Crawford Smith

The parties to a putative class action agreed to discontinue the action with prejudice, as similar claims were being pursued in a proposed class proceeding in British Columbia.

The court approved the discontinuance pursuant to s. 29(1) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and dispensed with the requirement to give notice to the class, noting the early stage of the proceeding and the continuation of the claims in British Columbia.

In the context of a CCAA restructuring, the respondent was previously ordered to specifically perform its obligation to reconvey certain lands to a special purpose entity, which had agreed to sell a portion of those lands to the moving party.

The respondent refused to complete the reconveyance, arguing that the parties had not agreed on the terms of 'shared facilities and/or reciprocal easement agreements' required under the reconveyance agreement.

The moving party brought a motion for the court to interpret the agreement and impose terms.

The court held it had jurisdiction to determine the terms of the reconveyance and found that the respondent's demanded easements (including for undefined future utilities, carbon sequestration, and emissions) were not valid easements at common law and did not meet the contractual requirement of being 'shared' or 'reciprocal'.

The court directed the parties to attempt one final negotiation before it would impose the final terms of the easement agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to settle a Rule 7 Order pursuant to the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, following the dismissal of their certification motion for a proposed class action regarding systemic abuse in amateur hockey.

The court reviewed and settled the revised Draft Section 7 Plan, which transitions the proposed class action into up to 60 joinder actions against the defendant hockey teams and leagues.

The court approved the notice plan, opt-in procedures, and case management provisions, with minor revisions to protect player privacy and ensure efficient administration.

Following the dismissal of a proposed class action regarding systemic abuse in the Canadian Hockey League, the plaintiffs brought a motion under section 7 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 to approve a plan to transition the proceeding into multiple joinder actions.

The court reviewed the competing Section 7 Plans submitted by the plaintiffs and defendants and found both to be procedurally flawed and overreaching.

The court proposed its own Draft Section 7 Plan designed to facilitate the commencement of up to 60 joinder actions while respecting the court's jurisdictional limits and the parties' procedural rights.

The motion was adjourned to a second phase for the parties to revise and discuss the court's draft plan.

The plaintiffs, former major junior hockey players, brought a proposed class action against the Canadian Hockey League, its three member leagues, and 60 individual teams, alleging systemic negligence, breach of fiduciary duty, and vicarious liability for widespread hazing, bullying, and abuse.

The out-of-province defendants brought a motion challenging the court's jurisdiction, which was dismissed as the court found they carried on business in Ontario.

The defendants also brought a Ragoonanan motion, which was granted because the representative plaintiffs only had personal causes of action against five of the 60 teams.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the claims failed the cause of action, common issues, preferable procedure, and representative plaintiff criteria, primarily because there was no basis for collective liability among the independent teams.

However, the court utilized sections 7, 12, and 25 of the Class Proceedings Act to permit the action to continue as individual joinder actions, ordering the plaintiffs to prepare an Individual Issues Protocol.

The applicants purchased a Finnish mining company from the respondents under a share purchase agreement containing tax indemnities.

Post-closing, the Finnish tax authority reassessed the company's pre-closing tax years, disallowing deductions and effectively eliminating tax loss carry forwards that the applicants had intended to use in post-closing years.

The applicants sought indemnification for the reassessed taxes and the resulting increased tax burden in post-closing years.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the reassessment breached the respondents' unqualified warranty that there were no grounds for reassessment.

The court further held that the increased taxes in post-closing years were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the reassessment and fell within the scope of the indemnities.

The respondents were ordered to pay the amounts already collected by the tax authority, with the remainder to be determined after the conclusion of Finnish tax appeals.

The plaintiff hired the defendant general contractor for a home renovation on a cost-plus basis.

After becoming concerned about costs, the plaintiff hired a cost consultant who discovered a fraudulent invoicing scheme, including inflated sub-trade accounts and double-counted HST.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment for civil fraud and to pierce the corporate veil to hold the sole shareholder personally liable.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the contractor committed civil fraud and the shareholder used the corporation as an instrument of fraud.

The defendants' counterclaim for unpaid invoices was largely dismissed due to lack of supporting documentation.

The plaintiffs sought leave under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act and certification under the Class Proceedings Act to pursue a class action against CIBC and its senior officers for alleged secondary market misrepresentations concerning CIBC's exposure to the U.S. residential mortgage market.

The court found that the plaintiffs met the test for leave and certification for the statutory claim.

However, applying the Court of Appeal's recent decision in Sharma v. Timminco Limited, the court held that the statutory claim was time-barred because leave was not obtained within the three-year limitation period under s. 138.14 of the Securities Act.

Consequently, both motions were dismissed.