Roslyn J. Levine

The Attorney General brought a motion to stay a Superior Court judgment that declared the threshold requirements for political parties to receive quarterly allowances under the Canada Elections Act unconstitutional and read in a one-vote threshold.

The Attorney General argued the prospective payment order was automatically stayed as an order for the payment of money, or alternatively, that a stay should be granted under the tripartite test.

The Court of Appeal held the prospective order was not an order for the payment of money.

However, applying the test for a stay pending appeal, the Court found a serious issue to be tried regarding the potential politicization of the Chief Electoral Officer, irreparable harm to the public interest, and that the balance of convenience favoured maintaining the status quo.

The motion for a stay was granted.

The federal government amended the Canada Pension Plan to extend survivor benefits to same-sex partners, but limited eligibility to those whose partners died on or after January 1, 1998, and precluded payments for months before July 2000.

A class action challenged these temporal limits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the temporal limits infringed section 15(1) of the Charter and were not justified under section 1.

However, the Court denied fully retroactive relief, finding that the prior exclusion of same-sex partners was based on a reasonable understanding of the law before the Court's landmark decision in M. v. H., and that the government acted in good faith.

The Court also held that estates do not have standing to advance section 15(1) claims.

The appellant inmates, serving life sentences, were involuntarily transferred from a minimum-security to medium-security institutions based on a computerized reclassification scale.

They applied to the provincial superior court for habeas corpus.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that provincial superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Court to hear habeas corpus applications from federal inmates and should not decline jurisdiction merely because an alternative remedy exists.

The Court further held that while the transfers were not arbitrary, the Correctional Service of Canada breached its statutory duty of disclosure under s. 27(1) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act by failing to provide the scoring matrix used in the reclassification.

This breach of procedural fairness rendered the transfer decisions null and void for want of jurisdiction.

The appellant sued the federal government for sexual battery committed by an employee at a student residence 20 years earlier.

The trial judge awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, finding the abuse caused the appellant's alcoholism and subsequent loss of earnings.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the pecuniary damages, applying a 'rehearing' standard of review to substitute its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the standard of review for findings of fact in Saskatchewan is 'palpable and overriding error', consistent with the rest of Canada.

The Court restored the past loss of earnings award but ordered it reduced for time spent in prison and social assistance received, and upheld the dismissal of the future loss of earnings award.

The appellant sought a declaration that s. 43 of the Criminal Code, which justifies the reasonable use of force by way of correction by parents and teachers against children, violates ss. 7, 12, and 15(1) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 43 does not offend the Charter.

The Court found that s. 43 is not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment, and does not discriminate against children, as it is grounded in their actual needs and circumstances by protecting them from the blunt instrument of the criminal law for minor disciplinary contacts.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Canada Elections Act requirement that a political party must nominate candidates in at least 50 electoral districts to obtain registered party status and its associated benefits.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the 50-candidate threshold violates the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process guaranteed by section 3 of the Charter.

The Court found that the threshold diminishes the capacity of marginal or regional parties to communicate their ideas, thereby undermining the right of citizens to play a meaningful role in the electoral process.

The infringement was not justified under section 1 of the Charter, and the relevant provisions were declared unconstitutional.

Arrêt constitutionnel majeur portant sur l'exclusion des couples de même sexe de la définition du mariage aux fins de la common law.

La Cour a appliqué l'analyse du par. 15(1) de la Charte et conclu que la définition hétérosexuelle du mariage portait atteinte à la dignité et aux droits à l'égalité des couples de même sexe, sans justification au regard de l'article premier.

La Cour a rejeté les prétentions fondées sur la liberté de religion et l'égalité religieuse de l'église intervenante, concluant que l'affaire visait l'institution juridique du mariage plutôt que sa dimension religieuse.

Comme réparation, la Cour a déclaré invalide la définition existante dans la mesure où elle contenait les mots « d'un homme et d'une femme », l'a reformulée immédiatement comme l'union de deux personnes, et a ordonné la délivrance et l'enregistrement des mariages visés.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed a Divisional Court decision finding that the common law definition of marriage as between 'one man and one woman' violated the equality rights of same-sex couples under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from the institution of marriage demeaned their dignity and was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The Court allowed the cross-appeals on remedy, declaring the existing definition invalid and immediately reformulating it as 'the voluntary union for life of two persons to the exclusion of all others'.

The appellant, who suffers from AIDS, uses marihuana for medicinal purposes and obtained a personal exemption under s. 56 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

He applied for a declaration that his s. 7 Charter rights were infringed because the exemption did not protect his caregivers from criminal liability and the government failed to provide a safe supply of marihuana.

The Court of Appeal held that while the provincial superior court had jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge to the Act, the appellant failed to establish a s. 7 violation.

