Donald C. Murray

The accused was convicted of sexually assaulting his 12-year-old daughter.

The Court of Appeal allowed his appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge improperly used the complainant's pre-trial statements and that Crown counsel's conduct rendered the trial unfair.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court held that while the Court of Appeal had jurisdiction to consider a miscarriage of justice not raised in the Notice of Appeal, the trial's shortcomings did not amount to a miscarriage of justice.

The trial judge's reasons did not show improper use of statements, and Crown counsel's questions did not cross the threshold of impermissible leading questions.

The appellants were convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

The Crown's case relied heavily on the testimony of two accomplices who were granted immunity and witness protection.

The trial judge warned the jury to be cautious in accepting their testimony and that it would be unsafe to rely on their evidence alone, but instructed that they could rely on it if convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that it was true.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the trial judge's Vetrovec warning was thorough and complete, and properly alerted the jury to the dangers of accepting the accomplices' testimony without corroborating evidence.

The accused was acquitted of three counts of first-degree murder.

The Crown appealed, arguing the trial judge misdirected the jury by instructing them to reject the accused's out-of-court confession if his trial testimony raised a reasonable doubt about it.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the accused's appeal and restored the acquittal, finding that the jury charge, read as a whole, did not improperly instruct the jury to evaluate the evidence in a piecemeal or two-stage fashion.

The respondent was charged with communicating in a public place for the purpose of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute contrary to s. 195.1(1)(c) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, but the Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the provision infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter and was not saved by s. 1.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that while the provision infringes s. 2(b), it is a reasonable limit demonstrably justified under s. 1.

The Court further held that the provision does not infringe the guarantee of freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter, as its target is expressive conduct rather than conduct of an associational nature.