Liz Tinker

The appellants purchased land near Sturgeon Lake and commissioned a survey indicating their property abutted land owned by the Long Beach Residents' Association.

They claimed that a portion of Long Beach's land between their property and the lake shore was originally part of their parcel and should be conveyed to them.

The application judge dismissed their claim, finding that Long Beach's property was originally a water lot conveyed to the federal government and that fill was deposited to construct a wharf, moving the shoreline eastward.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding the factual findings well-grounded in evidence and that survey monuments supported the boundary determination.

The court also dismissed the appellants' riparian rights claim, finding any such rights would have been extinguished under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

The parties brought cross-motions regarding refusals and undertakings from examinations for discovery.

The plaintiff sought to compel answers from the defendants and the Attorney General, while the Attorney General sought to compel answers from the plaintiff, clarify the scope of the pleadings, and obtain foundational information for the plaintiff's expert report.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce a refused sales graph, amend its pleadings to clarify the temporal scope and damages claim, and provide the foundational information for its expert report.

The plaintiff's motion against the Attorney General was dismissed, as the court found the undertaking regarding correspondence with U.S. regulators was adequately answered.

The Attorney General of Canada brought an action for unjust enrichment to recover $194,000 USD mistakenly paid to the defendants.

The funds were intended for another claimant under a United Nations compensation program but were erroneously sent to the defendant wife.

The defendants cashed the cheque and spent the funds, later arguing estoppel and change of position.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the defendants knew or ought to have known the funds were misdirected.

The court rejected the defendants' defences, finding no juristic reason for the enrichment, and ordered the defendants to repay the outstanding balance of the funds plus interest and costs.

On an appeal from a Master's discovery order, the appellants challenged findings that they had failed to substantiate privilege claims over documents listed or redacted in documentary production.

The court upheld the finding that the moving parties had not met their burden to justify privilege and criticized their shifting positions, inadequate evidence, and misuse of procedural advantages available to government litigants.

However, the court held that Rule 30.06 does not permit wholesale disclosure merely because privilege has not been proven; disclosure may only be ordered after a positive determination that the document is not privileged.

After personally reviewing the disputed documents, the court upheld all remaining privilege claims except for one limited redaction and awarded the respondent partial indemnity costs.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy appealed a decision allowing 407 ETR to enforce pre-bankruptcy toll debts against a discharged bankrupt by directing the Registrar of Motor Vehicles to refuse to renew the bankrupt's vehicle permit under s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act.

The Court of Appeal found no operational conflict between the provincial legislation and s. 178(2) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as dual compliance was possible.

However, the Court held that s. 22(4) of the Highway 407 Act frustrated the federal legislative purpose of providing a discharged bankrupt with a financial 'fresh start'.

Consequently, the doctrine of federal paramountcy applied, rendering s. 22(4) inoperative to the extent that it thwarted the fresh start purpose of the BIA.

The appellants, creditors of a bankrupt corporation, sought leave under s. 215 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence a negligence action against the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the proposed action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellants argued that subsequent appeals of a Registrar's decision regarding the trustee's misconduct tolled the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's finding that all material facts were known to the appellants by June 23, 2008, and the subsequent appeals did not affect the limitation period.

The Superintendent of Bankruptcy sought to appeal a Superior Court decision that found no operational conflict between the Highway 407 Act's vehicle permit denial provisions and the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act's discharge provisions.

The Superintendent had not been a party to the lower court proceedings. 407 ETR moved to quash the appeal for lack of standing.

The Court of Appeal held that while the Superintendent does not have an automatic right to appeal as a non-party, the court has jurisdiction under s. 193(e) of the BIA to grant leave to appeal in exceptional circumstances.

Finding that the Superintendent was deprived of notice below and raised issues of systemic importance, the Court granted an extension of time and leave to appeal.

The moving creditors in a bankruptcy sought leave under s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to commence an action relating to the administration of the bankrupt estate, and also sought leave under s. 215 of the Act to include the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy and two of its employees as defendants.

The proposed claim against the regulatory authority and its employees alleged negligence in the investigation and handling of complaints about the trustee’s conduct.

The court held that all material facts supporting the negligence claim were known by June 23, 2008, when a registrar issued a decision finding misconduct by the trustee.

Accordingly, any claim against the regulatory authority defendants was barred by the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

Leave to include those defendants was refused, but authorization under s. 38 to pursue claims against other defendants was granted.

The appellant was catastrophically injured in a horseback riding accident while participating in a national youth volunteer program in Alberta.

She sued the program operators, the group leader, and the federal Crown in Ontario.

The trial judge found the defendants breached their duty of care but dismissed the action on the basis that the negligence did not cause the injury.

The trial judge also held that she would have exercised her discretion to extend the applicable Alberta limitation period, which had expired.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority upheld the trial judge's findings on causation, concluding there was no palpable and overriding error.

In a concurring opinion, Laskin J.A. found the trial judge's causation analysis unsatisfactory but agreed the action should be dismissed because it was statute-barred under Alberta law, and the court had no discretion to extend the limitation period following the Supreme Court's decision in Tolofson.