Liza C. Sheard

The defendant, Department of National Defence (DND), brought a motion to strike the plaintiff's statement of claim for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action and for not complying with pleading rules, and to deny leave to amend.

The plaintiff, a self-represented former Canadian Armed Forces (CAF) member, sought damages for wrongful/constructive dismissal and alleged Charter violations (ss. 2(d), 7, 15).

The court found the claim deficient as it contained no material facts.

It also determined that the plaintiff's proposed Charter claims were "doomed to fail" and that the plaintiff had not exhausted the exclusive statutory grievance procedure under the National Defence Act.

The motion to strike the claim in its entirety without leave to amend was granted.

The Conlons (plaintiffs) brought a motion to either stay or transfer their Small Claims Court (SCC) action against JP Quality Care Construction Inc. and James Palmerton to the Superior Court of Justice (SCJ) and consolidate it with their existing SCJ action.

The SCC action involved claims for unpaid invoices and unjust enrichment related to construction services, while the SCJ action involved breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims by the Conlons, and a significant counterclaim by JP for business interference and defamation.

The court denied the transfer, finding the SCC issues not complex enough to warrant it, but granted a stay of the SCC action pending the determination of the SCJ action to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and ensure the Conlons' access to justice, as their counterclaim exceeded the SCC monetary limit.

This decision addresses the costs of an application brought by the applicant under the Co-operative Corporations Act, which was dismissed due to the applicant's inability to proceed and lack of proper leave.

The applicant, Angelique Codina, sought injunctive and other relief but failed to obtain the required court order under s. 68(2) of the Act before commencing the action.

The application was adjourned multiple times due to the applicant's incarceration and her inability to effectively pursue the matter or find other co-op members to assume carriage.

The court dismissed the application on procedural grounds and considered the respondents' request for costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the respondents, declining their request for substantial indemnity, as the dismissal was procedural and not on the merits of the allegations.

This decision addresses the costs arising from an application where the applicant successfully sought directions regarding her parents' estates, resulting in the removal of the respondents as co-estate trustees.

The applicant sought full recovery of her costs, proposing that substantial indemnity costs be paid by the respondents and the balance from the estates.

The court found the respondents' conduct, including failure to fulfill their obligations, preferring self-interest, and non-compliance with court orders, to be "reprehensible and outrageous." Consequently, the court awarded costs on a partial indemnity basis for the initial phase of the litigation (Part A) and on a substantial indemnity basis for the subsequent phases (Parts B and C) directly caused by the respondents' intransigence.

The applicant's full indemnity costs were fixed at $78,802.63, with the respondents ordered to pay $60,821.50, and the remaining $17,981.13 to be paid from the estates.

The respondent, Edward Alan Stocker, brought a motion to set aside a restraining order previously granted without notice to the applicant, Laura Lynn Boyle.

The parties, common-law spouses, were living separately in their co-owned home.

Stocker argued the order was based on false facts and used as a tactic for exclusive possession.

The court found that on a full record, Boyle did not have reasonable grounds to fear for her safety, and her initial affidavit lacked full disclosure.

The court emphasized that ex parte restraining orders should expire at the next hearing, shifting the burden back to the applicant to re-establish entitlement.

The restraining order was set aside.

The plaintiff, Ursula Sams, brought a motion for default judgment against her former employer, BCG Logistics (2000) Inc., for wrongful dismissal after 12 years of employment.

The defendant was noted in default.

The court initially declined to grant the full relief sought due to insufficient evidence regarding the value of benefits, the plaintiff's mitigation efforts, and the basis for aggravated damages.

The plaintiff was required to provide further evidence, including her current employment status and proof of income.

Despite initially attempting to avoid disclosing re-employment, the plaintiff later confirmed she had found comparable employment within four months.

The court emphasized the plaintiff's obligation to mitigate damages, even in a default judgment scenario.

The court ultimately awarded the plaintiff statutory termination pay and damages for the period until she secured new employment, dismissing claims for aggravated damages and the argument that mitigation credit was not required due to default.

