Raj Napal

The College of Early Childhood Educators appealed a penalty order imposing a four-month suspension and conditions on an early childhood educator for failing to supervise a child and breaching professional standards.

The College sought revocation of the educator's license, arguing the penalty was clearly unfit and inconsistent with the misconduct findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Discipline Committee properly considered mitigating factors, including a five-year period where the educator could not work due to unproven abuse allegations, and did not err in applying the principle of proportionality.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80, arguing the trial judge provided insufficient reasons on a s. 10(b) Charter application regarding his right to counsel.

The appellant claimed the trial judge failed to explain why he preferred the police officers' evidence over his own.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not make a negative credibility finding, but rather relied on the uncontroverted evidence that the arresting officer read the right to counsel from a card while the appellant was in the police cruiser.

The reasons were deemed sufficient for appellate review.

The respondents brought a motion to enforce a settlement agreement against the applicant, who had initially sought an interest in a property held by a family trust.

The applicant argued that no binding agreement was reached due to a lack of agreement on the specific terms of a mutual release, which he considered an essential term, and that he entered the agreement under duress.

The court applied contract law principles and Rule 49.09, finding that a mutual intention to settle existed and all essential terms were agreed upon.

It held that the specific wording of a release is not a material term unless explicitly made conditional, and rejected the duress claim due to a lack of credible evidence.

The settlement was enforced, and the applicant's original application was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and touching for a sexual purpose after allegedly performing cunnilingus on a ten-year-old child who was sleeping over at his residence.

The Crown's case relied on the testimony of the child and DNA evidence showing the accused's amylase on the child's underwear.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming he was at work at the time and suggesting the DNA transfer was due to innocent contamination.

The court rejected the accused's evidence, accepted the child's testimony as corroborated by the DNA evidence, and found the accused guilty of both charges.

The accused was charged with impaired driving and over 80 following a severe single-vehicle collision in Burlington on April 23, 2013.

The accused brought multiple Charter applications challenging the validity of the arrest, the breath demand, and the procedures followed at the hospital.

The court dismissed all Charter applications, finding that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest based on a constellation of factors including the unexplained severe collision, observations of disorientation and unsteadiness, odour of alcohol, admission of alcohol consumption, and physical indicators consistent with impairment.

The court found the accused's rights to counsel were properly respected and that the hospital setting did not prevent adequate privacy for consultation with counsel.

The accused was convicted of impaired driving.

In ongoing case-managed proceedings involving a proposed vexatious litigant declaration under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, the applicant sought the case management judge’s recusal and challenged portions of affidavit evidence as inadmissible hearsay.

The court held that evidentiary questions regarding the scope of cross-examination and admissibility should be determined by the judge hearing the substantive s. 140 application.

The judge concluded that, as the assigned case management judge overseeing all related proceedings, he had jurisdiction to hear the s. 140 application and that doing so was the most practical and proportionate course.

The court rejected arguments that prior interlocutory rulings created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The motion for recusal was dismissed.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with more than 80 milligrams of alcohol in 100 milliliters of blood.

The trial judge found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired care or control based on the totality of circumstances, including the accused's disorientation, admission of drinking, odour of alcohol, and the manner in which the vehicle was parked on a highway.

However, the trial judge found that the officer breached the accused's Charter rights under section 10(b) by failing to inform him of his right to counsel immediately upon arrest, instead delaying 16 minutes to administer an Approved Screening Device test.

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The accused was acquitted.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable and that the gas company's conduct broke the chain of causation between his tampering with a gas meter and the subsequent explosion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant altered the meter and that his actions were a substantial contributing cause of the explosion.

The court also rejected the admission of fresh evidence, finding it immaterial.

The defendants brought motions in two mortgage enforcement proceedings seeking broad relief including setting aside a prior summary judgment, vacating writs of execution and notices of garnishment, and reopening mortgage accounting.

At the hearing, newly retained counsel for the defendants sought an adjournment after acknowledging that the motion materials were unfocused and procedurally unsuitable for many of the issues raised.

