Erica Lewin

A hired dog walker sustained significant injuries when the respondents' dog attacked her while she was attempting to put booties on the animal in the respondents' home.

The appellant brought an action under the Dog Owners' Liability Act claiming the respondents, as dog owners, were strictly liable.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment on the basis that the appellant herself qualified as an "owner" under the Act and could not recover from fellow owners.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, applying the definition of "possesses" from Wilk v. Arbour and confirming that a person in physical possession and control of a dog just before an attack is an "owner" regardless of whether she was acting under the instructions of the registrant owners, and regardless of whether the attack occurred in another owner's home.

The court granted summary judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s claim for damages arising from a dog bite, holding that the plaintiff, a dog walker, was an “owner” under the Dog Owners’ Liability Act (DOLA) at the time of the incident.

The court found that the plaintiff was in physical possession and control of the dog immediately before the bite, and thus was jointly and severally liable under the DOLA, precluding her from recovering damages from the other owners.

The decision applies the Ontario Court of Appeal’s interpretation of “owner” in Wilk v. Arbour and clarifies that dominion or independent control is not required for liability under the DOLA.

The plaintiff, injured while a passenger on a bus, brought a motion to strike the jury notice due to COVID-19 delays and to permit witnesses to testify virtually.

The defendants brought a cross-motion to amend their Statement of Defence to allege contributory negligence and failure to mitigate.

The court granted the defendants' motion to amend, finding the proposed amendments legally tenable.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's motion to strike the jury notice at this time, noting the availability of jury trial facilities in Toronto and the substantive right to a jury, but adjourned the trial.

The court granted the request to allow witnesses to testify by video conference, subject to notice requirements.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking various forms of relief, including advance legal costs, payment of living expenses, reimbursement of social services, waiver of Rules of Civil Procedure, ongoing accommodation, anonymization of proceedings, driver's license renewal, and a court investigation into systemic racism.

The court dismissed all aspects of the plaintiff's motion, finding that the claims for advance payments did not meet the Law v. Canada test for discrimination under the Charter, and the request for advance legal costs did not meet the British Columbia (Ministry of Forests) v. Okanagan Indian Band three-part test for interim costs in exceptional cases, particularly as contingent fee arrangements are available in personal injury litigation.

An insurer mistakenly believed that a snowmobile was not covered under its automobile insurance policy and persuaded the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund to accept responsibility for paying statutory accident benefits to an injured passenger.

When the coverage error was discovered, the Fund sought reimbursement and the insurer refused, arguing that the Fund had lost its ability to contest priority once it accepted responsibility.

The arbitrator found the insurer was the priority insurer and ordered reimbursement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, holding that the Fund is not an ordinary insurer in priority disputes under the Regulation and is entitled to resile from its acceptance of priority.

The court also clarified that section 7(6) of the Regulation permits an arbitrator to order full reimbursement of benefits paid, not merely impose sanctions.