Mark Ertel

The applicant, charged with sexual assault and extortion, brought a s. 11(b) Charter application seeking a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

However, the court deducted 73 days of defence delay attributed to the late notice of the s. 11(b) application, bringing the net delay below the ceiling.

The court rejected the Crown's arguments that a conflict in the Crown's office and a change in the assigned trial judge constituted exceptional circumstances.

The application was dismissed.

The offender, a high-ranking civilian member of the RCMP, was convicted of communicating special operational information to targets of international investigations, breach of trust, and unauthorized use of a computer.

The Crown sought 22 to 25 years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a sentence of time served (seven years).

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's extreme breach of trust and the potential risk to undercover operations, but also considered his historically good character and harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court imposed a total sentence of 14 years' imprisonment, reduced by 2400 days of pre-trial custody credit, leaving 7 years and 155 days to serve.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the arresting officer's grounds for arrest and observations of the appellant's driving.

The Superior Court of Justice reviewed the trial judge's assessment of the evidence, including the officer's testimony about tire tracks, the appellant's belligerent behaviour, and information from civilian callers.

The court found that the trial judge did not misapprehend the evidence and properly resolved inconsistencies in the testimony.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, a former high-ranking civilian member of the RCMP charged with serious national security offences under the Security of Information Act, sought a bail review after spending over three years in pre-trial custody.

Following the dismissal of four of the ten charges against him, the court found a material change in circumstances.

The court concluded that the applicant met his onus on the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds, noting that the passage of time and strict proposed conditions mitigated the risks of flight, reoffending, and loss of public confidence.

The application was granted, and the applicant was released on strict conditions including house arrest and GPS monitoring.

The person sought in an extradition proceeding brought an application for disclosure of records from the Requesting State (United States), including police interviews and polygraph test results, to support a potential abuse of process claim.

He alleged that he had cooperated with US authorities and passed a polygraph test, which was not mentioned in the Record of the Case.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the person sought failed to meet the first stage of the Larosa test because his affidavit did not provide an evidentiary foundation for an agreement or deal with US authorities that would support a stay for abuse of process.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the trial judge erred in finding the breath samples were taken 'as soon as practicable' and improperly took judicial notice of police procedures regarding meetings between arresting officers and breathalyzer technicians.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge correctly applied the law, properly took tacit judicial notice based on common experience, and reasonably concluded the police acted with reasonable promptness.

The two accused were charged with multiple firearms and driving offences following a drive-by shooting and subsequent high-speed police chase.

The Crown's case relied heavily on circumstantial evidence, as the accused were arrested in the suspect vehicle shortly after the shooting, and gunshot residue was found on their hands.

The driver testified that two unknown passengers committed the shooting and fled the vehicle before the police stopped them.

The court rejected the accused's testimony, applying the W.(D.) and Villaroman frameworks, and found both accused guilty of the firearms offences and the driver guilty of the driving offences, but acquitted the driver of resisting arrest due to inconsistent police testimony.

The appellant appealed his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

He argued the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds for a breath demand because she mistakenly arrested him for 'over 80' instead of 'impaired driving', and that the trial judge erred in admitting the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, finding the officer had both subjective and objective grounds to make the breath demand based on the totality of the circumstances, and that the trial judge correctly admitted the evidence despite the minor s. 9 Charter breach.

The accused was charged with possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and multiple firearms offences following a police investigation into her boyfriend's drug dealing.

Police observed the boyfriend conducting drug transactions from the accused's car and later executed search warrants, finding drugs at an apartment and a firearm in the accused's bedroom.

The court found the accused not guilty on all charges, concluding the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that she had knowledge and control of the drugs found at the apartment, or that she knowingly possessed the firearm, particularly given her boyfriend's spontaneous confession that he had hidden the gun in her room without her knowledge.

The applicant brought a Charter motion to exclude a handgun and ammunition seized during a police search of her residence.

The police executed the search warrant using a dynamic entry, breaking down the door and using a distraction device without knocking or announcing their presence.

The court found that the systematic use of dynamic entry by the police violated the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights against unreasonable search.

However, applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breach did not seriously undermine the applicant's interests and society has a strong interest in adjudicating the charges on their merits.

The applicants, charged with driving offences following a dirt bike collision, brought a Charter motion to exclude blood samples and medical records seized by police.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) failed to establish the affiant's subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found the affiant only possessed a reasonable suspicion, rendering the search warrant and production order invalid and in breach of s. 8 of the Charter.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), citing the overbroad production order, careless drafting, and the issuing justice's apparent failure to properly review the materials.

The applicant, who was convicted of manslaughter, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 24(1) of the Charter, arguing that the delay of approximately six years and seven months from the date of charge to the anticipated end of his trial was unreasonable under s. 11(b).

