possession of property obtained by crime following a five-day trial.

The Crown sought a three-year penitentiary sentence with ancillary orders including a s. 109 firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture.

The defence sought 15-18 months jail with pre-trial custody credit.

The court imposed a 20-month custodial sentence concurrent on all charges, with 16 days pre-trial custody credit.

The court granted a s. 109 order for life, a DNA order, and a forfeiture order for all seized property including a BlackBerry device.

A 12-month probation term was imposed following release from custody.

A sexual assault trial involving allegations of non-consensual sexual activity.

The Crown alleged that the accused engaged in sexual intercourse without the complainant's subjective consent.

The case hinged on whether the complainant consented to the sexual activity and, alternatively, whether the accused held an honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The trial was divided into three phases: consensual foreplay on a couch, bedroom intercourse, and a second act of intercourse.

The court found reasonable doubt regarding the complainant's lack of subjective consent and dismissed the charge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault contrary to section 271 of the Criminal Code for allegedly touching the complainant's breasts without consent in a hospital room.

The complainant testified that she was given alcohol that caused her to become disoriented, and she did not consent to the sexual contact.

The accused testified that the sexual contact was consensual.

The court found significant credibility and reliability issues with the complainant's evidence, particularly regarding the effects of the alcohol consumed, the presence of a nurse who allegedly intervened, and inconsistencies with objective evidence from nursing and security staff.

The court found that the accused's evidence, while not fully accepted, raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the Crown had proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted.

The accused pleaded guilty to one breach of a recognizance and one breach of probation.

The breaches involved violating court orders to stay away from the victim, Monique Fortin, whom he had previously assaulted on two separate occasions.

The court imposed a six-month conditional sentence followed by two years' probation, along with a section 109 weapons prohibition order for 10 years and a DNA order.

The sentence balanced the serious aggravating factors, including multiple breaches and a pattern of domestic violence, against mitigating factors such as the guilty plea, recent rehabilitation efforts, and stable employment.

The accused was charged with impaired care or control.

The Crown's case relied on blood test results obtained at a hospital without the accused's consent.

The defence sought to exclude the blood results based on alleged Charter breaches, including unlawful detention, delayed right to counsel, and failure to facilitate the accused's request to contact counsel.

The court found that while the initial order to exit the vehicle was lawful under the Waterfield test (justified to protect life), there were Charter breaches regarding the right to counsel.

The court excluded the blood evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests was significant, particularly given the accused's vulnerability and explicit request for counsel that was not facilitated.

The defendant was charged with depositing snow or ice on a highway contrary to City of Greater Sudbury By-law 2011-219, Road Fouling By-law, section 8(1), with an offence date of November 21, 2018.

The prosecution failed to prove the municipal by-law creating the offence charged, as it tendered only an uncertified photocopy of a by-law dated seven years prior without establishing that it had not been amended or repealed.

Additionally, on the merits, the defendant established a due diligence defence.

The defendant was found not guilty.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while having an excessive amount of alcohol in his blood following a single-vehicle accident near Simcoe, Ontario.

The accused alleged that police violated his section 8 Charter rights by videotaping him using toilet facilities while in police custody without providing adequate privacy protections.

The court found that the accused's Charter rights were breached on two occasions when he used the toilet at the police station.

Although the police had a policy of providing privacy gowns to detainees, the implementation of this policy was inadequate.

The court applied the Grant test and determined that the seriousness of the breach and its impact on the accused's privacy and dignity outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The breath sample analysis results were excluded as evidence, and the charge was dismissed.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order for the appointment of an assessor and costs of the assessment pursuant to section 30 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The parties are parents of a nine-year-old child with diagnosed ADHD and Adjustment Disorder.

The applicant argued that a section 30 assessment was necessary because the prior Office of the Children's Lawyer report did not include direct communication with the child's psychiatrist.

The respondent opposed the motion, arguing that the OCL report was comprehensive and that subjecting the child to another assessment would not be in the child's best interests.

The court denied the motion, finding that the OCL report adequately addressed the child's clinical needs and that the applicant's true objective appeared to be obtaining a report favourable to her position.