John S. McNeil

The defendants brought motions seeking summary judgment dismissing an action alleging extortion, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligence in relation to mortgage financing.

They argued the claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 and alternatively sought a stay based on prior court orders restricting proceedings by a principal associated with the plaintiff corporation.

The court accepted documentary evidence showing that the interest rate, commitment letter, and finder’s fee had been disclosed, and found the action was commenced more than two years after the latest possible date of discoverability.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action as statute-barred.

In the alternative, the court ruled the action would be stayed pursuant to an earlier order concerning the plaintiff’s principal being a vexatious litigant and granted leave to appeal an order permitting that individual to represent the corporate plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for negligence and malicious prosecution against a security guard and other parties.

The action arose after the appellant was arrested based on the security guard's identification, though charges were later withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the appellant failed to plead necessary facts or establish a causal connection between the security guard's actions and the arrest, which was an independent police decision.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicants continued their application to seek a contribution towards costs from the decision-maker.

The Divisional Court found that while the continuation was not an abuse of process, the applicants failed to establish a factual foundation to seek costs from the decision-maker.

The application was dismissed without costs.

The applicant sought an extension of time to file a Notice of Motion for Leave to Appeal a Superior Court decision that refused leave to appeal an arbitrator's fault determination under the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal held that, following Denison Mines and Hillmond, a decision refusing leave to appeal under s. 45(1) of the Arbitration Act is a final order from which there is no appeal, unless the judge mistakenly declined jurisdiction.

Finding that the application judge did not decline jurisdiction but rather exercised it, the Court concluded there was no right of appeal and dismissed the motion for an extension of time.

The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their action against their insurer.

The trial judge found that the insureds' failure to report the incident for eight months and their failure to respond to the insurer's letters amounted to a substantial and material breach of their insurance policy.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's findings of fact and dismissed the appeal.

The moving parties, a Michigan lawyer and his law firm, sought a stay of proceedings pending their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the issue of jurisdiction simpliciter.

The moving parties argued that if they were forced to file a statement of defence, it might constitute an attornment to Ontario's jurisdiction, rendering their leave application moot and causing irreparable harm.

The Court of Appeal applied the RJR-MacDonald test and found that the leave application raised a serious issue, the potential for attornment constituted irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience favoured granting a stay against all parties due to the intertwined nature of the claims.

The insured stored its boat at a marina, which subsequently sold the boat to an innocent third party without the insured's knowledge or consent.

After unsuccessfully suing the third party, the insured claimed against its all-risk insurance policy for the direct physical loss of the boat.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the loss was due to the transfer of title rather than a physical loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the insurer's appeal, holding that the marina's unlawful conversion was the proximate cause of the loss and constituted a fortuitous, direct physical loss covered by the policy.

The appellant, Lafarge Canada Inc., sought a Bullock order regarding costs.

The Court of Appeal declined to make the order, noting that the appellant should have known the inclusion of the successful insurers as respondents on the appeal was unnecessary, as evidenced by the appellant abandoning the appeal against most of them at the end of oral argument.

The Court requested further submissions on whether the successful insurers should receive partial or substantial indemnity costs and whether costs should be fixed or assessed.

The plaintiffs, homeowners, sued Bertrand and Lafarge for damages resulting from defective concrete foundations caused by fly ash supplied by Lafarge.

The trial judge found Lafarge 80% liable and Bertrand 20% liable for approximately $20,000,000 in damages.

This appeal concerns the insurance coverage disputes between Bertrand, Lafarge, and their numerous primary and excess insurers.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the defective foundations constituted property damage under the CGL policies, that the continuous trigger theory applied to trigger all policies from 1986 to 1992, and that certain excess insurers had a duty to contribute to defence and third-party costs.

The appeal by Guardian Insurance was allowed regarding its duty to defend, but all other appeals and cross-appeals were dismissed.

Following an arbitration regarding statutory accident benefits where the applicant was awarded a small portion of the claimed death benefits, both parties sought their expenses.

The arbitrator considered the criteria under the Insurance Act and Regulation 664, including the applicant's lack of success, the conduct of both parties, and the complexity of the issues.

The arbitrator concluded that neither party was entitled to their expenses, ordering each party to bear their own costs.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and received statutory accident benefits until the insurer terminated them, claiming he could return to his pre-accident employment.

The parties disputed the physical demands of his pre-accident job as a folding wall installer and service coordinator.

The arbitrator found the job involved medium to occasionally heavy physical demands.

Relying on medical and functional capacity evidence, the arbitrator concluded the applicant remained disabled until he completed a functional restoration program on April 8, 1994.

The insurer was ordered to pay arrears of weekly income benefits totaling $12,167.94, plus interest, and supplementary medical and rehabilitation expenses.

The applicant, who sustained paraplegia in a motorcycle accident, sought payment from his insurer for various expenses related to temporary accommodation, home renovations, transportation, and miscellaneous items under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The arbitrator allowed certain expenses for apartment furnishings, window blinds, and a wire basket system as reasonable and necessary for rehabilitation.

However, claims for unauthorized changes to the home's heating and cooling system, landscaping, a second set of vehicle hand controls, and optional vehicle extras were denied as they were not required as a result of the accident.

The insurer was ordered to pay 17 months of lease payments for an interim vehicle and the cost of an interior stain guard for the modified minivan.

A husband and wife purchased a joint life insurance policy naming the survivor as the beneficiary.

The husband subsequently murdered his wife and claimed the insurance proceeds.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that public policy prevented the husband from recovering the proceeds as a wrongdoer cannot profit from his crime.

The Court further held that the contract could not be interpreted to require payment to the wife's estate, nor could a constructive trust be imposed, as the insurer was simply complying with the express terms of the contract and there was no unjust enrichment.

The insurer appealed an arbitrator's order requiring it to provide the catastrophically injured insured with a suitably modified mini-van under section 6(1)(f) of the No-Fault Benefits Schedule.

The insurer argued that transportation expenses were exhaustively covered by section 6(1)(d) and that a van was not 'necessary' for rehabilitation.

The insured cross-appealed, seeking a full-size custom van and a special award.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the insurer's appeal, finding that section 6(1)(f) authorized the provision of a motor vehicle and that a broad definition of rehabilitation included psychological adjustment and independence.

The cross-appeal for a full-size van was also dismissed, as the mini-van was deemed a reasonable expense.

The Director's Delegate refused to admit fresh evidence on the special award issue, finding it could have been adduced at the original hearing.

The Applicant suffered catastrophic injuries in a motorcycle accident, resulting in paraplegia.

He applied for no-fault benefits, including home renovations and a suitably modified motor vehicle.

The Insurer refused to provide a vehicle, arguing it was only liable for transportation costs to and from treatment.

The arbitrator held that a modified mini van was a reasonable expense resulting from the accident under section 6(1)(f) of the No-Fault Benefits Schedule, as it was necessary for the Applicant's rehabilitation and independence.

The arbitrator dismissed the Applicant's claim for a special award under section 282(10) of the Insurance Act, finding that the Insurer had not unreasonably withheld or delayed payments.