Marco Drudi

The defendant City brought a motion to stay a construction lien proceeding pending its appeal of the trial judge's liability determination in a bifurcated trial.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the liability decision was an interlocutory order under the Construction Lien Act, which cannot be appealed until the damages phase is completed.

Furthermore, the court held that even if it had jurisdiction, it would not exercise its discretion to grant a stay because the City failed to demonstrate irreparable harm and the balance of convenience favored proceeding with the scheduled damages trial.

A contractor sued a municipal owner after being terminated from a major civic construction project shortly before substantial completion.

The owner alleged the contractor was in default for failing to meet milestones and failing to comply with scheduling and change directives.

The court held that even if breaches occurred, they did not amount to a fundamental breach justifying termination, particularly where the project was approximately 95–98% complete and delay damages could be compensated in money.

The court further found the owner had compromised the consultant’s contractual role of impartiality by directing the consultant’s notice of default and failed to act in good faith under the dispute resolution provisions.

The termination was therefore wrongful and invalid.

In the liability phase of a civil trial arising from a dispute between a construction contractor and a municipality, the court determined liability on the contractor’s claim and the municipality’s counterclaims.

The contractor succeeded on its claim and on its defence to the counterclaims.

The municipality’s counterclaims were dismissed.

The court indicated that detailed reasons would follow and directed the parties to provide written submissions regarding costs of the trial phase.

The plaintiffs brought a motion arising from refusals on discovery concerning requests for handwriting specimens.

The action alleged that a life insurance policy conversion application contained a forged signature and that the forgery was prepared by or on behalf of a corporate principal.

The court held that obtaining original signature specimens from the alleged individual involved was relevant to the pleaded forgery allegation and ordered the corporate defendant to produce up to 30 original signature samples for examination by the plaintiffs’ expert.

However, the request for signature specimens from another employee was refused because no pleaded allegation connected that individual to the alleged forgery.

Given the mixed success on the refusals, costs were ordered in the cause.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking leave to deliver a fresh as amended statement of claim alleging tortious interference with inheritance rights, to add a new defendant, compel a capacity assessment of the defendant mother, examine her lawyer regarding preparation of a will, lift solicitor‑client privilege, and exempt evidence from the deemed undertaking rule.

The proposed amendments were based on allegations that the defendant lacked testamentary capacity when she executed a new will reducing the plaintiff’s inheritance.

The court found the proposed claims lacked material particulars, were unsupported by evidence, and were likely statute‑barred under the applicable limitation period.

The court also held the amendments would unduly expand and delay a focused action involving property accounting disputes.

Leave to amend and related relief were refused, but a limited extension was granted for the action to be set down for trial.

The plaintiff sued his former family lawyer and the lawyer’s firm for negligence arising from advice and drafting of a separation agreement that waived spousal support.

The plaintiff argued that the agreement was vulnerable to challenge and that counsel failed to adequately advise him of the risks and should have ceased acting once the agreement was attacked in subsequent litigation.

The court held that the lawyer met the heightened standard of care applicable to a family law specialist, having properly explained the risks and drafted a robust spousal support waiver.

The court also found no breach in continuing the retainer and concluded that causation and damages were not established, including under a lost‑chance analysis.

The action was dismissed.

A subcontractor obtained judgment against a corporate officer for breach of trust under the Construction Lien Act after the officer’s defence was struck for failing to provide ordered financial disclosure.

Unknown to the creditor, the officer had earlier assigned himself into bankruptcy and later sought to have the creditor’s writ withdrawn following his discharge.

The creditor moved for leave nunc pro tunc under s. 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to continue the action notwithstanding the bankruptcy, arguing the debt arose from breach of fiduciary trust and would survive discharge under s. 178(1)(d).

The court held that the creditor’s failure to obtain prior leave was merely an irregularity caused by lack of notice of the bankruptcy.

Leave was granted nunc pro tunc and the judgment debt was declared to survive the discharge.

An elderly co-owner of a multi-unit residential property sought an order for partition and sale under the Partition Act, along with the potential appointment of a receiver/manager pending sale.

The court held that a tenant-in-common has a prima facie right to seek partition or sale unless the opposing party proves oppression, malice, or vexatious intent.

The respondents failed to demonstrate such circumstances, and evidence showed a lack of transparency and accounting in the property's management.

The court ordered that the property be valued and listed for sale, with the respondents given a short opportunity to purchase the applicant’s interest at fair market value.

If no acceptable offer is made, a receiver/manager will be appointed to manage and sell the property.

Co-owners of a residential apartment complex brought a motion to stay a partition and sale application or, alternatively, to have it heard together with or consolidated with an earlier civil action involving related family disputes over the property and alleged financial dealings.

The court considered Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure governing consolidation of proceedings and the balance of convenience factors articulated in prior case law.

The court held that the two proceedings involved different legal issues and procedural postures, with the application proceeding on affidavit evidence and the action involving historical contractual and estate-related claims.

The court also found the motion was brought late and appeared designed to delay adjudication of the partition application.

The motion to stay, consolidate, or hear the matters together was dismissed.