The defendants, having successfully obtained a dismissal of the plaintiffs' action on limitation grounds, sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing the issues were not complex and that allegations of fraud were not adjudicated.

The court considered the complexity of the original claim, the significant amount claimed, the plaintiffs' pursuit of a statute-barred action despite early notice, and unsubstantiated allegations of fraud.

Applying Rule 57.01 factors, the court found that the plaintiffs' conduct warranted an award of costs higher than partial indemnity.

The plaintiffs sought court approval of an infant settlement and disbursement of funds.

The court approved the $58,000 settlement for the infant plaintiff, Bentley Hall, who suffered abuse at school.

However, the court declined to approve the request to pay the net settlement funds into a Registered Disability Savings Plan (RDSP), ordering them paid into court instead, citing a lack of exceptional circumstances to deviate from Rule 7.09(1).

Furthermore, the court refused to enforce the plaintiffs' contingency fee agreement (CFA) because it was not in writing, as required by the Solicitors Act and its Regulation.

The proposed legal fees were also deemed unreasonable and disproportionate, leading the court to assess and reduce them from $15,461.79 to $11,865 (including HST).

This decision addresses the final calculation of equalization payment and costs following a 13-day trial.

The court found the applicant, Daniel Parry, to be the successful party and awarded him costs on a full indemnity basis due to the respondent, Eda Parry's, unreasonable and bad faith conduct throughout the litigation, including breaches of court orders, failure to disclose, and untruthfulness.

The court reduced the claimed fees slightly for proportionality on minor issues.

The plaintiff mortgagee sought to recover over $1.3 million from the defendant guarantor.

The court previously determined that the mortgage amount could not be increased by payments made by the plaintiff's corporation.

This decision addresses the final judgment amount, post-trial interest adjustments, and costs.

The court calculated the amount owing under the mortgage to be $1,897.89.

It declined to suspend interest, finding no legal basis for it.

Regarding costs, the plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs, while the defendant sought costs against the plaintiff.

The court applied Rule 57.05(1) and exercised its discretion to deny costs to the plaintiff, given the minimal recovery compared to the amount claimed and the plaintiff's knowledge regarding the legal basis of her claim.

The court also found no legal basis to award costs to the defendant.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(a) and (b) to strike portions of the plaintiffs' Amended Amended Statement of Claim.

The claims at issue included breach of trust, misappropriation, defalcation, and relief under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) and Assignments and Preferences Act (APA), as well as interim relief.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the breach of trust, misappropriation, and defalcation claims, finding they were not plainly obvious to fail.

However, claims for declaratory relief under the BIA and claims under the APA were struck as premature, as were claims relying on an unproclaimed section of the Construction Act.

The court also dismissed the defendants' request for a declaration that deposits were forfeited, deeming it a mixed question of fact and law unsuitable for determination at the pleadings stage.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to set aside a registrar's order that dismissed their action for delay.

The action, initiated in 2012, sought $5,000,000 in damages against the City of Hamilton related to land development and an alleged 2005 agreement.

The court applied the four Reid factors to determine if the dismissal order should be set aside.

The plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the significant litigation delay, did not establish that the deadline was missed through inadvertence, and the court found a strong presumption of prejudice to the defendant due to the passage of time and the evolving nature of the plaintiffs' claim.

Consequently, the motion to set aside the dismissal order was denied, and the City was presumptively entitled to its costs.

The plaintiff, Janet Louise Hilson, sought to recover amounts from the defendant, Carole Evans, as guarantor of a second mortgage.

Hilson claimed her initial investment in the mortgage, payments made to keep a first mortgage in good standing, and amounts for repairs and renovations.

The court dismissed Hilson's claims for equitable subrogation for pre-purchase payments and for payments made by her corporation (177), finding these were not secured by the mortgage or properly proven.

Claims for repairs and renovations were also dismissed due to insufficient evidence.