The court applied the Jordan framework and determined that the delay attributable to certiorari proceedings and appeals therefrom should be excluded from the calculation.

The court found that the net delay was well below the 30-month ceiling.

Alternatively, even if the appellate delay was included, deductions for defence delay and exceptional circumstances (including discrete events and case complexity) brought the delay below the ceiling.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was convicted of manslaughter for his role in a home invasion and robbery that resulted in the shooting death of a 19-year-old victim.

The accused provided information and assistance to the perpetrators but was not present during the home invasion and did not have subjective foresight of death.

The court weighed the serious aggravating factors of a planned home invasion for greed against mitigating factors including the accused's youth, lack of criminal record, and adherence to bail conditions over five years.

The accused was sentenced to 9 years' imprisonment, less 17 months' credit for pre-sentence custody.

The applicant was found guilty of sexual interference and sexual assault against his 15-year-old half-stepdaughter.

He brought a Charter motion challenging the one-year mandatory minimum sentence under s. 151(a) of the Criminal Code as cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter.

The court determined that a fit sentence for the applicant would be nine months' incarceration, and that the one-year minimum was not grossly disproportionate for him personally.

However, applying the Supreme Court's framework in Nur, the court found the mandatory minimum would be grossly disproportionate for reasonable hypothetical offenders.

The provision was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter and was declared of no force or effect.

The accused, charged with second degree murder and attempted murder following a fatal stabbing over a drug dispute, applied for bail pending trial.

The court evaluated the proposed release plans, which included sureties and electronic monitoring.

The court found the proposed sureties to be weak and unreliable, failing to satisfy the secondary ground that there was no substantial likelihood of further offences.

Furthermore, given the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offences, and the violent circumstances, the court held that detention was necessary under the tertiary ground to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

Bail was denied.

The accused was charged with possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

The defence sought exclusion of evidence seized from a vehicle, alleging a breach of s. 8 of the Charter due to an unlawful traffic stop and search.

The court found significant credibility concerns with the arresting officer, including prior professional misconduct involving dishonesty and evasive testimony.

However, corroborating evidence from a second officer supported the account that the accused ran a red light, providing reasonable and probable grounds for the stop and subsequent arrest.

The search of the vehicle incident to arrest was therefore lawful and the seized drugs and cash were admissible.

The offender pleaded guilty to producing cannabis under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and to theft of electricity under the Criminal Code arising from a residential marijuana grow operation containing 536 plants and a hydro bypass.

The offender was a first-time offender assessed as low risk with strong family support and significant medical issues following car accidents.

The court considered the usual custodial range of nine to fifteen months for such offences but balanced general deterrence with substantial mitigating circumstances including the guilty plea and personal circumstances.

Although the court viewed a conditional sentence as conceptually appropriate, it concluded that general deterrence required a custodial sentence.

A six‑month jail sentence was imposed with a ten‑year weapons prohibition and no DNA order.

The applicants brought a motion to reconsider a previous decision denying production of CSIS source documents and sought leave to cross-examine the CSIS affiant on a Garofoli voir dire.

The court found that newly disclosed information revealed an apparent contradiction in the CSIS affidavit regarding whether a target was actively seeking a gun.

This contradiction met the threshold to show the affiant may have failed to make full, frank, and fair disclosure.

The court ordered the CSIS source documents to be produced for judicial review to determine their relevance to the Garofoli application.

In a terrorism prosecution, the applicants sought further disclosure from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service relating to payments made to a human source relied upon in a CSIS affidavit supporting investigative warrants under the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act.

The court held that records detailing remuneration and reimbursements paid to the source were likely relevant to a pending Garofoli voir dire because financial incentives may affect credibility and the affiant’s assessment of reliability.

Production of records relating to payments to the source was therefore ordered.

However, the request for disclosure of any CSIS reliability assessments concerning a target of the investigation was refused, as the target was not a traditional informant whose reliability required evaluation.

Following jury convictions for conspiracy to facilitate a terrorist activity and facilitating a terrorist activity, the court conducted a Gardiner hearing to determine disputed facts relevant to sentencing.

Applying s. 724 of the Criminal Code and the principles in R. v. Gardiner, the judge determined which aggravating facts were proven beyond a reasonable doubt and which alleged mitigating facts were established on a balance of probabilities.

The court found that the accused supported violent jihadist causes, assisted associates involved in terrorist activity, provided funds intended for foreign terrorists to purchase weapons and grenades, and participated in recruiting others into the group.

The court also addressed possession of explosive components but concluded that the purpose of that possession was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt in light of the jury’s acquittal on the explosives charge.

The decision sets out factual findings to guide the subsequent sentencing determination.