Louis Anthony Frapporti

The appellant meat processing company sued the respondent energy retailer for rescission of a fixed price electrical contract and damages for negligent misrepresentation.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the respondent had fully explained the contract terms, including the risk that the appellant would pay more if electricity prices dropped, and that the respondent had not misled the appellant.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings and dismissed the appeal.

The plaintiff sought rescission and damages arising from a five-year fixed price electricity contract entered into in 2008, alleging negligence, negligent misrepresentation, bad faith, and breach of contract after market electricity prices later fell below the contract rate.

The court found the parties were acting at arm’s length in an ordinary commercial transaction, that the defendant’s sales representative made no dishonest or knowingly misleading statements, and that any views expressed about future electricity prices were opinions or expectations honestly held at the time.

The court further held the plaintiff failed to prove actual reliance, had signed a contract expressly disclaiming reliance on outside representations, and had not attempted termination in accordance with the contract terms.

The later-pleaded claim that the defendant breached the contract by failing to accept termination was held to be a new cause of action and statute barred.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff landlord brought a motion for summary judgment against a commercial tenant and its guarantor for unpaid rent and related damages under a lease agreement.

The defendants resisted the motion and sought an order compelling the plaintiff to produce an affidavit of documents, while also advancing a counterclaim alleging that the landlord interfered with a proposed assignment of the lease to new tenants.

The court held that the evidentiary record, including affidavits, cross-examinations, and correspondence, provided a sufficient basis to determine the issues without a trial.

The court rejected the counterclaim, finding the allegation that the landlord’s lawyer discouraged prospective purchasers by misstating arrears lacked evidentiary support.

Summary judgment was granted for the landlord, including damages for arrears and mitigation-adjusted future rent.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion seeking an interim stay of an action and a stay of a production order pending a summary judgment motion, the successful plaintiff sought costs payable immediately and on a substantial indemnity basis.

The defendant argued the issue of costs should be reserved to the judge hearing the summary judgment motion, or alternatively fixed on a partial indemnity basis.

The court reaffirmed that the successful party on a motion generally has a reasonable expectation of costs and that substantial indemnity costs are reserved for exceptional circumstances involving egregious or unreasonable conduct.

Finding no such conduct and rejecting the request to defer the issue, the court ordered costs on a partial indemnity basis.

Costs were fixed at $10,000 inclusive of disbursements and tax, payable within 30 days.

The moving party sought judgment under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure enforcing the terms of an alleged settlement offer.

The dispute arose after the parties exchanged an offer and acceptance referring to an action number that no longer existed due to a prior consolidation order.

The court considered principles of contractual interpretation governing settlement agreements and concluded that the offer was ambiguous and referred to a nullity.

Extrinsic evidence demonstrated that the parties had differing understandings of what was being settled and were not ad idem.

As a result, no enforceable settlement existed and the motion for judgment was dismissed.

Following summary judgment enforcing a settlement agreement, the court determined costs and interest issues.

The successful defendant sought substantial indemnity costs, compensation for his own legal work as a lawyer-litigant, recovery for work performed by a lawyer in his firm, reimbursement of expert fees, and enhanced interest rates.

The court held that substantial indemnity costs were not justified and awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis.

A litigant who is represented by counsel is not entitled to recover personal legal fees simply because he is a lawyer, though limited recovery was permitted for work performed by another lawyer in his firm.

The court also allowed certain tax advisory disbursements, disallowed an accountant’s fee, reduced costs due to late filing of submissions, and applied the statutory court rates for pre- and postjudgment interest.

Following dismissal of a motion for interim injunctive relief, the court addressed costs.

The respondents sought partial indemnity costs and the applicant did not challenge the amounts claimed or the reasonableness of the time spent and hourly rates.

The applicant argued that costs should be in the cause, determined by the judge hearing the ultimate application, or that no costs should be ordered.

Applying Rule 57.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that costs of the motion should be fixed absent a more just order and found no basis to defer or decline a costs award.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to each respondent.

The applicant sought an interim injunction and relief from forfeiture arising from the cancellation of billboard licence agreements on railway lands.

The respondents terminated the licences and demanded removal of approximately 240 billboard structures and payment of alleged rental arrears.

The court applied the three‑part test for interlocutory injunctions and found that although a serious issue existed regarding the parties’ conduct and contractual interpretation, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm because any loss could be compensated by damages.

The balance of convenience did not favour either party.

Interim equitable relief was therefore inappropriate in what was fundamentally a monetary dispute.

Following settlement of the underlying civil action pursuant to an offer to settle and acceptance, a dispute arose between the parties regarding costs.

The plaintiff indicated an intention to bring a motion for summary judgment regarding the costs issue and did not consent to the pre‑trial judge determining the matter.

The court noted that although the judge had presided as pre‑trial judge, costs had not been discussed during the pre‑trial.

The endorsement records the existence of the dispute but does not determine the costs issue.

The applicant sought recognition and enforcement of portions of an international arbitral award under the International Commercial Arbitration Act and the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The respondent argued that the arbitral tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction by awarding attorney’s fees and arbitration costs because the arbitration clause required each party to bear its own costs except in the specific context of an early termination charge.

