Lisa Freeman

The appellant was successful in his appeal against the Law Society of Upper Canada and sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found that while the time spent and hourly rates were generally acceptable, the total amounts claimed were excessive given the reasonable expectations of the losing party and the historical scale of costs in such appeals.

The court fixed costs at $7,500 for fees at the Divisional Court level and $12,000 for fees at the appeal tribunal level, plus disbursements and GST.

The appellant, a disbarred lawyer, appealed the Law Society's dismissal of his application for readmission.

The Law Society panels had found that the appellant met most criteria for readmission but failed to show he had purged his guilt and was extremely unlikely to re-offend, primarily because he continued to deny that he intentionally misappropriated funds.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the panels erred in law by effectively making an admission of guilt a precondition for reinstatement, contrary to established legal principles.

The Court ordered the appellant's readmission, remitting the matter to a Hearing Panel solely to determine appropriate conditions.

The appellant appealed a 12-month custodial sentence imposed after a guilty plea to two welfare fraud charges over $5,000 arising from the same facts.

The Court of Appeal held that the sentencing judge erred in principle by treating custody as presumptively required and by concluding that a conditional sentence was unavailable for welfare fraud.

Applying the conditional sentence framework under s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code, the court found the statutory requirements were met, noting the appellant's remorse, parental responsibilities, employment history, upgrading efforts, favourable pre-sentence report, and substantial restitution.

The custodial sentence was set aside and replaced with a conditional sentence of two years less one day, including house arrest and community service.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual offences against two child complainants and sought a proportionate sentence reduction if one conviction were overturned.

The court rejected challenges to the jury charge on reasonable doubt, held that any error in admitting two prior discreditable incidents was harmless, and found no reviewable prejudice arising from the treatment of prior statements.

On the second complainant's count, the court upheld admission of a videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code notwithstanding a delay of approximately two years, relying on the evidentiary record explaining delayed disclosure by a timid child witness.

The conviction appeals were dismissed, leave to appeal sentence was granted, and the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a conviction for importing marijuana arising from a controlled delivery and a subsequent search of her apartment.

The court held that police breached s. 10(b) by questioning the appellant while detained without advising her of the right to counsel, and that later admissions obtained after formal compliance remained temporally, contextually and causally connected to the original breach.

Once those admissions were excised, the information to obtain did not justify the search warrant, rendering the apartment search contrary to s. 8.

The admissions and the seized material were characterized as conscriptive evidence and excluded under s. 24(2).

Without that evidence, the conviction could not stand and an acquittal was entered.

The appellant appealed both conviction for attempted murder and an eight-year penitentiary sentence arising from a stabbing of his wife.

The Court of Appeal rejected arguments that the trial judge ignored a reasonable doubt, reversed the burden of proof, improperly treated psychiatric evidence concerning specific intent, or wrongly relied on post-offence statements.

On sentence, the court held that protection of the spouse was the dominant consideration and that the appellant’s mental illness did not necessarily reduce the otherwise fit sentence where the illness created future risk.

Fresh evidence concerning day parole and psychiatric conditions of release did not justify appellate intervention.