Eric Andrew Francis Grigg

The proposed intervenor, Keith Bannon, a former lawyer for the City of Windsor, sought leave under Rule 13.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to intervene as an added party in a pending motion.

This pending motion concerned the legal consequences of a prior decision that permanently stayed the City's counterclaim due to abuse of process related to undisclosed settlement agreements.

The court found that while Bannon might be adversely affected by the judgment due to potential professional negligence liability (satisfying Rule 13.01(1)(b)), his intervention would not offer a useful contribution and would cause undue delay and prejudice in what was an essentially private dispute.

The court emphasized that intervention in private lawsuits is granted "sparingly or rarely." Consequently, the motion for intervention was dismissed, and Bannon was ordered to pay costs to Southside Construction.

The court fixed costs following a successful motion by Southside Construction and the Architects to stay the City of Windsor's claims due to abuse of process.

The City had failed to immediately disclose complete terms of settlement agreements with third-party subtrades, which fundamentally altered the litigation landscape.

The court found the City's conduct egregious and awarded substantial indemnity costs to Southside and the Architects, emphasizing that such an elevated scale was appropriate to express judicial disapproval and deter similar future behaviour, though not egregious enough for full indemnity costs.

The City of Windsor entered into confidential settlement agreements with eight third-party subcontractors, which included indemnities and assumption of liabilities, fundamentally altering the litigation landscape.

The City failed to immediately and fully disclose these agreements to the general contractor (Southside Construction) and the architects, despite multiple opportunities and court orders.

The court found this non-disclosure constituted an abuse of process, as it created a circularity in claims and prejudiced the non-settling parties by forcing them to incur significant costs to uncover the true nature of the agreements.

The appellant, Gordon Dunk Farms Ltd., appealed a summary judgment decision that found its action for negligence and breach of contract against the respondents (designers, contractors, and concrete workers) was statute-barred due to the expiration of the limitation period.

The action stemmed from the collapse of a hog barn.

The motion judge found that the appellant's principals knew or ought to have known the material facts constituting their claim by May 12, 2014, more than two years before the action was commenced on May 24, 2016.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that a "claim" under the Limitations Act, 2002, does not require knowledge of every specific act or omission, but rather sufficient facts to draw a plausible inference of liability.

The appeal was dismissed, confirming the action was statute-barred against all respondents.

A developer, 375 Lakeshore Developments Inc., sought a permanent injunction to enforce releases signed by homeowners (Tong Lin, Jing Ning, and Michael Watkinson) to prevent them from pursuing warranty claims with Tarion Warranty Corporation regarding cold temperatures on the ground floor of their new townhouses.

The homeowners had accepted a $1,200 cash settlement based on the developer's representation that the issue was an inadequate heating system.

Tarion later identified the problem as a major structural defect due to insufficient insulation, with estimated repair costs of $80,000-$100,000 per unit.

The court dismissed the application, finding the releases unenforceable under s. 13(6) of the Ontario New Home Warranties Plan Act, which prohibits contracting out of statutory warranties, and also rescinded the releases on the basis of innocent misrepresentation by the developer regarding the true cause and severity of the defect.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of complex, interrelated standard form agreements common in the road construction industry.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario affirmed the application judge's interpretation of these contractual provisions, finding no error in the lower court's reasoning.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

A non-party lawyer appealed an order requiring him to attend for examination as a witness in a motion pending before the Superior Court of Justice.

The lawyer was counsel of record for the City of Windsor.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding that the case management judge had properly applied the stringent test for ordering opposing counsel to be examined and had made no error warranting appellate intervention.

Rassaun Services Inc. (RSI) brought a motion to renew a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the Elgin Road property, which had been initially issued without notice.

The defendants opposed the renewal, arguing that RSI lacked a reasonable claim to an interest in the land.

The court found that RSI failed to establish a triable issue regarding its claim, as the evidence presented amounted to mere suspicion rather than proof of a proprietary interest or a statutory trust under the Construction Act.

The motion to renew the CPL was dismissed, and the CPL was discharged.

Costs were reserved to the motion judge presiding over the adjourned matter.

GF Machining Solutions LLC (GFMS) brought an application seeking judgment for unpaid invoices against Technicut Tool Inc. Technicut responded by commencing a separate action for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, negligence, and negligent misrepresentation, and then brought a motion to convert GFMS's application into an action and consolidate it with Technicut's claims as a counterclaim.

The court found that there were genuine issues of material fact and credibility requiring a trial, particularly concerning the scope of the service contracts, GFMS's performance, and Technicut's alleged damages and right of set-off.

The court granted Technicut's motion, converting GFMS's application into an action and directing Technicut's claims to proceed as a counterclaim within that newly constituted action, while staying Technicut's separate action.

The court also provided detailed procedural directions for the converted action.