Gillian Kerr

The parties to a putative class action agreed to discontinue the action with prejudice, as similar claims were being pursued in a proposed class proceeding in British Columbia.

The court approved the discontinuance pursuant to s. 29(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and dispensed with the requirement to give notice to the class, noting the early stage of the proceeding and the continuation of the claims in British Columbia.

The plaintiff in a proposed price-fixing class action regarding linear resistors brought motions to discontinue the action against six defendants and to certify the action for settlement purposes against the Kamaya defendants.

The court approved the discontinuance, finding no prejudice to the class as tolling agreements were in place and there was no evidence of the discontinued defendants' involvement in the conspiracy.

The court also certified the action for settlement purposes, approving an expanded class definition that included British Columbia purchasers to facilitate a comprehensive settlement with the Kamaya defendants.

The plaintiff in a class action alleging a price-fixing conspiracy regarding film capacitors moved for approval of a settlement with the Panasonic defendants and for approval of class counsel fees.

The court found the $1.35 million settlement, which included valuable cooperation from the settling defendants, to be fair and reasonable despite being heavily discounted from the estimated exposure.

The court also approved the requested class counsel fees of 25% of the settlement, but ordered the payment to be split into two installments to incentivize counsel to advance the litigation more expeditiously.

The plaintiffs in a price-fixing class action regarding electrolytic capacitors moved for court approval of a $5.9 million settlement with the Panasonic defendants, as well as approval of class counsel fees and disbursements.

The court found the settlement, which included significant cooperation from the settling defendants, to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved the retainer agreements and the requested class counsel fees of $1,487,500 (25% of the settlement) and disbursements of $141,866.96, noting the complexity and risk of the litigation.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the plaintiffs' claims for intrusion upon seclusion and all claims against the individual defendant lawyer, Costantino.

The plaintiffs cross-moved to amend their Statement of Claim to add new defendants and causes of action for breach of confidence and Human Rights Code violations.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to plead the necessary elements for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, as the disclosure of a witness list in a quasi-judicial proceeding was legally justified and not highly offensive.

The court struck the privacy claims and dismissed the action against the lawyer, finding she owed no duty of care to the opposing party's witness and her actions were protected by absolute privilege.

The plaintiffs' motion to amend was dismissed as the proposed claims were doomed to fail.

The court determined costs following two anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant broadcaster, having successfully dismissed the defamation claim against it, was awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, though the requested amount was reduced to $500,000 plus disbursements due to the motion's excessive complexity.

The plaintiff, having successfully defeated the defendant university's novel anti-SLAPP motion regarding a negligence claim, was awarded partial indemnity costs of $222,000, as the university's motion lacked the characteristics of a true SLAPP suit.

The defendants, CBC and Trent University, brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiffs' $210 million defamation and negligence action.

The action arose from a Marketplace report alleging the plaintiffs' chicken sandwiches contained only 50% chicken based on DNA tests conducted by Trent University.

The court granted CBC's motion, finding that while the defamation claim had substantial merit, CBC had a valid defence of responsible communication and the public interest in protecting investigative journalism outweighed the plaintiffs' private harm.

The court dismissed Trent University's motion, holding that the negligence claim regarding faulty laboratory testing did not arise from an expression relating to a matter of public interest and was therefore not subject to dismissal under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action and approve a $2.25 million settlement regarding the defendants' systemic collection of credit scores during the automobile insurance claims adjusting process, which the Privacy Commissioner found breached PIPEDA.

The court certified the action for settlement purposes, finding the settlement fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The court also approved a 60-day opt-out period, a cy-près distribution to the Public Interest Advocacy Centre, the notice plan, a $15,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff, and class counsel fees of $500,000 plus disbursements.

The plaintiffs sought judicial approval of two settlement agreements in class actions alleging price-fixing in the automotive parts industry.

The first settlement with T.Rad was for $1,167,452, and the second with S-Y Systems was for $50,000.

The court found both settlements to be fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class, noting they fell within a zone of reasonableness.

The settlements and requested legal fees were approved.

In a medical malpractice action concerning obstetrical negligence resulting in a child's severe brain damage, the jury found the defendant doctors breached the standard of care and caused the injuries.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 52.08(1) arguing there was no evidence to support the causation finding, or alternatively, that the jury's answers on causation were unresponsive.

The trial judge found there was some evidence to support causation, but held that the jury's answers on causation were fatally flawed because they merely repeated the standard of care answers (as improperly suggested by plaintiffs' counsel) and failed to explain how the negligence caused the brain damage.