The court held that the tribunal lacked jurisdiction to award general attorney’s fees and costs after rejecting the contractual early termination provision that allowed such recovery.

As the parties had not expressly agreed in writing to amend the arbitration clause to allow fee‑shifting outside that provision, the cost award was unenforceable.

The court dismissed the application to enforce the attorney’s fees and cost components of the arbitral award and held that post‑judgment interest would be governed by the statutory rate under the Courts of Justice Act.

Following the dismissal of a motion for partial summary judgment, the court determined the issue of costs after written submissions.

The moving party had argued that the opposing party lacked an evidentiary basis for its damages claim.

The court found the motion had been reasonably brought but concluded that the factual nature of the dispute and the wording of the agreements rendered the motion premature.

Costs were awarded to the responding party on a partial indemnity basis, fixed at $12,500 inclusive, payable in the cause as determined by the trial judge.

The appellant suffered catastrophic injuries after slipping and falling on stairs in a restaurant.

The trial judge dismissed the action against the respondent landlord, finding it was not an 'occupier' under the Occupiers' Liability Act.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge misapprehended the tenant's evidence and the terms of the lease regarding the landlord's responsibility for repairs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly interpreted the lease as a completely carefree net lease and reasonably assessed the evidence of the parties' conduct to conclude the landlord lacked the necessary control to be an occupier.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement arising from an oral agreement reached during a break in litigation proceedings.

The dispute concerned whether the settlement permitted the purchase of the defendant’s shares through a corporate share redemption rather than a purchase by the individual plaintiffs.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to determine the issue and converted the motion into a summary judgment motion.

After reviewing the surrounding circumstances and draft settlement documents, the court concluded that the parties intended the personal plaintiffs to purchase the shares.

The court declared that a binding settlement existed and ordered enforcement consistent with that interpretation.

Clarke Productions brought a motion for summary judgment on its counterclaim against Category 5 Imaging Ltd. for unpaid invoices totaling $13,324.50 for subcontracted printing work.

Category 5 opposed, alleging defective work and claiming an equitable set-off based on alleged unlawful interference with economic relations.

The court found no triable issue, noting the work was completed, Category 5 was paid by its client, and there was no evidence of defective work.

The court also rejected the equitable set-off claim, finding no factual basis to meet the connectedness requirement.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The moving party sought partial summary judgment for payment of $144,000 under a promissory note issued pursuant to a share purchase agreement and related non‑competition, non‑solicitation, and non‑disclosure agreements.

The responding party argued that the note was subject to the broader contractual framework and that the moving party had breached the restrictive covenants.

Evidence suggested the moving party may have assisted a competing company and facilitated the movement of employees and customers during the restricted period.

The court held that these allegations created genuine triable issues and that the evidentiary record did not permit the full appreciation required for summary judgment under Rule 20.04 and the test articulated in Combined Air Mechanical Services Inc. v. Flesch.

The motion for partial summary judgment was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment that dismissed the majority of its contractual claims against the respondent regarding a magazine publishing agreement.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge failed to consider material evidence regarding the factual matrix of the contract, ignored evidence of the respondent's lack of good faith in negotiating a renewal, and failed to provide adequate reasons for rejecting the credibility of the appellant's key witness.

The appellant purchased a vacant lot and hired a builder recommended by a co-worker real estate agent to build a custom home with a walk-out basement apartment.

After the builder encountered financial difficulties and failed to complete the project, the appellant sued the co-worker for negligent misrepresentation and breach of fiduciary duty.

The trial judge awarded damages for negligent misrepresentation regarding the legality of the basement apartment and punitive damages for breach of fiduciary duty.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appellant's appeal to increase damages, finding she failed to mitigate.

The Court allowed the respondent's cross-appeal in part, setting aside the punitive damages award because no fiduciary relationship existed between the parties.

The appellants, an optician and his associated companies, appealed a finding of contempt and a $1 million fine for flagrantly breaching a court order.

The underlying order prohibited them from prescribing and dispensing corrective lenses without a prescription from an optometrist or physician.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the notice of application was adequate, the self-represented appellant received a fair hearing, and the consolidated hearing on liability and penalty did not vitiate the contempt finding.

The $1 million fine was upheld due to the appellants' deliberate and protracted disobedience of the court order.

The appellant manufacturer sued a competitor and its employee for slander, inducement of breach of contract, and interference with economic relations after the employee allegedly told customers the appellant's product was dangerous.

The slander claim was withdrawn as it was outside the two-year limitation period.

The motion judge struck the remaining claims, finding they were an attempt to indirectly plead slander.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the economic torts were distinct causes of action that provided remedies for commercial losses not covered by slander, and were therefore not barred by the two-year limitation period.

The appellant appealed a trial decision finding that the Town of Oakville did not owe her a duty of care to require a builder to warn about noise.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the Town lacked the legal authority under the Planning Act to impose such a duty on the builder.

The court found that the Town's inability to discharge the duty without the Region's consent to severance negated any prima facie duty of care.

No costs were awarded as the Town did less than it might have.