Jennifer Epstein

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching against a 14-year-old complainant.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred by failing to disclose the second part of a jury note asking for a rest day, failing to give a cross-count reasoning instruction, and failing to give a prior consistent statement instruction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's handling of the jury note, which did not indicate rushed deliberations or prejudice.

The court also found that the additional jury instructions were not necessary, as there was no risk of cross-count reasoning and the Crown did not rely on prior consistent statements to bolster credibility.

The moving party sought leave to appeal a decision reversing a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The appeal judge had deducted 15 months of pandemic-related administrative adjournments and nearly 3 months of delay caused by an administrative mailing error as exceptional circumstances, bringing the net delay below the 18-month ceiling.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for leave, finding that the pandemic delay issue was already settled law and the administrative error did not raise a question of law alone or a failure of natural justice.

The appellants appealed their convictions for second-degree murder and manslaughter arising from a fatal group assault.

The primary appellant, convicted of murder as the stabber, sought to introduce fresh expert evidence and challenged the trial judge's instructions on identification and a key witness.

The co-appellants, convicted of manslaughter, argued the trial judge misdirected the jury on causation, specifically regarding whether the stabbing was an intervening act that broke the chain of causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all appeals, finding the jury instructions, when read as a whole, properly conveyed the law of causation and the requirements for assessing witness credibility.

The appellant appealed his conviction for the first degree murder of his wife.

He argued the trial judge erred by not leaving the partial defence of provocation with the jury, and by leaving first degree murder based on planning and deliberation and constructive murder with the jury.

The Court of Appeal found no error regarding provocation or planning and deliberation.

However, the Court held the trial judge erred in leaving constructive murder for the jury, as the murder was completed before the subsequent unlawful confinement of a witness, breaking the required causal connection.

A new trial was ordered for the first degree murder charge.