Luba Kowal

Following his conviction for assaulting his wife, the requester sought access to the Crown brief and related documents under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Ministry denied access under the solicitor-client exemption in s. 19 of the Act.

The adjudicator ordered disclosure, finding that the exemption under the second branch of s. 19 terminated when the litigation ended and that privilege was waived for documents disclosed to defence counsel.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court quashed the decision, holding that the statutory exemption in s. 19 does not terminate with the litigation and is not waived by the Crown's mandatory Stinchcombe disclosure.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that there was evidence to sustain the Board's finding of significant risk and that the order was not unreasonable when issued.

However, noting that the appellant's regular review was overdue and that fresh evidence suggested an emerging consensus that the appellant was fit to reside in the community under supervision, the Court ordered the Board to expedite the review.

The plaintiffs in a civil action arising from an assault sought production of police and Crown records relating to the young offenders who committed the assault.

The motion judge ordered production under the Rules of Civil Procedure, and a subsequent judge ordered compliance subject to a vetting process.

The Attorney General appealed, arguing that the Youth Criminal Justice Act (YCJA) provides the exclusive mechanism for accessing such records.

The Court of Appeal agreed, holding that section 118(1) of the YCJA clearly and unambiguously limits access to young offender records to the procedures set out in that Act, precluding the Superior Court from ordering production under Rule 30.10 or its inherent jurisdiction.

The appeal was allowed and the production order set aside.

The Attorney General for Ontario moved for a stay of an order requiring the production of a videotaped police statement in a civil action, pending an application for leave to appeal.

The videotape was made by the plaintiff regarding sexual assault allegations against a former teacher of the defendant school, and had already been disclosed to the accused in the related criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for a stay, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding the Master's jurisdiction or the application of litigation privilege, no irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience strongly favoured the parties in the civil action.

The requester sought access to photos and a video from a closed Crown prosecutor's file under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The inquiry officer ordered disclosure, finding that the litigation privilege exemption under s. 19 ended when the prosecution concluded.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision on judicial review.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the legislative intent of s. 19 was to provide a permanent exemption for Crown counsel's work product, akin to solicitor-client privilege.

The applicant sought judicial review of the Minister's decision to revoke his appointment to an industry advisory committee.

The Minister revoked the appointment after learning the applicant was a member of the Hell's Angels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Minister's exercise of discretion was not unreasonable and that the revocation did not violate the applicant's freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

A dissenting judge would have quashed the decision, finding the revocation unreasonable given the applicant's good character, qualifications, and the fixed term of the appointment.

The requester, an insurance company, sought access to Crown files prepared for a criminal prosecution under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA).

The Attorney General refused disclosure, and an Inquiry Officer ordered partial disclosure, finding that litigation privilege under s. 19 of FIPPA terminated when the criminal proceedings ended.

On judicial review, the Divisional Court held that the Inquiry Officer's interpretation of s. 19 was unreasonable and wrong in law, as the statutory exemption for records prepared by Crown counsel for litigation does not incorporate common law limitations on litigation privilege.

The Attorney General's application was allowed, and the requester's application regarding privacy exemptions under s. 21 was dismissed.

The appellants appealed an order striking their third party claims against the Attorney General of Ontario for breach of fiduciary duty and malicious failure to prosecute.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred by concluding that the Attorney General can never owe a fiduciary duty in the prosecutorial function, as the categories of fiduciary are not closed.

The Court also held that the motions judge improperly relied on affidavit evidence on a Rule 21 motion to conclude that the malicious failure to prosecute claim was incapable of proof.

The third party claims were reinstated.