Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The appellant purchaser appealed a summary judgment decision finding he unjustifiably repudiated an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property.

The purchaser argued the vendors failed to provide a survey complying with the agreement, rendering it null and void.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the survey was not essential to the transaction or the purchaser's ability to close, and dismissed the appeal.

Following the release of the appeal judgment, the parties requested on consent to amend the partial indemnity costs of the applications below.

The Court of Appeal allowed the amendment, reducing the costs awarded to the appellants for the proceedings below from $93,000 to $55,000, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard an appeal regarding the calculation of the 10% levy payable to the Class Proceedings Fund under O. Reg. 771/92 of the Law Society Act.

The appellant, Her Majesty the Queen in right of Ontario, argued the levy should apply only to settlement funds actually received by class members.

The respondent, Christopher Welsh, contended it should apply to the total settlement funds available.

The Court dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's interpretation that the levy applies to the amount of settlement funds to which class members were "entitled," regardless of whether they claimed their entitlement.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment order dismissing her claims against TD Canada Trust and Dan Arcand.

The appellant failed to demonstrate any error in the motion judge's conclusion that TD Canada Trust was entitled to terminate its banking relationship with the appellant.

The appellant also failed to point to any evidence sustaining her other claims for defamation and unjust enrichment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment and dismissed both the motion for leave to appeal and the appeal itself, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his motion for leave to proceed with a motion to change a 2010 child support order and to reduce a 2012 security for costs order.

The motion judge had dismissed both requests without adequate explanation.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge's reasons were insufficient for meaningful appellate review.

The court determined that the appellant had established a prima facie case of change in circumstances warranting review of the child support order, including significant income reduction and bankruptcy.

The court allowed the appeal, granted leave to proceed with the motion to reduce security for costs, and reduced the security requirement from $59,500 to $10,000, enabling the appellant to pursue his motion to change the child support order.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision that enforced an oral agreement of purchase and sale for the sale of his property to the respondents for $750,000 (after a $100,000 gift to his daughter).

The motion judge had found that the parties agreed to extend the closing date beyond August 31, 2016.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge made a palpable and overriding error in making a factual determination regarding whether the parties had agreed to extend the closing date.

The court held that this crucial factual question, which turned on credibility assessments and competing versions of events, could not be properly resolved on summary judgment and required a trial.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict awarding approximately $186,000 in damages for a motor vehicle accident, significantly less than their claim of over $10 million and the respondent's pre-trial settlement offer of $500,000.

The appellants argued that the jury improperly assessed the plaintiff's credibility through evidence of his criminal record and unlawful conduct, and that the jury was misled on the test for causation and the standard of proof for future damages.

The Court of Appeal rejected all arguments, finding that the trial judge properly exercised her gatekeeping function, correctly charged the jury on credibility and causation, and that the jury's verdict was reasonable.

The appellants recovered nothing after costs were set off.

The appellant, Solstice Two Limited, appealed a decision granting relief from forfeiture to the respondent, Valeria Scicluna, who had advanced $293,685 toward the purchase of a condominium but failed to close due to job loss.

The application judge awarded the recovered funds to the bankruptcy trustee rather than to Scicluna.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, upholding the relief from forfeiture as appropriate given the grossly disproportionate nature of the forfeiture and confirming that the funds properly vest in the bankruptcy trustee under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a summary judgment order that declared certain joint accounts passed by right of survivorship to the responding party.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the delay was short, the moving party's explanation for the delay was troubling given his recent experience as appellate counsel.

Furthermore, the proposed appeal lacked merit, as the motion judge made no palpable and overriding errors in finding overwhelming evidence that the testator intended the joint accounts to pass to the responding party.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision.

The Court of Appeal found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the respondent employer was entitled to direct the appellant to take his vacation during the notice period.

The employer's vacation policy was ambiguous, meaning the issue could not be resolved on summary judgment before discoveries.

The appeal was allowed and the summary judgment was set aside.

The appellant sought an adjournment of his appeal after failing to comply with a previous order requiring him to bring a motion for an adjournment by a specified date.

The Court of Appeal granted the adjournment to ensure fairness, as the appellant was in the process of retaining counsel.

The adjournment was granted on strict conditions, including the payment of $8,673.39 in costs by a specified date, failing which the respondent could move to dismiss the appeal.

The appellants appealed an order declaring that they had repudiated Minutes of Settlement and lifting a stay in bankruptcy proceedings to allow the respondent's action to continue.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in making the declaration of repudiation because the relief was sought by motion rather than by originating process.

However, the Court upheld the order lifting the stay, finding that the motion judge correctly concluded there had been repudiation in the context of the motion to lift the stay.

The appeal was allowed in part to quash the declaration, but dismissed regarding the lifting of the stay.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding that a contract existed between the two individuals, C. Brar and S. Brar.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was evidence to support the trial judge's conclusion.

The respondent cross-appealed regarding a fraudulent conveyance.

The Court of Appeal allowed the cross-appeal, declaring the transfer of assets from the numbered company to SKLF Doors to be a fraudulent conveyance, as agreed by counsel for S. Brar and the numbered company.

Costs of $7,500 were awarded to the respondent.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside a decision of the Chief Justice, which had refused to set aside the Registrar's order dismissing his appeal.

The moving party claimed medical difficulties prevented him from perfecting the appeal over three years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the medical evidence did not support his contention of being medically unable to perfect the appeal.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment under the Partition Act, arguing the trial judge erred in several factual findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge gave cogent reasons for her factual findings based on the written agreement, approved financial statements, and accountants' evidence.

The court found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings.

The Crown appealed a decision granting the respondents lawful ownership of an island by way of adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's weighing of affidavit evidence or his conclusion that the respondents met the three-pronged test for possessory title.

The Court upheld the finding that the land was not vacant or wasteland, rendering section 16 of the Limitations Act inapplicable.

The respondent in an appeal brought a motion to quash the portion of the appeal relating to a refusal to order the production of documents, and for an order requiring the appellant to post security for costs.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding the production order was interlocutory and required leave to appeal to the Divisional Court.

However, the Court dismissed the motion for security for costs, holding that such an order cannot be made against a defendant/appellant who was forced into court by the plaintiff.

Costs of the motion were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of an action commenced approximately 25 years after the events in question.

The trial judge had dismissed the action as statute-barred by the Limitations Act and under the equitable doctrine of laches, noting that key documents were lost, parties dissolved, and witnesses deceased.

The Court of Appeal found no error of fact or law, concluding that the respondent had been substantially prejudiced by the passage of time, and dismissed the appeal with costs.

The appellants appealed a costs order, arguing that their Rule 49 offer should have attracted cost consequences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion.

The trial judge correctly held that the offer lacked clarity, particularly regarding multiple claimants and the absence of reference to the Family Law Act claimant.

The Court affirmed the policy that Rule 49 offers must be crystal clear to be effective.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision dismissing her claims for malicious prosecution and defamation against the police services board and several officers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motions judge's finding that the claims were not properly pleaded until 2002 and were therefore statute-barred under the applicable limitation periods, including the Public Authorities Protection Act.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.