Philip Norton

The accused was tried on multiple historical sexual offence charges arising from alleged abuse of his step-daughter when she was between approximately eight and ten years old.

Applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court found the complainant's account compelling in many respects and rejected several defence theories grounded in stereotypical assumptions about victim behaviour and delayed disclosure.

However, the court remained troubled by material inconsistencies, including a false denial about obtaining a friend's police statement and discrepancies concerning key sexual acts.

Although the court preferred much of the complainant's evidence and considered guilt probable, it was not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt and entered acquittals on all counts.

The appellant was convicted of theft under $5,000 and possession of property obtained by crime after a stolen vehicle was found abandoned with a balaclava inside containing his DNA.

The trial judge relied on the DNA evidence and the proximity of the theft to other crimes the appellant was acquitted of.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as the DNA evidence only proved the appellant wore the balaclava at some point, not that he possessed it during the theft.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and an acquittal was entered.

The accused applied for a bail review.

In this addendum to the original reasons, the court amended the terms of release on consent of the parties.

The accused was granted judicial interim release upon entering into a $50,000 recognizance with one named surety and subject to various conditions, including house arrest, a weapons prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The accused applied for a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after spending 32 months in pre-trial custody on charges including drug trafficking and participating in a criminal organization.

The court found that the lengthy pre-trial custody constituted a material change in circumstances justifying a review of the initial detention order.

The court concluded that the proposed strict release plan, supervised by a reliable surety, adequately addressed the secondary ground for detention.

The accused was ordered released on a $50,000 recognizance with strict conditions.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for committing an indecent act and dangerous driving.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant of the indecent act based on a perceived legal presumption that intent to act wilfully arises when the act is seen by another person.

The appeal court found this to be a legal error, as no such presumption exists, and ordered a new trial on the indecent act charge.

The appeal against the dangerous driving conviction was dismissed, as the trial judge reasonably concluded the appellant's driving in heavy fog was a marked departure from the standard of care.

The appellant appealed his conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the conviction did not depend on accepting the police evidence, as the appellant's own evidence established both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder, pointing a firearm, and breach of recognizance, as well as his life sentence for attempted murder.

The victim was shot six times at point-blank range and paralyzed.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the reliability of the eyewitness identification evidence, which included recognition by the victim and an independent witness.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's exemplary assessment of the identification evidence.

The court also upheld the life sentence, finding it proportionate to the grave, unprovoked nature of the crime and the need to deter gun violence in public places.

The accused was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after the victim identified him as the attacker.

At trial, the lead investigating police officer testified for the Crown, providing a narrative of the investigation that included hearsay and his personal opinion that the accused was guilty.

The trial judge failed to give the jury a limiting instruction regarding the permissible use of this investigative hearsay and opinion evidence.

The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions due to this error.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that while the omission of a limiting instruction was an error of law, it was harmless in the context of the trial and caused no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice under the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he argued that police conducted an unauthorized search and breached his s. 10(b) Charter rights following an investigative detention.

The Court of Appeal declined to entertain the Charter arguments as they were not raised before the trial judge.

Furthermore, the court found that the police's actions did not amount to a search, as the appellant's clothing was in plain view and no pat-down occurred until after his arrest.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant sought a reduction of his 4.5-year sentence to a reformatory term to contest a deportation order.

The court dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was within an acceptable range and a major adjustment was not warranted.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after fatally stabbing the victim following a dispute.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding post-offence conduct, the common sense inference of intent, and the 'rolled-up' charge on mens rea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury instructions were adequate, properly cautioned the jury, and correctly placed the burden of proof on the Crown.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentence for firearms and driving offences.

He argued that the police violated his s. 8 Charter rights by searching his vehicle after he was arrested for failing to identify himself under the Highway Traffic Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police did not know the appellant's identity with certainty and that the search of the vehicle for identification was progressive and reasonable.

The conviction and the five-year sentence were upheld, noting the appellant's lengthy criminal record and breaches of prohibitions.

The appellant was convicted of attempted murder, robbery, and forcible confinement after a third trial, the first two having resulted in hung juries.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in failing to give a limiting instruction regarding the lead police investigator's testimony, which included hearsay and personal opinions on the appellant's guilt.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the failure to provide a limiting instruction was a fatal error that could have led the jury to believe the police possessed undisclosed inculpatory evidence.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso given the prior hung juries, and entered a stay of proceedings rather than ordering a fourth trial.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, he argued that his right to the assistance of an interpreter under s. 14 of the Charter was violated because his assigned interpreter was not accredited.

He also raised several grounds of appeal relating to the trial judge's jury instructions on identification evidence, the mental element for murder, post-offence conduct, and intoxication, as well as evidentiary rulings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to establish a violation of his s. 14 Charter rights, as he had agreed to the interpreter arrangement and never complained of any lack of understanding during the trial.

The Court also found no reversible errors in the jury instructions or evidentiary rulings.

The appellant was tried by a jury for attempted murder and breach of probation.

The jury acquitted him of attempted murder but convicted him of aggravated assault.

The trial judge inadvertently instructed the jury on self-defence under s. 34(1) of the Criminal Code instead of s. 34(2), despite agreement among counsel that only s. 34(2) applied.

The Crown conceded this was a serious legal error.

Additionally, the trial judge withdrew the breach of probation count from the jury and recorded the conviction himself, which he lacked jurisdiction to do.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside both convictions, and ordered a new trial.