M. Huberman

The applicant, convicted of planned and deliberate first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years, applied under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code for judicial screening of a "faint hope" application to reduce his parole ineligibility period.

The court considered the statutory factors under ss. 745.61 and 745.63, including the horrific nature of the offence, the applicant's post-offence conduct, his purported acceptance of responsibility and remorse, his conduct in custody, victim impact evidence, and risk assessments.

Despite acknowledging some genuine progress in custody and low to low-moderate risk of reoffending, the court found that the applicant's late-breaking claim of remorse was opportunistic and not genuine, his criminal thinking remained entrenched, and there was no reasonable prospect a unanimous jury would reduce his parole ineligibility.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, convicted of first-degree murder for his role in a contract killing, brought a faint hope application under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code seeking to reduce his 25-year parole ineligibility period.

The court conducted a judicial screening to determine if there was a reasonable prospect of success before a jury.

Despite some recent positive behaviour in custody, the court dismissed the application, citing the heinous nature of the contract killing, the applicant's failure to fully accept responsibility, and his extensive history of institutional misconduct.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Information and Privacy Commissioner decision ordering a hospital to disclose a linen services contract and a memorandum summarizing its terms.

The applicant argued the records contained financial information supplied in confidence during a bid process, exempting them from disclosure under s. 17(1)(a) of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Adjudicator reasonably concluded that the contract was the product of negotiations and the information was mutually generated, not supplied in confidence.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of a loaded prohibited firearm, breach of a weapons prohibition, and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence agreed that the appropriate sentence before pre-sentence custody credit was seven years.

The court considered the exceptionally harsh conditions of the offender's pre-sentence custody, including frequent lockdowns and COVID-19 restrictions at the Toronto South Detention Centre.

Applying the principles from Duncan and Marshall, the court reduced the otherwise appropriate sentence by two years to account for these harsh conditions, resulting in a five-year sentence.

After applying enhanced credit for time served, the offender was sentenced to 98 days going forward.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment that denied its claim for damages for breach of contract and allowed the respondent employee's counterclaim for unpaid commission.

The employee had been terminated for cause after the employer discovered he was performing work for another business on company time and taking steps to start a competing business.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal in part, finding the trial judge made a palpable and overriding error by failing to order the disgorgement of the $5,152.15 the employee earned from the undisclosed work.

The award for unpaid commission was upheld, and the trial costs award against the employer was set aside due to the employee's egregious conduct.