Margaret A. Hoy

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim and dismiss the action as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The plaintiffs had sued their mortgagees, mortgage broker, and solicitors, alleging collusion and a criminal interest rate after defaulting on their mortgages.

The court found the statement of claim was inadequately pleaded, failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action, and could not be cured by amendment.

Furthermore, proceeding with the action would constitute an abuse of process as it would re-litigate issues already determined in a related mortgage action.

The motion was granted and the statement of claim was struck without leave to amend.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend her statement of claim, more than four years after its issuance and six years after her termination, to introduce claims related to medical disability preventing mitigation and a bad faith dismissal.

The court denied the plaintiff's request for an adjournment to cross-examine the defendant's affiant, finding it would not be useful.

The motion to amend the statement of claim was dismissed, as the court found significant prejudice to the defendant that could not be compensated by costs or an adjournment.

The delay in raising these new issues, particularly the medical disability and bad faith claims, deprived the defendant of a timely opportunity to investigate.

The bad faith claim was also deemed statute-barred.

The applicants sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an interlocutory order dismissing their motion to consolidate three separate actions.

The court denied leave, finding that the alleged "conflicting decision" was from a lower-level judicial officer (Master) and did not represent a conflict on a matter of principle, but rather an application of the same principles to different facts.

The court emphasized that a conflicting decision for the purpose of leave to appeal must be on a matter of principle and not merely a different factual outcome.

The motion judge's discretionary decision to deny consolidation was found to be amply supported by the evidence, considering the insufficient connection among the transactions and the different stages of the proceedings.

The defendants sought costs for a WSIAT hearing and for the conduct of the action, having previously made an all-inclusive offer to settle for $10,000.

The plaintiffs had significant success on the motion, successfully arguing that the costs of the WSIAT proceeding should not be awarded and achieving a significant reduction in the fees claimed by the defendants.

Finding that success was divided, the court made no order as to costs of the motion.

This motion concerned the defendants' entitlement to costs after the plaintiffs' action was dismissed on consent, as the right of action was removed by s. 28 of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act (WSIA).

The defendants sought costs for defending the action and for a related hearing before the Workplace Safety Insurance and Appeals Tribunal (WSIAT).

The court determined that costs related to the WSIAT hearing were not recoverable in the action, consistent with the WSIAT's no-costs regime.

Furthermore, the court significantly reduced the defendants' claimed costs for the action itself, finding that certain steps like examinations for discovery and pretrial attendance were unnecessarily incurred due to the defendants' delay in bringing the WSIAT application and their initial denial of the employment relationship.

The court fixed the party and party costs of the action, payable by the plaintiffs to the defendants, at $3,000.00 all inclusive.

The appellant, a vulnerable young woman with a brain injury, took out litigation loans arranged by her personal injury law firm.

The lender was the lawyer's wife and an employee of the firm, but this was not disclosed to the appellant, nor was she advised to seek independent legal advice.

The motions judge granted summary judgment enforcing the loans.

On appeal, the Divisional Court set aside the summary judgment, finding the transactions unconscionable due to the imbalance of power, the lender's unfair advantage, and the improvident nature of the bargain.

The loan agreements were rescinded and the action dismissed.

Following a summary judgment awarding the plaintiff damages for unpaid litigation loans, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs and an order that the defendant's lawyer be held personally liable for a portion of the costs under Rule 57.07(1).

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, finding the matter was not complex and the plaintiff's costs claims were excessive.

The court declined to order costs against the defendant's lawyer personally, despite finding she made careless and misleading statements in her costs submissions, as the high threshold for such an order was not met.

Post-judgment interest was awarded at the contractual rate of 19.5%.

The plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 30.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking production of the full Special Investigations Unit (SIU) investigative file in a civil action alleging negligence, assault, and Charter breaches arising from a police use-of-force incident.

The SIU, a non‑party, resisted production of certain civilian and police witness statements that had been obtained under assurances of confidentiality.

The court applied the factors from Ontario (Attorney General) v. Stavro and emphasized that a moving party must demonstrate both relevance and that proceeding to trial without the documents would be unfair.

The court found the plaintiff had not made reasonable efforts to obtain evidence from available witnesses and could not rely on the SIU investigation as a substitute for civil discovery.

Production of the remaining witness statements was therefore refused.

The plaintiff lender brought a motion for summary judgment to recover three litigation loans advanced to the defendant during the course of a personal injury action.

The defendant admitted owing the principal on two loans but disputed the contractual interest rate of 18% compounded monthly and alleged breaches of fiduciary duty, lack of disclosure of a conflict of interest, and unconscionability.

The court found the borrower had been fully informed of the loan terms and that the interest rate and structure were standard within the litigation lending industry.

The court rejected the defences, holding that any failure to disclose the lender’s relationship to the borrower’s lawyer caused no compensable loss and did not invalidate the agreements.

Summary judgment was granted enforcing repayment of the loans with interest according to their terms, except that interest was not awarded on one loan where the lender had waived it.

