Joyce Harris

A former law firm partner brought an application disputing liability for goodwill payments and accounting fees following his withdrawal from the partnership.

The central issue was whether the goodwill buy‑in constituted a fixed obligation payable over five years or annual payments contingent on continued partnership membership.

The court held that the parties had not expressly addressed early departure and that the available documentation and surrounding circumstances supported the interpretation that goodwill payments were contingent on partnership earnings during each year.

As the applicant left the partnership after two years, he was not liable for the remaining goodwill payments.

The court also held that accounting services incurred to resolve disputes regarding the firm's records were firm expenses, not the applicant’s personal liability.

The defendant corporation brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action for wrongful dismissal arising from the termination of a management consulting agreement.

The defendant alleged that the plaintiff consultant committed a “criminal act of dishonesty” by installing hidden surveillance cameras to intercept private communications at a company property, relying on a prior finding that the conduct breached s. 184(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that determining whether the criminal act constituted dishonesty within the contractual clause, and whether the act was intended to result in personal gain at the company’s expense, required a contextual assessment of intent and surrounding corporate conflict.

Given conflicting evidence regarding the plaintiff’s motives and the broader corporate struggle between board factions, the issues were unsuitable for determination on a summary judgment record.

A full trial was required to properly assess credibility and context.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment regarding compensation for services related to ATM machines, interest on loans, and the application of the Partnership Act.

The appellant also brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence consisting of a sentencing hearing transcript of a fact witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding the fresh evidence would not affect the trial judge's conclusions.

The appeal was also dismissed, as the court found no misapprehension of evidence and ample support for the trial judge's findings on compensation, interest, and partnership.

The appellant sought to review and set aside an order requiring him to post $40,000 as security for costs to proceed with his appeal.

The motion judge had ordered security under rule 61.06(1)(a) on the basis that the appeal was frivolous and vexatious and the appellant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario.

The Court of Appeal set aside the order, finding that the respondent failed to meet the onus of demonstrating the appellant had insufficient assets, as the evidence relied upon related to past cash flow issues rather than current asset ownership.

A dissenting judge would have upheld the order.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory injunction granted in favour of the defendants in a dispute between two family-owned companies over commercial lease rent payments.

The plaintiffs argued the motions judge erred in finding irreparable harm and exceeded his jurisdiction by characterizing their conduct as illegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision and concluding the matter did not raise issues of public importance justifying a hearing by a full panel.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claim for breach of fiduciary duty against their former solicitors.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that a breach of fiduciary duty requires a breakdown of trust and loyalty, such as dishonesty or a conflict of interest.

It does not extend to situations where only the quality of advice or representation is at issue.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision finding that the services it provided were real estate services under the Real Estate and Business Brokers Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the scope of services to be provided was a matter of factual dispute requiring a trial to determine the precise services and assess them against the legislative language.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision finding no agreement existed for the respondent to pay a real estate commission or finder's fee.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's conclusion that the three property 'flips' were part of one transaction for which the appellant had already earned a commission, and that the respondent had refused to sign an agreement for any further fee.

The appeal was dismissed.

Retired police officers, through their representative corporation, appealed the dismissal of a Rule 22 motion claiming an interest in approximately $6 million in excess pension funds arising after legislative amendments moved supplementary early retirement benefits into the basic OMERS plan.

The appeal advanced theories based on deferred wages, trust, fiduciary obligations, unjust enrichment, partial wind-up, and statutory restrictions on surplus use.

The Court of Appeal substantially adopted the motion judge’s reasoning and held that the supplementary agreement did not create a separate pension plan and that retirees under a defined benefit plan had no inherent entitlement to the excess funds.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The respondents brought a motion to dismiss a human rights complaint, arguing that a four-year delay by the Commission and the existence of multiple proceedings amounted to an abuse of process and a violation of their section 7 Charter rights.

The Board of Inquiry dismissed the motion, finding that section 7 of the Charter does not apply to human rights proceedings.

The Board also held that the respondents failed to demonstrate actual prejudice resulting from the delay, as their claims regarding unavailable witnesses and lost documents were speculative.

Furthermore, the complainant was entitled to pursue her rights in multiple forums, which did not constitute an abuse of process.

The appellant appealed an order striking portions of a defamation claim for failure to comply with the notice provisions of the Libel and Slander Act.

The court held that multiple newspaper articles cannot be treated as a single libel for notice purposes unless their defamatory meaning depends on other publications.

It further held that the candidate-for-public-office provision in s. 5(3) does not exempt a plaintiff from giving notice under s. 5(1), but only affects the retraction-related consequences in s. 5(2).

The appeal was dismissed and the motion judge’s order was upheld.