As a result, the trial judge refused to enter judgment on the verdict and ordered a new trial.

The moving party, Dr. Chandra, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal from a jury verdict dismissing his $130 million libel and invasion of privacy action against the CBC.

The jury had found that the defamatory broadcast alleging scientific fraud was true.

The Court of Appeal denied the extension, finding that the moving party failed to form a timely intention to appeal, provided no satisfactory explanation for the delay, and that the proposed appeal lacked merit.

The court also noted the moving party's lack of candour and attempts to encumber his only Ontario asset, concluding that the justice of the case required dismissing the motion.

Following a lengthy jury trial concerning defamation and invasion of privacy claims against media defendants, the jury accepted the defence of justification and dismissed the action.

The successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs exceeding $1.6 million.

The court considered the governing principles under the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the presumption that costs are fixed by the trial judge and the factors under Rule 57.01.

Given the jury’s findings that the impugned statements were true and the plaintiff’s unsuccessful prosecution of extensive allegations of fraud, the court held that the case justified an award of substantial indemnity costs.

Costs were fixed at the defendants’ reasonable full indemnity amount due to the indemnity principle.

The defendants brought a pre‑trial motion seeking permission to call several non‑party witnesses residing outside Canada to testify at trial by video conference.

The plaintiff opposed the request, arguing that credibility assessment, document handling, and logistical issues required in‑person testimony.

Applying Rule 1.08 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the proportionality principles in Rule 1.04, the court held that modern video conferencing technology can permit effective credibility assessment and efficient presentation of evidence.

Given the witnesses’ overseas residence, professional obligations, and the disproportionate cost and difficulty of travel, the court granted leave for their testimony to be given by video conference subject to procedural conditions.

During a civil jury trial for defamation arising from a televised investigative documentary, the media defendants sought a ruling that the plaintiff’s claim for invasion of privacy should not be put to the jury.

The defendants argued that the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act constituted a complete legislative scheme precluding a common law privacy claim and that the tort of intrusion upon seclusion did not apply to journalistic publication.

The court held that PIPEDA does not oust the development of common law privacy claims and that media defendants are not categorically immune from liability for intrusion upon seclusion.

However, the scope of such claims is limited where journalistic activity engages freedom of expression and established defamation defences.

The court concluded that a properly instructed jury could potentially find an unlawful intrusion and therefore allowed the privacy claim to proceed to the jury with limiting instructions.

The plaintiff brought a motion shortly before trial seeking a determination under Rule 21.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure that a televised documentary was prima facie defamatory, along with directions regarding the order of evidence and a proposed bifurcation of liability and damages.

The court held that although questions about defamatory meaning can sometimes be determined before trial, such motions must be brought promptly under Rule 21.02.

Because the action had been underway for nine years and the motion was brought only weeks before trial, the request for a Rule 21 determination was refused.

The court also declined to modify the usual order of presentation of evidence in a jury trial or to bifurcate liability and damages absent party consent.

The plaintiff was granted leave to file a DVD of the documentary as part of the record.

The moving defendants sought to strike a jury notice in a defamation and invasion of privacy action arising from a broadcast alleging scientific fraud and financial deception.

The court reviewed the governing principles respecting the substantive right to a civil jury trial, including complexity, expert evidence, trial length, legal difficulty, and the availability of a wait-and-see approach.

Although the action involved voluminous documents, anticipated expert scientific evidence, and complex defamation issues, the court held that cogent reasons had not yet been shown to displace the jury.

The preferable course was to permit the trial to begin and reconsider discharge of the jury only if the anticipated complexities materialized to a degree warranting intervention.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against the Dow defendants for an alleged price-fixing conspiracy in the market for polyether polyol products.

The court reviewed the requirements for certification under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, in light of recent Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on indirect purchaser claims.

The court found that the pleadings disclosed a cause of action, there was an identifiable class, common issues existed with a plausible methodology for proving class-wide loss, a class action was the preferable procedure, and the plaintiff was a suitable representative.

The motion for certification was granted.

The parties entered into a marriage contract during an attempted reconciliation.

Due to a drafting error, the written agreement provided the appellant husband with the entire value of the matrimonial home, contrary to the respondent wife's intention of an equal division.

The trial judge set aside the contract, finding no meeting of the minds and unconscionability.

On appeal, the appellant sought rectification, which he had resisted at trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the appellant could not seek rectification after insisting on enforcing the erroneous written terms at trial, and found no error in the trial judge's findings on the meeting of the minds, property valuation, support, or costs.