This was a costs decision following a motion by a defendant to set aside a default judgment.

Although the plaintiffs were technically unsuccessful on the motion, the court had granted the motion on terms requiring payments to the plaintiffs, including costs thrown away and security for costs.

The plaintiffs sought substantial indemnity costs or, alternatively, partial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court held that a punitive costs award was not warranted and fixed costs at $8,500 all inclusive on a partial indemnity basis.

The defendant home inspector brought a motion to set aside a default judgment granted to the plaintiffs four years prior.

The plaintiffs had sued the defendant for professional negligence and breach of contract regarding a home inspection that failed to disclose severe water damage and rot.

The defendant failed to defend the action, citing severe health issues including a heart attack and rheumatoid arthritis.

Despite the significant delay and procedural non-compliance, the court found an arguable defence on the merits and no genuine prejudice to the plaintiffs' ability to prove their case.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the default judgment, but imposed strict terms including payment of costs thrown away and payment into court as security.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were awarded non-pecuniary damages, the court determined the issues of prejudgment interest and costs.

The court awarded prejudgment interest at the prescribed rate of 3.0 per cent from the commencement of the action, declining the defendants' request to average the rate or shorten the period due to delay.

The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim for substantial indemnity costs, finding no justification for it, and awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $175,000 all-inclusive.

The appellant appealed a costs order made by the application judge, arguing a lack of jurisdiction and inadequate notice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claim for further relief, a previous costs order, and a settlement offer provided adequate notice.

The court also upheld the costs order as justified because the application judge found the appellant had perjured herself, protracting the litigation.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 56.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking security for costs on the basis that the plaintiff resided outside Ontario and had no assets in the province.

The plaintiff alleged an assault by police officers in Ontario but relied on asserted assets in New York State and reciprocal enforcement legislation to resist the motion.

The court held that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient objective evidence establishing that the foreign assets were appropriate and sufficient to satisfy a potential costs order.

The court also rejected arguments that financial hardship caused by the alleged assault or the Victims’ Bill of Rights precluded the order.

Balancing the relevant factors, the court exercised its discretion to order security for costs.

The appellant appealed an order finding him in contempt of court, imposing a $10,000 fine payable to the estate, and dismissing his request for a passing of accounts in Brampton.

The Court of Appeal upheld the contempt finding, noting the appellant's repeated attempts to re-litigate venue constituted an abuse of process and subverted the administration of justice.

The Court also held that the lack of personal service did not invalidate the contempt finding as the appellant had actual knowledge and a full opportunity to be heard.

However, the Court set aside the $10,000 fine, ruling that civil contempt fines should be payable to the Provincial Treasurer rather than a party, and found no fine was necessary for deterrence given the three-day imprisonment already served.

The prohibition on further litigation was varied to allow steps with leave of the court.

The appellants appealed an order that stayed their motion, transferred the proceeding, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the motion to quash, finding that the order appealed from was interlocutory and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction.

The court also noted that the appeal should be quashed due to the appellants' persistent failure to pay outstanding costs orders from previous proceedings.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Appeal in the Divisional Court from a trial judgment dismissing her wrongful dismissal action.

The moving party had initially filed her appeal in the Court of Appeal, which quashed it for lack of jurisdiction after a seven-month delay during which her counsel ignored warnings about the jurisdictional error.

The Divisional Court applied the four-factor test for extending time and found no bona fide intention to appeal, no reasonable explanation for the excessive delay, and no merit to the proposed appeal.

The motion was dismissed.

The court reconsidered a prior costs decision following late submissions from the respondent.

The issue was whether costs could be ordered personally against the respondent when the notice of application had requested costs only from the incapable person.

The court held that no prejudice arose because the respondent had ample notice throughout the proceedings that personal costs were in issue, including through settlement offers and prior court appearances where costs were reserved.

Emphasizing the principle that costs follow the result and that family members assisting an incapable person should not bear all litigation risk, the court confirmed that a costs order against the respondent was permissible as ancillary relief.

The earlier costs order was therefore affirmed.

Following a successful guardianship application brought for the benefit of an incapable person, the applicant sought costs against the respondent.

The court noted that the incapable person had no meaningful estate from which costs could be recovered, despite benefiting from the proceeding.

The respondent’s conduct during the litigation, including perjury in cross-examination that risked exposing the incapable person to harm, unnecessarily increased the cost of the proceedings.

Applying the principle that costs follow the event and referencing the recognized range for such proceedings, the court ordered costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

Costs were fixed at $30,500 all inclusive.

The court reconsidered a prior costs decision after receiving late submissions from counsel for the respondent.

The issue concerned whether the court had jurisdiction to order costs against the respondent when the notice of application had requested costs only against an incapable person.

The court permitted the applicant to file written submissions addressing the jurisdictional issue within 15 days.

The endorsement dealt solely with the procedural reconsideration of the costs determination.