Andrew Parley

The responding parties brought an application seeking declaratory relief regarding the moving parties' alleged failure to retain an operator for a light rail transit project.

The moving parties brought a motion to stay the application in favour of arbitration, relying on a dispute resolution clause in prior Minutes of Settlement.

The court granted the stay, applying the competence-competence principle and finding that the moving parties established an arguable case that the dispute fell within the arbitration agreement.

The court also found no undue delay by the moving parties in seeking the stay.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that set aside a Registrar's administrative dismissal of the respondent's action for delay.

The respondent law firm had commenced an action alleging wrongful solicitation of clients by the appellants.

The action was dismissed five years later under Rule 48.14.

The Superior Court found that the Master made several legal and palpable and overriding errors in applying the Reid factors, including equating delay with the litigation not advancing at all, lowering the bar for what it means to prosecute an action, and improperly shifting the burden of proving prejudice to the appellants.

The appeal was allowed, the Master's decision was set aside, and the Registrar's dismissal was upheld.

The applicants sought declarations that the respondent, the mayor of Caledon, contravened the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act by voting on land development matters in which he allegedly had a pecuniary interest.

The court found no evidence that the respondent had a direct or indirect pecuniary interest in the matters voted upon, noting that his property was located several kilometers away from the developments and any potential development of his land was decades in the future.

Both applications were dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to enforce answers to questions refused on cross-examination and a motion to adduce fresh evidence, following an adjournment of an underlying motion to vary a Mareva order.

The non-parties sought costs for the adjournment and the motions.

The court found the non-parties were mostly successful overall and awarded them costs on a partial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at $9,610 for one non-party and $4,310 for the other after assessing the reasonableness of the claimed fees.

The applicants, a group of mortgage investors, applied to appoint a receiver over the property of the respondent, a not-for-profit corporation operating a church and school, due to an outstanding loan balance of approximately $11.5 million.

The respondent had previously commenced an action against the applicants alleging conspiracy and seeking restitution.

The court dismissed the application, finding it was not just and convenient to appoint a receiver because the respondent raised triable issues, the property value greatly exceeded the debt, and a receivership would effectively end the ongoing litigation and negatively impact the church and school.

The defendant landlord moved for a mandatory interlocutory injunction to compel the plaintiff tenant to allow access to the leased premises for environmental testing related to redevelopment.

The landlord relied on a lease provision requiring the tenant not to hinder redevelopment.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the lease provision did not grant the landlord a right of access, the landlord's case on the merits was weak, and there was insufficient evidence of irreparable harm.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend a statement of claim to plead that certain corporate defendants were sham entities incorporated to perpetrate a fraud and to seek relief piercing the corporate veil against individuals controlling the corporations.

The defendants opposed, arguing the amendment introduced a new cause of action barred by the Limitations Act, 2002.

The court held the proposed amendment did not introduce a new cause of action but instead sought an additional remedy arising from facts already pleaded, namely alleged fraudulent misrepresentations and misuse of corporate entities.

Alternatively, the court found that even if a new cause of action were pleaded, the limitation period had not expired because discoverability arose only after examinations for discovery revealed that the corporations conducted no legitimate insurance business.

Leave to amend was granted.

The applicant brought an application under the Municipal Conflict of Interest Act (MCIA) seeking to declare the respondent's seat on Toronto City Council vacant.

The respondent, the Mayor of Toronto, had previously been found to have violated the Code of Conduct and was ordered to reimburse $3,150 to donors.

At a subsequent Council meeting, the respondent spoke and voted on a motion to rescind that repayment obligation.

The court found that the respondent had a pecuniary interest in the matter and breached s. 5(1) of the MCIA.

The court rejected arguments that the MCIA did not apply to Code of Conduct violations, that the repayment order was ultra vires, or that the interest was too insignificant to influence him.

The court also found the breach was not committed through inadvertence or an error in judgment.

The application was granted and the respondent's seat was declared vacant.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion for an interlocutory injunction against the vendor of its IT business and several former employees who joined a newly established direct competitor.

The vendor had signed a non-competition and non-solicitation agreement upon the sale of the business.

The court found that the strong prima facie case standard applied to the restrictive covenant in the context of a sale of a business.

The court held that the non-competition clause was reasonable, except for a 10 km geographic extension which was severed using the blue-pencil doctrine.

The court granted the injunction against the vendor and the other defendants, finding they were impressed with fiduciary duties, and ordered the preservation and forensic review of electronic devices due to a strong prima facie case of misappropriation of confidential information.