The defendant municipality brought a motion under Rule 31.11 seeking to read in discovery evidence of subcontractors in a construction dispute involving lien claimants.

After issuing reasons dismissing the motion, the court issued a supplementary endorsement addressing reply submissions that had not initially come to the judge’s attention due to an administrative issue.

The moving party argued that s. 15 of the Ontario Evidence Act permitted the use of discovery evidence of non-adverse parties against both subcontractors and the general contractor.

The court rejected that interpretation, holding that it would undermine the wording of Rule 31.11 limiting read‑ins to evidence against the adverse party.

The court accepted the reasoning in Cain v. Peterson as governing authority and affirmed dismissal of the motion.

The defendant municipality brought a motion seeking leave under Rule 31.11(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to read into evidence at trial excerpts from examinations for discovery of subcontractor lien claimants.

The motion arose in the context of a construction dispute and lien action concerning termination of a construction contract.

The responding party argued that discovery evidence given by one party cannot be read in against a different party in a multi‑party action.

The court held that the wording of Rule 31.11(1), specifically the use of the term “the adverse party,” restricts read‑in evidence to use against the party who provided it on discovery.

The motion was dismissed.

The defendant appealed an interlocutory order that dismissed his motion to strike the plaintiffs' civil contempt motion for lack of particulars, but ordered the plaintiffs to provide clear and concise particulars.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and dismissed the contempt motion, finding that the motions judge erred in applying the test for adequate particulars by failing to recognize the strictissimi juris nature of civil contempt proceedings.

The court also held that the motions judge erred in principle by granting the plaintiffs an unsolicited right to amend their defective motion without balancing the relevant factors.

The plaintiff purchased a pre-construction condominium unit from the vendor, The Printing Factory Lofts Inc. Due to unexpected hydro duct placement, an exterior door was eliminated from the unit's plans.

The plaintiff closed the transaction under protest and sued the vendor, as well as Beaverbrook Homes Inc. and Anthony Lanni, for the loss of the door and construction deficiencies.

Beaverbrook and Lanni moved for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against them.

The court granted the motion, finding that Beaverbrook and Lanni were not parties to the Agreement of Purchase and Sale, which contained an entire agreement clause and specific releases.

The court also found no evidence of actionable misrepresentations by the moving parties, applying the parol evidence rule.

During a Trial Management Conference in a construction lien dispute, sub‑trade lien claimants raised concerns that the municipality’s defence and counterclaim lacked sufficient particulars regarding alleged deficiencies and delays attributed to various sub‑trades.

The court considered the purpose of particulars in civil proceedings, namely to define issues, prevent surprise, and facilitate trial preparation.

Although the municipality argued that extensive disclosure had been provided during discovery, the court held that the information must be presented coherently and with sufficient specificity.

The municipality was ordered to provide written particulars detailing the alleged deficiencies and delays, even where costs had not yet been incurred.

Following an unsuccessful motion by the defendant to dismiss a contempt motion, the court addressed costs.

Although the defendant did not succeed on the motion, the court found merit in the defendant’s complaints regarding the organization and drafting of the plaintiffs’ materials, which were described as poorly organized and “reader hostile.” Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered the parties’ conduct and its impact on the duration and efficiency of the proceeding.

The court concluded that the plaintiffs’ conduct justified a costs award against them despite their success on the motion.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the moving party.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking to compel the respondents to consent to severing a one-acre parcel of land pursuant to a memorandum of agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the relevant clause lacked sufficient certainty on essential terms, such as location, dimensions, title, and price, to be legally enforceable.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss or stay a civil contempt motion arising from an alleged breach of a prior injunction restricting dealings with former firm clients.

The defendant argued the contempt motion lacked sufficient particulars, served no purpose because the underlying order had expired, and constituted an abuse of process.

The court held that although the materials were poorly organized and lacked clarity, the defendant had not demonstrated a complete absence of fair notice of the allegations.

The court also found that the expiry of the order did not eliminate the public interest in enforcing respect for court orders and that the high threshold for abuse of process had not been met.

The motion to dismiss the contempt proceeding was refused, but the plaintiffs were ordered to serve clear and concise particulars of the alleged contempt.

The vendor sought an order requiring the purchaser to replace a $64,000 letter of credit used as a security deposit under an Agreement of Purchase and Sale after the vendor had drawn down the existing letter of credit.

The purchaser argued that the obligation to maintain the security deposit ended once the contractual conditions for its return were satisfied, namely the issuance of final grading certificates and completion of the top coat of asphalt on the subdivision roads.

Interpreting the agreement as a whole, the court held that the obligation to issue or maintain letters of credit was not independent of the obligation to maintain the security deposit itself.

Once the security deposit obligation expired under the amended return provisions, there was no contractual basis to compel the purchaser to issue a new letter of credit.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the purchaser.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its claim as time-barred.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the loan in question was tantamount to a loan payable on demand, and therefore the claim was time-barred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding an unpaid account, challenging the admissibility of business records and the pre-judgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, holding that a lack of personal knowledge does not affect the admissibility of business records under the Evidence Act.

The court modified the judgment slightly to set the interest rate at 2 percent and dismissed the appeal in all other respects, awarding costs to the respondent.