The court granted an adjournment in order to narrow the issues, limiting any future motion to whether the mortgage judgment had been satisfied and whether enforcement steps such as writs and garnishments should be lifted.

A related motion in a second mortgage matter was also adjourned, with the court observing that the issues were more appropriately addressed through the mortgage costs assessment process.

Costs were awarded against the moving parties for the unnecessary expense caused by their broad motion materials and subsequent adjournment request.

The plaintiffs brought a medical malpractice action alleging negligence and lack of informed consent arising from cosmetic breast augmentation and tummy tuck surgery.

The court excluded the plaintiffs’ expert evidence because the expert lacked familiarity with the Ontario standard of care, leaving no admissible evidence on the negligence claim.

The court therefore dismissed the standard of care allegations but proceeded on the issue of informed consent.

Considering the patient’s limited English proficiency, education, and the circumstances surrounding the consultations and consent forms, the court found that the physician failed to ensure the patient understood the material risks and consequences of the procedures.

The court held that a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances would not have proceeded had adequate disclosure been made, and awarded damages.

The appellant appealed a committal order and sought judicial review of a surrender order to the United States.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the Minister's surrender order, noting that even if the appellant's affidavit was accepted as fresh evidence, it did not afford a basis to remit the issue of surrender to the Minister.

The appeal was dismissed, and the appeal from the committal order was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed his conviction for unlawfully entering Canada after being the subject of a removal order.

At trial, the judge allowed the Crown to rely on issue estoppel to prevent the appellant from attempting to prove he was a Canadian citizen.

Applying the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Mahalingam, the Court of Appeal held that the Crown cannot rely on issue estoppel against an accused.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The applicant's application for statutory accident benefits was previously dismissed after the applicant and his counsel failed to attend the hearing.

The insurer sought expenses of $6,723.58.

The arbitrator reduced the counsel hours claimed from 55 to 40 and adjusted the hourly rate to comply with the Legal Aid Services Act.

The arbitrator ordered the applicant to pay $3,588.72 in expenses to the insurer.

The arbitrator declined to order the applicant's counsel to pay any portion of the expenses personally under s. 282 of the Insurance Act, finding that the counsel did not cause unnecessary expenses or delays, and the fault lay with the client.

The applicant failed to attend a peremptory preliminary issues hearing regarding his claim for statutory accident benefits.

His counsel requested an adjournment, stating the applicant was in the Philippines, but provided no evidence or instructions.

The arbitrator dismissed the application due to the applicant's failure to meet his onus of establishing a basis for his claim.

The arbitrator also ordered expenses payable to the insurer and allowed submissions on whether the applicant's counsel should be personally liable for a portion of the costs.

The appellant appealed an arbitration decision that dismissed her claims for income replacement and housekeeping benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The Arbitrator had excluded the expert testimony of the appellant's two medical witnesses regarding her disability because she failed to serve a will-say statement under Rule 42 of the Dispute Resolution Practice Code.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate found that the Arbitrator erred in law by failing to consider whether the medical reports already filed provided adequate notice of the substance of the experts' testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the arbitration orders were revoked, and the matter was remitted for a new hearing before a different arbitrator.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's claim for statutory accident benefits, the insurer sought its expenses of the arbitration proceeding.

The arbitrator found that the applicant was completely unsuccessful and had failed to provide any reliable independent evidence of payments to a replacement worker, rendering the proceeding borderline frivolous.

The applicant was ordered to pay the insurer's expenses in the amount of $3,686.25.

The applicant sought income replacement benefits and housekeeping expenses following a motor vehicle accident.

She claimed she was unable to perform her work as an electrolysist and had to hire a replacement worker.

The arbitrator found the applicant's financial records unreliable and unsupported by source documentation.

The arbitrator concluded that the applicant continued to work after the accident at or above her pre-accident level and did not hire a replacement worker.

The claims for income replacement benefits, housekeeping expenses, and a special award were dismissed.