The Crown appealed acquittals on trafficking in persons and receiving a material benefit from trafficking, where the trial judge had characterized evidence of the accused's regular violence and threats of violence toward the complainant as past discreditable conduct evidence, limiting its relevance to a mere contextual backdrop.
The Supreme Court majority held that this was an error of law because such violence, covered by the indictment's time period and locations, was directly relevant to the actus reus of trafficking under s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code — it could establish that the accused exercised control, direction, or influence over the complainant's movements, and could satisfy the definition of exploitation in s. 279.04.
The majority further held this error might have had a material bearing on the acquittals by undermining the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant.
The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.
Côté and Rowe JJ. dissented, finding the error did not have a material bearing on the acquittals given the trial judge's detailed credibility findings and the absence of evidence linking the violence to the complainant's provision of sexual services.