The Act itself did not preclude caregiver exemptions, and the appellant was not dependent on the government for his supply.

The appellant challenged the constitutionality of section 43 of the Criminal Code, which provides a defence for parents and teachers who use reasonable force to correct a child.

The appellant argued that the provision violates sections 7, 12, and 15 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while section 43 engages a child's security of the person, it does not violate the principles of fundamental justice.

The court also held that section 43 does not constitute state-imposed cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and any infringement of equality rights under section 15 is justified under section 1 of the Charter.

EGALE Canada Inc. moved for intervenor status as an added party in an application brought by same-sex couples seeking marriage licences.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the motion.

The court granted EGALE intervenor status under Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding that EGALE had a direct interest in the subject matter and could make a useful contribution by providing a different perspective from the applicants, specifically regarding relationship options and national context.

To prevent undue delay and prejudice, the court imposed strict conditions on EGALE's participation, limiting its evidence and cross-examination to its unique perspectives.

Media appellants challenged the federal election provision prohibiting the broadcasting, publication, or dissemination of new opinion survey results during the final three days of an election campaign.

The majority held that the ban infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not justified under s. 1 because the measure was overbroad, underinclusive, and failed minimal impairment.

The Court accepted that guarding against the possible influence of inaccurate late polls was a pressing and substantial objective, but found the evidentiary basis for broad deference insufficient and emphasized the central constitutional value of political expression.

The appeal was allowed and the provision was declared of no force or effect.

The appellant airlines purchased liquor abroad and stored it in customs bonded warehouses in Ontario for use on domestic and international flights.

The provincial liquor authorities charged markups and gallonage fees on the liquor.

The airlines sought restitution of the fees and a declaration that the provincial liquor monopoly was constitutionally inapplicable to their federal aeronautical undertaking.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the liquor was subject to the federal Importation of Intoxicating Liquors Act and that the provincial monopoly applied, as providing liquor is not an integral part of an aeronautical undertaking.

However, the Court ordered the provincial authorities to make full restitution of the gallonage fees wrongfully collected under an inapplicable licensing regime.

The appellant, born abroad to a Canadian mother and an American father before 1977, applied for Canadian citizenship.

Under the Citizenship Act, children of Canadian fathers were granted citizenship upon application, while children of Canadian mothers were required to undergo a security check and swear an oath.

The appellant's application was rejected due to outstanding criminal charges discovered during the security check.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the differential treatment based on the gender of the Canadian parent violated section 15(1) of the Charter and could not be saved under section 1.

The Court found that applying the Charter to the appellant's application was not an impermissible retrospective application, as it addressed his ongoing status at the time of his application.

Appeals concerning whether labour relations at a provincially owned utility's nuclear generating stations were governed by provincial or federal labour legislation.

The majority held that Parliament's declaratory power under s. 92(10)(c) and s. 91(29) validly brought the nuclear facilities within exclusive federal jurisdiction, and that labour relations were integral to the operation and management of those declared works.

A majority also held that atomic energy is a matter of national concern under the peace, order and good government power, and that labour relations at the nuclear facilities formed part of that jurisdiction.

The argument that provincial authority over electrical generation under s. 92A(1)(c) displaced federal authority was rejected.

The appeals were dismissed and the Canada Labour Code was held to apply to employees employed on or in connection with the nuclear facilities.

The appellant, a dual citizen of Ireland and the United Kingdom, was a former member of the INLA who was sentenced to death by the organization after he released hostages for reasons of conscience.

He fled to Canada and claimed Convention refugee status.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that state complicity is not a prerequisite for persecution under the refugee definition; a state's inability to protect its citizens is sufficient.

The Court also ruled that while the INLA is not a 'particular social group', the appellant's actions constituted an expression of political opinion for which he feared persecution.

However, because the appellant held dual nationality, the Court remitted the matter to the Board to determine whether he could be afforded protection in Great Britain.

The respondent, a natural father, was denied parental benefits under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971, which provided such benefits only to adoptive parents.

The trial judge found this violated s. 15 of the Charter and used s. 24(1) to read natural parents into the legislation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while reading in is a permissible remedy under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982, it was inappropriate in this case due to the budgetary implications and the lack of a clear legislative mandate.

The Court concluded that the proper remedy was to declare the provision invalid but suspend the declaration to allow Parliament to amend the legislation.

The appellant was convicted of gross indecency, found to be a dangerous offender, and sentenced to indeterminate detention prior to the enactment of the Charter.

Subsequently, gross indecency was removed from the definition of 'serious personal injury offence' in the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought habeas corpus and Charter relief, arguing his continued detention was unlawful because his offence no longer qualified for indeterminate detention.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the change in the law did not alter his status as a dangerous offender and his continued detention did not violate the Charter.