Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCJ

The defendant was convicted of assaulting his intimate partner following a domestic dispute.

The assault occurred in the family home after the defendant took the victim's vehicle keys and purse, leaving their children in the van.

The defendant chased the victim around the kitchen island, swung at her with a closed fist, attempted to kick her, and then lunged and grabbed her.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with three years probation, finding that while the defendant had no criminal record and demonstrated remorse through counselling, the serious nature of intimate partner violence, the context of coercive control, and the presence of children required a conviction to reflect denunciation and deterrence principles.

Omari Rodney was convicted of possession of a loaded 9mm handgun, cocaine, and methamphetamine.

He absconded after conviction but before sentencing.

The court proceeded with sentencing, considering aggravating factors such as the nature of the firearm, its defaced serial number, the combination of gun and drugs, the accused's prior weapons and violence history, and the public safety risk.

Mitigating factors included pre-sentence custody conditions and family support, though his rehabilitative prospects were deemed minimal due to absconding and lack of insight.

The court applied the totality principle and sentenced Mr. Rodney to a net term of 5 years and 2 months in jail, along with a lifetime weapons prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of cash and firearm.

The accused, Bill Thanis, was charged with three counts of uttering threats to cause death and one count of criminal harassment, arising from his interactions with Tax Court of Canada and Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) employees.

The court found that the alleged threats, including statements about a "killing spree" and "shooting people in the streets," did not objectively constitute a threat or were not directed at an "ascertainable group" as required by law.

The criminal harassment charge failed because the alleged threatening conduct was not proven to be a threat, and there was no evidence the complainant felt "harassed" in the legal sense.

The accused was found not guilty on all counts.

The applicant, G.H., sought to re-elect his mode of trial from the Ontario Court of Justice to the Superior Court of Justice with a judge and jury, asserting a right to do so under s. 561(2) of the Criminal Code, or alternatively, requesting a transfer under s. 555(1).

The Crown opposed, arguing the trial had already commenced for the purposes of s. 561(2) due to substantive pre-trial applications (s. 278.4 and s. 714.2 hearings).

The court dismissed the application, finding that the trial had commenced with the substantive pre-trial applications, thus G.H. no longer had a right to re-elect without Crown consent.

The court also declined to exercise its discretionary power under s. 555(1), finding no sufficient basis to disrupt proceedings, despite the applicant's concerns about COVID-19 and judicial re-assignment.

The defendant was charged with assault causing bodily harm against his estranged wife.

The defendant admitted striking his wife three to four times in the face, causing significant injuries including two black eyes and broken nasal bones.

The defendant raised a self-defence claim under Criminal Code section 34, arguing he acted to protect his three-year-old son from imminent harm.

The Crown conceded there was an air of reality to the defence.

The court found that the defendant subjectively believed his son's safety was at risk and that this belief was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including the complainant's prior threat of self-harm, her volatile behavior that evening, and her deliberate destruction of his clothing.

The court concluded the force used was reasonable in the circumstances and acquitted the defendant.

The defendant sought to introduce evidence of non-consensual prior sexual activity with the complainant, his aunt, to explain the nature of their relationship, his behaviour during the alleged incident, and his mental state at the time of the alleged sexual assault.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine whether the other sexual activity (OSA) evidence met the requirements of section 276 of the Criminal Code.

The defendant claimed the complainant had sexually assaulted him over a two to three-year period when he was a youth.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence sufficiently particularized, relevant to issues at trial, and having significant probative value that was not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997: wilfully failing to inform the Board of a material change in circumstances and knowingly making a false or misleading statement in connection with a benefits claim.

The trial proceeded over multiple dates spanning from October 2016 to February 2019.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the total delay exceeded the presumptive ceiling of 18 months, certain delays were attributable to defence conduct and waiver, and an exceptional circumstance existed in the form of a discrete event (a pending Ontario Court of Appeal decision on a related matter involving the interpretation of the mens rea element of the offence).

After accounting for these factors, the remaining delay still exceeded the ceiling, and the court granted a stay of proceedings.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings based on an alleged violation of their right to be tried without unreasonable delay under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was approximately 16.5 months, just below the 18-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

The court found that the accused demonstrated meaningful and sustained efforts to expedite proceedings, that no delay was attributable to the defence, and that the Crown failed to provide timely disclosure.

The court determined that approximately six months of added delay resulted from the Crown's failure to disclose materials that could have been provided within 90-120 days of arrest.

The court granted the stay of all charges.

The accused was charged with trafficking cocaine, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of property obtained by crime over $5,000.

The trial judge addressed multiple pre-trial motions including a ruling on whether the judge was the trial judge, a recusal motion, a change of venue motion, and a motion to stay proceedings for delay under the Charter.

The judge ruled that he would continue as the trial judge, rejected the argument that he should recuse himself or transfer the case on his own motion, and scheduled the remaining motions for argument on the trial date.

The judge also addressed concerns about successive applications for prerogative relief potentially delaying the trial indefinitely.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving after being stopped for speeding.

The Crown relied on blood alcohol test results showing readings of 96 and 95 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood, taken approximately three hours after the defendant was stopped.

A toxicologist provided expert evidence that the defendant's blood alcohol level at the time of driving exceeded 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The defendant challenged the toxicologist's assumptions regarding elimination rates, plateau periods, breath-to-blood conversion ratios, and other factors.

The court found that while the defence raised hypothetical scenarios that could theoretically affect the calculations, there was insufficient case-specific evidence to create a reasonable doubt about the Crown's case.

The defendant was found guilty.

