Jessica Laham

The plaintiff brought a medical malpractice action against her rheumatologist, alleging he breached the standard of care by misdiagnosing her with gout, failing to perform a joint aspiration, and prescribing Allopurinol without informed consent, which led to her developing Stevens-Johnson Syndrome.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the defendant met the standard of care of a reasonable community rheumatologist in diagnosing gout clinically and prescribing Allopurinol.

The court also found that informed consent was obtained and that the plaintiff failed to prove causation, as expert evidence established she had a genetic predisposition making the adverse reaction inevitable regardless of the starting dose.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision declaring that the limitation period for putative class members remained suspended under s. 28(1) of the Class Proceedings Act following the denial of class certification.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 28(1) provides an exhaustive list of circumstances that resume a limitation period, and denial of certification is not among them.

Consequently, the limitation period remains suspended indefinitely following a denial of certification, a result the court noted must be addressed by the Legislature.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Environmental Review Tribunal upholding a Director's order under s. 18 of the Environmental Protection Act.

The order required the appellants, as owners or former owners/occupiers of a contaminated source property, to delineate contamination that had migrated to off-site properties.

The appellants argued s. 18 was limited to future events and on-site remediation, contrasting it with the fault-based s. 17.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Tribunal's broad interpretation of s. 18—that it permits off-site orders and applies to existing, ongoing, and future adverse effects—was reasonable and consistent with the modern principles of statutory interpretation.

The appellants appealed an order issued by the Director of the Ministry of the Environment and Climate Change requiring them to delineate off-site contamination.

After an unsuccessful jurisdictional motion, the appellants withdrew their remaining grounds of appeal on the basis that the order's requirements had been or would be substantially complied with.

The Director consented to the withdrawal.

The Environmental Review Tribunal dismissed the appeals pursuant to Rule 199 of its Rules of Practice.

The appellant, Ivanmarino Mazia, appealed his conviction for theft under $5,000, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to grant his Rowbotham application and provide adequate assistance given his visual impairment.

The Superior Court admitted fresh evidence establishing Mazia's legal blindness at the time of trial.

The court found the trial judge erred by not inquiring into Mazia's stated vision problems and by applying an overly stringent "rare and exceptional" test for the Rowbotham application.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff commenced a professional negligence action in Small Claims Court.

The deputy judge dismissed the claim under r. 12.02 for failure to produce formal expert reports.

The Divisional Court allowed the plaintiff's appeal, finding the dismissal was a denial of natural justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the defendants' appeal, holding that under Westerhof v. Gee Estate, treating physicians can provide expert opinion evidence without formal reports, and this principle applies equally to Small Claims Court proceedings to ensure accessible justice.

The appellant sought leave under s. 138.8 of the Securities Act to commence an action against the respondent bank for misrepresentations in a corporate circular and prospectus.

The appellant alleged the bank was a 'promoter' and an 'influential person' who knowingly influenced the release of the documents.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding the appellant failed to offer a plausible interpretation of 'promoter' and lacked sufficient evidence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming that a promoter must play a vital or leading role in the organization or reorganization of an issuer, and that providing conventional banking or advisory services is insufficient.