Michael D. Wright

Following certification of a securities class action, the court determined the appropriate costs award arising from the leave and certification motions.

The moving parties sought more than $1.18 million in fees and disbursements on a partial indemnity basis.

The court emphasized the need for transparency, proportionality, and historical benchmarking when assessing certification-motion costs under Rule 57.01(1).

After adjusting excessive hourly rates and disbursements, and considering historical averages for comparable certification motions, the court fixed costs at $467,234 payable forthwith, with an additional $100,000 in disbursements payable in the cause.

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act to bring an action against Manulife Financial Corporation and its former executives.

The plaintiffs alleged that the defendants misrepresented the adequacy of Manulife's risk management practices and failed to disclose its massive unhedged exposure to equity market risk prior to the 2008 financial crisis.

The court granted leave, finding a reasonable possibility of success at trial, and certified the action as a class proceeding, certifying seven common issues.

The plaintiffs in a proposed class action for secondary market misrepresentation sought leave to appeal a decision quashing their summonses to two Manulife employees and refusing to compel the defendants to file affidavits on the upcoming leave motion under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which followed established jurisprudence that defendants are not required to deliver affidavits or be subjected to cross-examination if they do not intend to lead evidence on the leave motion.

Employees brought a motion for default judgment in wrongful dismissal actions after the defendants’ statements of defence were struck and the defendants were noted in default.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants operated as common employers and were jointly and severally liable following the discontinuation of the business and termination of employees without adequate notice or severance.

Affidavit evidence detailed employment history, mitigation efforts, and damages.

Although the court rejected the proposed formula of one month’s pay per year of service and questioned the appropriateness of a fixed 24‑month cap, it held that the damages claimed were reasonable in the circumstances.

Default judgment was granted against two corporate defendants for the amounts claimed with pre‑judgment interest and costs.

The appellant, Hydro One Inc., appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Financial Services Tribunal order for a partial wind-up of its pension plan under s. 69(1)(d) of the Pension Benefits Act.

Following a corporate merger, the employment of 73 Management Compensation Plan (MCP) employees was terminated.

The Tribunal used a 'subset analysis' to determine that a 'significant number' of plan members had been terminated, comparing the number of terminated MCP employees to the total number of active MCP plan members.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 69(1)(d) permits a subset analysis in appropriate circumstances and that the Tribunal's application of this analysis was reasonable given that the merger intentionally targeted senior employees nearing retirement.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Ontario Human Rights Commission to not deal with her complaint against the University of Windsor.

The applicant alleged that the university's policy of keeping her failed first-year marks on her transcript was discriminatory.

The Commission dismissed the complaint because it was filed beyond the six-month limitation period and the delay was not incurred in good faith.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission's decision reasonable and holding that the ongoing presence of the marks on the transcript constituted continuing effects of a past act, not a continuing contravention of the Code.

The plaintiff attended a mandatory training program to become a licensed sales representative for the defendant.

After completing the program, she signed a contract containing an arbitration clause.

She later brought a proposed class action claiming the defendant failed to pay minimum wage during the training period under the Employment Standards Act.

The defendant moved to stay the action under s. 7(1) of the Arbitration Act, 1991.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's dismissal of the stay, finding that the arbitration clause applied only to disputes arising from the relationship created by the contract, not the pre-contractual training relationship.

On a motion to quash an appeal, the moving party argued that a refusal to stay a class proceeding under the Arbitration Act, 1991 was unappealable under s. 7(6) and, in any event, interlocutory.

The court held that where the motions judge determined the arbitration agreement did not govern the dispute, the matter fell outside s. 7 and the statutory appeal bar did not apply.

The court further held that an order refusing a stay pending arbitration was final because it conclusively determined the forum and deprived the responding party of the substantive right to resolve the dispute by negotiation and arbitration.

The motion to quash was dismissed with costs.