Peter Quinlan

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision, arguing that his responsibilities had changed following the hiring of a new senior employee, which he contended amounted to a constructive dismissal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's argument directly contradicted the trial judge's factual findings.

The trial judge had expressly found that the appellant maintained his role as general manager, that there was no change in the company's hierarchy, and no evidence of a change in his remuneration or bonus package.

The appellate court concluded that the trial judge made no legal error and that her well-supported factual findings were fatal to the appellant's position.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dated January 27, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The defendants brought a motion seeking joinder of three separate actions initiated by the plaintiff, 2209509 Ontario Inc. operating as Norfolk Fairway Estates, concerning claims for "extras" on new home constructions.

They also sought an order for security for costs.

The plaintiff opposed both requests.

The court granted the joinder, finding common questions of law and fact across the actions and that joinder would promote the convenient administration of justice.

The court also granted the order for security for costs, determining that the plaintiff, an amalgamated corporation, had not sufficiently demonstrated it possessed exigible assets in Ontario to cover potential costs.

An estate dispute arose concerning the validity of a will, with applicants alleging lack of capacity and undue influence by the respondent.

Following an unsuccessful summary judgment motion by the respondent and subsequent mediation, all substantive issues were settled, but the determination of costs was referred to the court.

The court declined to award costs for the litigation, finding it impossible to determine success or fault without adjudicating the merits of the settled claims.

However, the court ordered that costs previously awarded to the applicants from the summary judgment motion be paid from the estate, and dismissed all outstanding objections and claims to facilitate the respondent's appointment as estate trustee.

This appeal concerns a boundary dispute between two cottage owners on Lake Erie.

The respondents constructed a road and steps on what they believed was their property to improve access to the lakeshore, permitting the appellant and other neighbours to use these improvements.

Upon discovering that much of the work had been performed on the appellant's adjacent lot, the appellant sued for trespass damages.

The respondents counterclaimed for title by adverse possession.

The trial judge dismissed the appellant's trespass claim and granted the respondents title to approximately 3,400 square feet by adverse possession.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by granting the adverse possession claim without making an explicit finding that the respondents had effectively excluded the appellant from possession.

The evidence demonstrated the opposite—the respondents had permitted the appellant and others to use the road and steps freely.

The defendants brought a motion to strike portions of an amended statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal and defamation action brought by a former deputy fire chief against a municipality and its fire chief.

The impugned pleadings relied upon statements allegedly contained in a confidential report prepared for an in camera municipal council meeting concerning the plaintiff’s termination.

The court had previously ruled that the report was protected by solicitor-client and communications privilege under the Wigmore framework and was not producible.

Applying Rule 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and authority holding that references to privileged communications are scandalous, frivolous, or vexatious, the court found the pleading constituted an abuse of process.

The motion was granted and the offending paragraphs were struck, though the plaintiff was granted leave to bring a further motion to amend without relying on the privileged communication.