Matthew Horner

The appellant, a manager at a provincial jail, filed a human rights complaint after the respondent union president posted sexist comments about her on a union blog during a labour dispute.

The Human Rights Tribunal dismissed the complaint, finding the conduct did not constitute discrimination 'with respect to employment' under s. 5(1) of the Human Rights Code, after balancing the Code's objectives with the respondent's Charter rights to freedom of expression and association.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that administrative tribunals must consider Charter values when interpreting their home statutes, even absent ambiguity, and that the Tribunal's balancing of these rights was reasonable.

The appellant sought to lay a private information against a police officer for an offence under the Highway Traffic Act.

The justice of the peace refused to receive the information because the appellant lacked the consent of a police officer required by s. 39.1(9) of the HTA.

The appellant's application for mandamus was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that a prosecution is instituted when an information is laid, meaning the justice of the peace correctly refused to receive it without the required consent.

The Court also dismissed the appellant's Charter challenge, finding that differential treatment of informants based on occupation does not violate s. 15(1).

The appellant, suffering from liver cancer, was deemed ineligible for a liver transplant in Ontario.

He obtained a life-saving living-related liver transplant in England at a cost of $450,000 and sought reimbursement from OHIP.

The Health Services Appeal and Review Board denied the claim, finding the treatment was not an 'insured service' under s. 28.4(2) of Regulation 552 because it was not generally accepted in Ontario as appropriate for a person in his medical circumstances.

The Divisional Court upheld the decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board's decision was reasonable and that the regulation did not violate section 7 of the Charter, as it did not deprive the appellant of life or security of the person but merely limited a financial benefit.

The appellant consented to the dismissal of the appeal on the basis that there would be no costs in the Court of Appeal or the court below.

The Court of Appeal ordered the dismissal on consent.

The plaintiff sued the defendant law firm for negligence after the expiry of the statutory limitation period, pursuant to a tolling agreement.

The defendant then commenced third party proceedings for contribution and indemnity against the third party accountants.

The third parties successfully moved for summary judgment dismissing the claim against them because the statutory limitation period between the plaintiff and the third parties had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendant's appeal, holding that section 8 of the Negligence Act applies to all contribution claims and requires the main action to be commenced within the applicable statutory limitation period, which was not done here.