Marco Drudi

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application seeking to compel the respondents to consent to severing a one-acre parcel of land pursuant to a memorandum of agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the application judge that the relevant clause lacked sufficient certainty on essential terms, such as location, dimensions, title, and price, to be legally enforceable.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss or stay a civil contempt motion arising from an alleged breach of a prior injunction restricting dealings with former firm clients.

The defendant argued the contempt motion lacked sufficient particulars, served no purpose because the underlying order had expired, and constituted an abuse of process.

The court held that although the materials were poorly organized and lacked clarity, the defendant had not demonstrated a complete absence of fair notice of the allegations.

The court also found that the expiry of the order did not eliminate the public interest in enforcing respect for court orders and that the high threshold for abuse of process had not been met.

The motion to dismiss the contempt proceeding was refused, but the plaintiffs were ordered to serve clear and concise particulars of the alleged contempt.

The vendor sought an order requiring the purchaser to replace a $64,000 letter of credit used as a security deposit under an Agreement of Purchase and Sale after the vendor had drawn down the existing letter of credit.

The purchaser argued that the obligation to maintain the security deposit ended once the contractual conditions for its return were satisfied, namely the issuance of final grading certificates and completion of the top coat of asphalt on the subdivision roads.

Interpreting the agreement as a whole, the court held that the obligation to issue or maintain letters of credit was not independent of the obligation to maintain the security deposit itself.

Once the security deposit obligation expired under the amended return provisions, there was no contractual basis to compel the purchaser to issue a new letter of credit.

The application was dismissed and costs were awarded to the purchaser.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its claim as time-barred.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the loan in question was tantamount to a loan payable on demand, and therefore the claim was time-barred.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a judgment regarding an unpaid account, challenging the admissibility of business records and the pre-judgment interest rate.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on liability, holding that a lack of personal knowledge does not affect the admissibility of business records under the Evidence Act.

The court modified the judgment slightly to set the interest rate at 2 percent and dismissed the appeal in all other respects, awarding costs to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a Master's decision striking its statement of defence and counterclaim for failing to comply with a 'last chance' order requiring the fulfillment of undertakings and particulars of damages.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Master misapprehended the evidence and the specific wording of the order, as the appellant had substantially complied by providing particulars, and the order did not require documentary evidence.

The Master's decision was set aside and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant estate appealed an order directing it to deliver shares owned by the husband to the wife's counsel for preservation and safekeeping under s. 12(b) of the Family Law Act.

The shares were already subject to a prior preservation order, which the husband breached by delivering them to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the order did not stay execution of the appellant's money judgment against the husband, nor did it constitute a collateral attack or determine priorities between the appellant and the wife.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order dismissing their motion under s. 12(3) of the Mortgages Act to pay disputed mortgage funds into court pending trial.

The dispute arose over adjustments to the purchase price of subdivision lots based on frontage.

The Divisional Court found no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision, which was based on a holistic assessment of the relative equities and the plaintiffs' failure to establish an arguable case.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with substantial indemnity costs awarded to the defendants.

The appellants appealed a trial decision dismissing their claim for damages arising from the negligent design of their home's HVAC system.

The trial judge found the defendants negligent but dismissed the claim because damages and causation were not proven.

The Divisional Court quashed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction under s. 19(1.1) of the Courts of Justice Act because the claim dismissed was for more than $25,000, and a dismissal for unproven damages is not equivalent to an 'award' of zero under s. 19(1.1)(d).

In the alternative, the court held it would have dismissed the appeal on the merits as the trial judge made no palpable and overriding errors.

The deceased died intestate and his separated wife was appointed estate trustee.

The respondent, claiming to be the deceased's common law spouse, sought a declaration of dependency and support under the Succession Law Reform Act.

The estate trustee served a notice of contestation under the Estates Act and later sought a declaration that the respondent had abandoned her claims by failing to meet the limitation period in the Estates Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the respondent's claims for declaratory relief were not a 'claim or demand' within the meaning of the Estates Act, which applies only to creditors' claims.

The limitation period under the Succession Law Reform Act governed the respondent's claims.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a decision declaring their option to purchase a residential parcel of farmland void for contravening section 50 of the Planning Act.

The appellants had sold a 74-acre farm but entered into an option agreement to purchase back the residential portion.

The Court of Appeal held that the option agreement violated section 50(3) because the grantor retained abutting lands not within a registered plan of subdivision.

The Court further found that the agreement lacked an express condition requiring compliance with the Planning Act under section 50(21), and declined to rectify the contract due to a lack of evidence of a prior oral agreement to include such a condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment finding Jasper liable to pay the respondent and assessing costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding no error in the liability determination.

However, the Court granted leave to appeal costs and reduced the trial costs to $45,000, noting the trial judge erred by including hours spent on unsuccessful motions.

The issue of entitlement to trust funds paid into court was remitted to the trial judge.

The respondent was awarded $7,500 in costs for the appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action alleging that the respondents, former officers and directors of a renovation company, conspired to divest the company of its assets to prevent the appellants from realizing on a default judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellants had only pleaded the tort of conspiracy and failed to prove that they suffered special damages as a result of the respondents' unlawful conduct.

The court also rejected arguments regarding reasonable apprehension of bias and entitlement to punitive damages.

The appellants appealed a decision finding oppression and ordering the valuation of the deceased's shares at fair market value without a minority discount.

The appellants argued that a draft shareholders' agreement, which valued shares at net book value, should dictate the reasonable expectations of the parties.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that there was no binding shareholders' agreement because one shareholder had not signed it, as required by s. 108 of the Business Corporations Act.

The Court also agreed that the evidence did not support the appellants' claim regarding reasonable expectations, as the parties had not abided by the draft agreement and were negotiating a new one based on fair market value prior to the deceased's death.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a permanent injunction against the respondents' competing business.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no evidence the appellant had sustained irreparable harm not compensable in damages.

The appellant appealed an order fixing the interest rate payable on an overpayment under the Fuel Tax Act.

The trial judge had set the rate based on a letter from the appellant's counsel stating it should match the rate charged on underpayments.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge had no jurisdiction to impose a different rate under the general provisions of the Act when specific regulations dictated the interest rate for overpayments.

The interest rate was ordered to be calculated in accordance with the Regulations.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

Based on the submissions of the parties, the court fixed the total costs at $8,000.

The appellant vendor appealed a trial judgment finding that its failure to construct a cathedral ceiling in a new home was a fundamental breach of the agreement of purchase and sale.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion, noting that the cathedral ceiling was a crucial feature of the contract and the vendor's unilateral change provision did not apply to fundamental changes.

The court also rejected the argument that the purchasers affirmed the contract by delaying their rescission, finding that they rescinded within a reasonable time after learning of the change.

The appeal was dismissed and the purchasers were entitled to the return of their deposit.

The plaintiff insurance broker appealed the trial judge's refusal to award pre-judgment interest and costs after successfully suing a former producer for the purchase price of her book of business.

The defendant cross-appealed the trial judge's interpretation of the agreement and the dismissal of her counterclaim for withheld commissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding ample support for the trial judge's interpretation.

The Court allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by depriving the successful plaintiff of costs and interest simply because the agreement was poorly worded, especially since the plaintiff had made an offer to settle for the amount the defendant claimed was owed.