John McNeil

The applicant, a former Senior Manager, Compliance, sought court advice and direction regarding claims for solicitor-client privilege asserted by the Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries over documents and information in her possession.

The applicant had previously initiated a wrongful dismissal claim and sent whistleblower reports to regulators using internal Bank documents.

The Bank asserted privilege over certain materials and applied redactions.

The court found that the documents and information in the applicant's possession were subject to solicitor-client privilege and should be returned or redacted.

The court also denied the applicant's request for her litigation counsel to review the privileged materials, finding no "absolute necessity" and rejected arguments that the privilege belonged to trust beneficiaries or was negated by a future crimes/fraud exception.

The application was dismissed in its entirety, and costs were awarded to the Bank.

The appellants sued the respondent consulting firms for failing to deliver an approved environmental Risk Assessment on time.

After discovery, the appellants moved to add an individual employee of the respondents as a necessary defendant, which the Master refused.

The appellants appealed the Master's decision and brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion to introduce fresh evidence, finding it could have been obtained prior to the hearing with reasonable diligence and would not be conclusive.

The court also dismissed the appeal, holding that the Master made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the individual was not a necessary party, as the corporate respondents were fully insured and capable of responding to the claims.

The appellant, an unauthorized sub-sub-contracted carrier, sought payment from the respondent consignee for transporting goods, relying on section 2 of the Bills of Lading Act.

The respondent had already paid its contracted transportation arranger, unaware of the unauthorized subcontracting chain.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant disentitled itself from relying on the Act by participating in the unauthorized subcontracting and concealing it from the respondent.

The appellants appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the statutory regime established to resolve the distribution of statutory accident benefit losses between insurers does not deprive injured parties of their right to sue in tort actions.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing its motion to stay the respondent's action on jurisdictional grounds.

The respondent moved to quash the appeal, arguing the underlying order was interlocutory.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion to quash, finding that the motions judge had dismissed the stay motion without prejudice due to an insufficient record, meaning the order did not finally determine the appellant's right to a stay.

As the order was interlocutory, any appeal lay to the Divisional Court with leave.

The defendants Garan, Lucow, Miller P.C. and Thomas W. Emery succeeded in their motion for a stay and sought costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded them partial indemnity costs fixed at $4,000, payable jointly and severally by the plaintiffs and the co-defendant Kingsway General Insurance Company.

The respondents brought a motion to quash the appeal, which was successfully resisted by the appellants.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellants their costs of the motion on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $4,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment and the refusal of a stay of proceedings by the motions judge.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motions judge's analysis or exercise of discretion under section 106 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the costs order was also denied.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and received weekly income benefits from the insurer.

A dispute arose regarding the calculation of the applicant's gross weekly income under section 12 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant, a 50% shareholder in a masonry business, had received a $6,000 bonus shortly before the accident.

The arbitrator found that the bonus was income but should be allocated over the 52 weeks preceding the accident rather than attributed solely to the four weeks prior.

Applying the formula in paragraph 12(7)1 of the Schedule, the arbitrator determined the applicant's gross weekly income to be $521.63 and awarded the applicant his arbitration expenses.