Jennifer Arduini

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding her incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic and mood stabilizing medications.

The appellant did not appear at the appeal hearing, but the court declined to dismiss the appeal as abandoned because she had expressed a desire to proceed with the assistance of amicus curiae.

On the merits, the court found no palpable and overriding error in the Board's conclusion that the appellant lacked the necessary insight into her schizoaffective disorder to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of refusing treatment.

The appeal was dismissed.

This ruling addresses requested changes to the jury charge in a medical negligence trial concerning the standard of care and the admissibility and weight of evidence regarding minority medical practice, usual practice, and the distinction between buttock numbness and saddle anaesthesia.

The court reviews the law on minority practice, the role of expert evidence, and the proper approach to weighing conflicting testimony, ultimately declining to make certain amendments requested by the defendant and clarifying the law for the jury.

This endorsement addresses multiple motions to strike claims for contribution and indemnity brought by various Children's Aid Societies (CAS) against Dr. Gideon Koren and the Hospital for Sick Children (HSC) in the context of the "Motherisk Cases." The court partially granted the motions, striking claims for contribution and indemnity based on the Negligence Act, as the CAS was not found liable to the original plaintiffs.

However, the court dismissed the motions to strike claims for contribution and indemnity based on breach of contract, finding it was not plain and obvious that such claims, including those relying on a principled exception to privity of contract, would fail.

HSC's claim was struck as unopposed.

One of Dr. Koren's crossclaims was struck with leave to amend to properly plead a contract claim.

The court also ordered consolidation of one of Dr. Koren's actions with a related M.M. Action.

The appellant appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision upholding her incapacity to consent to treatment with anti-psychotic medication and mood stabilizers.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error by the Board.

The court affirmed the Board's finding that the appellant failed the second branch of the capacity test, being unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of consenting or not consenting to treatment, and that the benefits and consequences of treatment were adequately explained.

The Appellant, Nodebe Agbapu, appealed a Consent and Capacity Board decision finding him incapable of consenting to anti-psychotic medication.

The Respondent, Dr. Tariq Munshi, brought a motion for the appointment of amicus curiae to assist the court, as the self-represented Appellant had not taken steps to perfect the appeal.

The court granted the motion, appointing Jennifer Danch as amicus curiae, finding it appropriate and necessary in the interest of justice to ensure the integrity of the judicial process.

This endorsement arises from an appeal of a Consent and Capacity Board decision.

Respondent's counsel requested the appointment of amicus curiae, which the appellant opposed.

The Civil Practice Court Judge directed that this request be brought by way of motion.

The endorsement confirms this direction, ordering the motion to be brought in writing before the Regional Senior Justice.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment against his insurer for the theft of a $550,000 heirloom ring and a gold chain while on vacation in the Dominican Republic.

The insurer denied the claim, alleging insufficient proof and lack of cooperation, but expressly declined to plead fraud.

The court found the plaintiff had fully cooperated and proven his loss.

The court granted summary judgment for the value of the ring and chain, and awarded $50,000 in punitive damages due to the insurer's bad faith conduct in stringing the plaintiff along after secretly deciding to deny the claim.

The appellant motorcyclist was rendered paraplegic after colliding with the respondent's recycling truck, which was making a left turn.

A jury found the appellant 100% responsible for the accident.

On appeal, the appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable and that expert evidence was improperly adduced during cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury's verdict was not so plainly unreasonable that no jury could have reached it, and that the expert evidence elicited on cross-examination was not outside the witnesses' expertise.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action against her motor vehicle insurer for income replacement benefits.

She argued the trial judge erred by excluding the medical reports of her deceased family physician and by misinterpreting the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS).

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to exclude the reports under section 52(2) of the Evidence Act, as they lacked necessity and reliability and would prejudice the respondent.

The Court also affirmed that under sections 4(1) and 5 of the SABS, an insured must establish eligibility for income replacement benefits within the first 104 weeks after the accident to qualify for benefits beyond that period.

The appeal was dismissed.