The court found Hilson was entitled to recover her initial $170,000 investment plus simple interest, subject to credits from the power of sale of the mortgaged units.

Evans was not entitled to a credit for Hilson's settlement with her former lawyer, Reiber, as there was no evidentiary basis to link that recovery to the guaranteed debt.

Further submissions were invited for final calculations, interest adjustments, and costs.

This is a costs decision following a judgment that set aside a will and power of attorney due to undue influence by Robert Graham.

The applicant, Timothy Graham, sought costs from Robert personally.

The court found Robert liable for costs due to his actions in the making of the will and transfer of assets.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs payable by Robert to Timothy and also awarded a portion of Timothy's costs to be paid from the estate, recognizing the benefit to other siblings.

The court declined to award costs on a higher than partial indemnity scale, noting that Timothy's settlement offer did not qualify as a Rule 49 offer.

The Applicant (Mother) sought costs for her successful motion, where she was granted interim sole custody, child support, and sale of matrimonial property, and the Respondent's (Father's) cross-motion was dismissed.

The court awarded costs on a substantial indemnity scale, finding the Father's conduct, including inflammatory accusations, use of surveillance, and inappropriate presentation of evidence, to be unreasonable and in bad faith.

The Mother's costs were fixed at $3,373.93.

This trial decision addresses financial issues following a divorce, including occupation rent, imputation of income for child support, living expenses during cohabitation under one roof, enforceability of a Mehr (marriage deed), and equalization of net family property.

The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed and unreasonably deducting expenses, imputing an income of $45,000 for child support purposes.

Occupation rent was awarded to the applicant due to the high-conflict living situation.

The Mehr was deemed unenforceable under Ontario law due to lack of clarity and expert evidence.

An equalization payment was ordered in favour of the applicant.

The defendants, Lauren Stephen (Son) and Brenda Stephen (Mother), brought separate motions for summary judgment to dismiss claims against them arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The Son, who caused the collision, argued he was not civilly liable due to a mental disorder at the time.

The Mother argued she was not vicariously liable as the Son lacked her consent to possess her vehicle, and denied negligence in her supervision or control of the vehicle keys.

The court granted both motions, finding the Son met the Buckley test for mental illness in negligence, and the Mother was neither vicariously liable nor negligent, as she did not give consent and could not have foreseen the Son's actions.

The applicant challenged the validity of a will and power of attorney (POA) signed by the deceased, Jacqueline Pearl Graham, alleging lack of testamentary capacity, lack of knowledge and approval, undue influence, and suspicious circumstances.

The will named one son, Robert Graham, as sole beneficiary and estate trustee, and the POA allowed him to transfer the deceased's house to himself.

The court found suspicious circumstances, shifting the burden to Robert to prove capacity and knowledge/approval.

The court concluded that Robert failed to meet this burden, declared the will and POA invalid, and set aside the transfer of the house.

The applicant sought to pass his accounts for the estate of his late mother.

The respondent raised numerous objections, asserting that a trial was necessary due to conflicting evidence and incomplete records regarding estate assets, including a family business, household contents, and a bank account.

The court, applying Rule 74.18(13.1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, determined that a fair decision could not be made on the paper record and directed a trial on the unresolved issues.

Specific directions were given for joint retention of valuators for the business and property contents, and for trial procedures.

The defendant, Laurie Ann Hynds, brought a motion seeking a declaration that the plaintiff, Dino Lepre, was in contempt of a 1999 court order (the "Lofchik Order") and an order allowing her to unilaterally sell jointly owned property (the "Powassan bush lot").

Lepre opposed this relief and brought a counter-motion for partition or sale of the property under the Partition Act.

The court dismissed Hynds' motion, finding the Lofchik Order unenforceable due to a 19-year delay and mutual non-compliance by all parties.

The court also found it would be unjust to grant Hynds sole control over the sale given Lepre's efforts in maintaining the property.

Lepre's counter-motion for partition or sale was allowed to proceed as an application.