The accused was charged with sexual exploitation of a young person under Criminal Code section 153(1)(a).

The Crown alleged that the accused, who was in a position of trust or authority, touched the complainant's private parts for a sexual purpose.

The complainant was 16 years old at the time and living in the accused's home as a condition of bail.

The trial judge found that while the complainant's evidence contained material inconsistencies and credibility issues, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred.

Additionally, the court found that the Crown did not establish that the accused was in a position of trust or authority over the complainant.

The accused was acquitted.

The defendant was charged with three counts of assault and one count of assault with a weapon against his domestic partner.

The Crown's case rested primarily on the testimony of the complainant, who alleged multiple incidents of domestic violence including a serious assault in June 2016 where the defendant allegedly choked her.

The defendant provided alternative accounts of the incidents.

The court found the complainant to be articulate and intelligent but noted significant inconsistencies in her statements to police, medical staff, and at trial.

The defendant's evidence, while not entirely credible, was not sufficiently rejected to meet the criminal burden of proof.

The court acquitted the defendant on all counts, finding reasonable doubt existed on each allegation.

The accused, a paternal grandfather, was charged with manslaughter in the death of a 13-month-old child in his care.

The child suffered a fatal traumatic brain injury while under the accused's supervision.

The Crown alleged the accused violently shook the child and impacted the child's head against a hard surface.

The defence contended the child's injuries resulted from an accidental collision with a large family dog.

The court found the accused guilty of manslaughter, rejecting the defence theory as internally inconsistent, medically implausible, and unsupported by credible evidence.

The court determined the accused assaulted the child through violent shaking, which constituted the unlawful act causing death.

The defendant was tried on two counts: sexual assault and sexual interference with a person under the age of 16 years, alleged to have occurred on May 23, 2016.

The defendant, the step-grandfather of the complainant, was accused of inappropriately touching the complainant on her breast and thigh while she sat on a couch in his living room.

The Crown presented evidence through a video-recorded statement by the complainant and testimony from the complainant and her mother.

The defendant testified that he did not commit the alleged acts and provided an alternative account of events.

The court found that while the complainant appeared truthful, her account left too much room for ambiguity and misunderstanding, and that the Crown had not met its burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charges were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with over 80, having care or control of a motor vehicle contrary to s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defence brought a Charter application challenging whether the investigating officer had reasonable suspicion to make an approved screening device (ASD) demand and whether there was an unreasonable delay in obtaining breath samples.

The defence conceded reasonable suspicion existed based on the odour of alcohol.

The primary issue was whether a 13-minute delay while the officer waited for a tow truck to impound the vehicle violated the "as soon as practicable" requirement under s. 254(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court found the delay was reasonable under the circumstances and dismissed the Charter application.

The Ministry of Labour appealed a sentence imposed on Ontario Power Generation following a guilty plea to one count under the Occupational Health and Safety Act.

The Crown sought to challenge an interlocutory Charter ruling made at trial that had excluded evidence of worker injury as an aggravating factor on sentence.

The central issue was whether a Crown sentence appeal could be used to overturn an interlocutory ruling made during the conviction phase, particularly where the Crown had participated in the guilty plea.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Crown had a reasonable alternative available—refusing to participate in the plea and calling no evidence to preserve the right to appeal—and that allowing the appeal would create procedural unfairness and inconsistent verdicts.

The accused was charged with arson for deliberately setting fires at his family home on December 25, 2014, and with breaching a probation order.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence including the accused's bizarre destructive behavior earlier that morning, his presence in the vicinity of the home shortly before the fire was discovered, his possession of a lighter, and the absence of signs of forced entry.

The defense argued that the circumstantial evidence could not exclude the reasonable possibility that an intruder had set the fires.

The court found that the accused's pattern of destructive conduct throughout the day, combined with the unlikelihood of a random arsonist targeting the home on Christmas Day, established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt on both counts.

The accused was charged with four counts of sexual assault and four counts of sexual interference involving his grandchildren between 2010 and 2011, as well as historical charges of gross indecency and indecent assault between 1975 and 1979.

The Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence on a count-to-count basis and evidence of a prior conviction in 2000 involving sexual assault and possession of child pornography.

The trial judge conducted a ruling on the admissibility of similar fact evidence under the framework established in R. v. Handy.

The court dismissed the Crown's application to admit the similar fact evidence, finding insufficient connectedness between the various allegations and significant concerns regarding collusion, tainting, and credibility of the witnesses.

The accused was charged with care and control of a motor vehicle while impaired and care and control of a motor vehicle with blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg/100 mL.

The trial focused on the identity of the driver and whether the evidence proved care and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown's case relied on a McDonald's employee's observations, the arresting officer's testimony, and Breathalyzer results.

The defence called the accused's brother and cousin who testified regarding the evening's events.

The court found the accused guilty of care and control over 80 but acquitted on the impaired charge and found insufficient evidence regarding the McDonald's incident.

The accused was sentenced to the minimum fine of $1,000 plus a $150 surcharge and a 12-month driving prohibition.

The accused was charged with assaulting a police officer engaged in the execution of his duty, assaulting three police officers with intent to resist lawful arrest, and causing a disturbance by being drunk in a public place.

The incident occurred outside a bar in Port Elgin after the accused approached police who were processing the arrest of his intoxicated co-worker.

The accused refused police requests to step back and was pushed by Sergeant Evans.

The accused then responded by pushing the officer away.

A physical altercation ensued, during which the accused resisted arrest and was tasered.

The court found the accused guilty of assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, and causing a disturbance, but acquitted him of assaulting three officers with intent to resist arrest.