OCA 2008

The appellant appealed the judgment of the motion judge.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, agreed with the motion judge's reasons, and dismissed the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal.

His counsel had been removed from the record, he had left the country, and there was an outstanding warrant for his arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis in the amount of $20,335.62.

The respondent campground owner challenged the inclusion of third-party owned, seasonally-used trailers in its property tax assessment.

The application judge held that the trailers did not form part of the 'current value' of the land because they were not part of the fee simple.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the term 'fee simple' in the definition of 'current value' does not limit assessment to interests owned by the freehold owner, and that the trailers were properly assessed as land.

The court also dismissed the cross-appeal, finding the tax was direct and constitutionally valid.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge misapprehended evidence regarding his continued abuse of a victim after being released from jail for a similar offence.

The appellant also argued the judge failed to give proper weight to an expert report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that even if the sentencing judge erred as alleged, the overall sentence imposed was fit.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against the Crown for failing to comply with the notice requirement in s. 7(1) of the Proceedings Against the Crown Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that notice under s. 7(1) must be in writing.

The court also declined to interfere with the motion judge's $1000 costs order.

The appellant appealed from a disposition of the Ontario Review Board holding that he continued to pose a significant threat to the safety of the public and ordering his detention in a medium secure unit.

The appellant argued the Board erred by not ordering a further review within six months and by keeping him in a medium secure unit despite his progress.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the treating psychiatrist did not definitively recommend a six-month review and the Board's decision to maintain medium security was reasonable given ongoing concerns about elopement and potential reoffending.

The appellant appealed an order regarding compensation in a class action.

The appeal was resolved on consent, with the appellant abandoning his claim for compensation in excess of $95,000.

Class counsel consented to a payment of $95,000 to the appellant on a quantum meruit basis, to be paid from funds set aside for class counsel and appellant compensation.

The appellant appealed a family law order, focusing primarily on the retroactive child support component and the imputation of income.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on entitlement and imputed income, but reduced the retroactive support amount by $5,658 based on the respondent's concession of a calculation error.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, and the respondent was awarded $5,000 in costs.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judge's spousal support order following a 19-year marriage.

The trial judge had ordered time-limited support with a review order and refused to make support retroactive.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in imposing a review order, refusing retroactive support, and in determining the quantum and duration of support.

The Court increased the support amount and duration, applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines as a cross-check, and set aside the review order.

The appellant was severely injured while exercising a horse at a racetrack.

His worker's compensation claim was denied because the trainer who hired him failed to maintain coverage as required by the Rules of Thoroughbred Racing.

The appellant sued the trainer, the Ontario Racing Commission, and the racetrack owner for negligence.

The trial judge found only the trainer liable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed that neither the Commission nor the racetrack owner owed a private law duty of care to the appellant to ensure compliance with the rules, as their statutory mandates were to serve the public interest rather than private individuals.

The appellant father appealed an Ontario Superior Court order requiring the return of his 14-year-old son to Canada from Oklahoma.

The child had been living in Oklahoma with the father, and U.S. courts had previously refused the respondent mother's Hague Convention petition for the child's return, citing the child's mature objection to returning to Canada under Article 13(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Ontario courts should decline jurisdiction in favour of the Oklahoma courts based on principles of comity and deference to the U.S. courts' reasonable interpretation of the Hague Convention.

The appellant appealed an order striking out portions of its statement of claim against two defendants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the amended statement of claim lacked sufficient facts to support the bald allegation of negligent misrepresentation.

The appellant appealed an order staying its Ontario proceedings on the basis of forum non conveniens.

The appellant argued the motion judge failed to apply the 'clearly establish' test from Amchem and improperly allowed the avoidance of multiple proceedings to trump other Muscutt factors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the heavy burden test and comprehensively weighed all relevant factors in determining that New York was the more appropriate forum.

The Toronto Police Association (TPA) Board passed a resolution dissolving the Legal Assistance Plan Board and assuming its duties.

The respondents, members of the Plan Board, successfully applied for a declaration that the resolution was ultra vires.

The TPA appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the regulation creating the Plan Board had the legal status of a by-law, and under the TPA's letters patent and section 129 of the Corporations Act, the TPA Board could not amend it without member approval.

The appeal was dismissed regarding the resolution's invalidity, but allowed in part to strike an overly broad mandatory order restraining the TPA Board from using the Plan Board's files for any purpose.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of two actions brought against the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario and various doctors performing review functions.

The motion judge had dismissed the actions based on the confidentiality and immunity from suit provisions in the Regulated Health Professions Act, as well as the doctrine of res judicata.

The Court of Appeal found no merit in the appeal, upheld the motion judge's analysis, and dismissed the appeal with costs fixed at $5,000.

The appellant sued her former employer for wrongful dismissal arising from a 2001 transfer of the business.

After the limitation period expired, she sought to amend her statement of claim to allege constructive dismissal based on a significant salary reduction in 1999.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that under Rule 26.01, the expiry of a limitation period creates a presumption of prejudice to the responding party.

The moving party must rebut this presumption by demonstrating special circumstances.

Because the proposed amendment advanced a fundamentally different and unrelated claim, and no special circumstances were shown, the amendment was properly denied.

The appellant obstetrician prescribed the fertility drug Clomid to the respondent mother, who subsequently gave birth prematurely to twin girls with severe disabilities.

The jury found the appellant negligent for failing to properly inform the mother of the risks of twinning and premature birth associated with Clomid, and that she would not have taken the drug if properly informed.

The trial judge held that the twins had a valid cause of action against the appellant and that the parents could recover future care costs for the twins beyond the age of 18.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the jury's verdict on causation and the parents' entitlement to future care costs.

However, the Court allowed the appeal regarding the twins' claims, holding that the appellant owed no duty of care to the unborn children when prescribing a fertility drug to the mother, as his duty was solely to provide the mother with sufficient information to make an informed choice.

The appellant pleaded guilty to carrying a weapon, unlawful confinement, and assault against his former girlfriend.

He was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment and two years' probation.

He appealed the sentence, arguing he should have been permitted to serve it in the community.

The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in assigning sole responsibility for delay to the appellant and in treating his initial minimization of the offence as an aggravating factor, the refusal of a conditional sentence was ultimately correct given the planned nature of the offence, the use of a weapon, and the significant psychological harm to the victim.

The appeal was dismissed.