Derek Knoke

A law firm appealed an application judge’s decision interpreting a contingency fee retainer agreement and rejecting its claim to a share of damages awarded on appeal.

The client had retained new counsel for the appeal, which resulted in a substantial damages award after an unsuccessful trial.

The firm argued it was entitled to fees under the retainer or alternatively on a quantum meruit basis.

The Court of Appeal held that the retainer expressly limited fee entitlement to damages recovered by settlement or judgment at trial and did not include recovery obtained on appeal.

The court also held that quantum meruit relief was unavailable where the parties had expressly defined the circumstances of payment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a judgment awarding over one million dollars in damages to the respondents for personal injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge discharged the jury after finding that defence counsel breached the rule in Browne v. Dunn by failing to cross-examine the plaintiff on a significant piece of evidence regarding fluid leaking from his ear, which was later introduced through expert witnesses.

The trial judge found the breach irreparably tainted the jury and proceeded with a bench trial, ultimately accepting the plaintiff's evidence and rejecting the defendant's malingering theory.

The Court of Appeal upheld all aspects of the trial judge's decision, including the finding of a Browne v. Dunn breach, the discharge of the jury, the qualification of a treating physician as an expert witness, and the damages award.

The Centre for Free Expression (CFE) sought leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a civil appeal arising from the dismissal of a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (Ontario) in a defamation action.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario, per Roberts J.A., dismissed the motion for intervention, finding that while CFE had a clear mandate and interest in freedom of expression issues, its proposed submissions would not provide a distinct or useful contribution beyond those of the parties.

The court emphasized that intervention is to be granted sparingly, particularly in private disputes, and that the issues raised by CFE were already adequately addressed by the parties.

This costs endorsement follows the plaintiffs' success in defeating an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss their libel action.

The court considered whether to award costs to the successful plaintiffs, referencing the discretion provided by section 137.1(8) of the Courts of Justice Act.

Finding that the defendant's impugned words were designed to cause serious detriment to the plaintiffs and undermine their business, the court exercised its discretion to award costs.

The court settled on a compromise amount, ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs $89,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a motion by Barbara Lang-Newlands regarding the operation of the automatic stay under rule 63.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure following a family law trial judgment.

The court addressed whether certain monetary awards (post-separation adjustments) should be characterized as support and thus exempt from the stay, and whether the stay should be lifted or maintained on various payments pending appeal.

The court declined to recharacterize the payments as support, but exercised its discretion to lift the stay on Ian Newlands' obligation to pay post-separation adjustments, given the risk that Barb would not recover the funds if the stay remained.

The court ordered Barb to pay Ian the net difference and expedited the appeal.

The court dismissed the defendant’s anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, finding that Facebook posts made by the defendant accusing the plaintiffs of corruption and bribery were not protected as fair comment.

The posts, which followed a controversial development approval in Niagara-on-the-Lake, were found to be based on falsehoods and reckless disregard for the truth, with the defendant admitting he had “no proof” for his accusations.

The court held that the harm to the plaintiffs’ reputation and business interests outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant’s expression, and that the posts were motivated by an ulterior motive to thwart the plaintiffs’ development project.

The proposed defendants in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to strike a supplementary affidavit sworn by the plaintiffs' lawyer.

The proposed defendants argued the affidavit was an abuse of process, violated rules of professional conduct regarding lawyers acting as witnesses, and constituted improper reply evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that disputes over whether the affidavit attempted to change or repudiate earlier evidence should be determined by the judge hearing the substantive leave motion.

The court also found that Rule 39.02(2) did not preclude the plaintiffs from delivering the supplementary affidavit because they had not cross-examined on an adverse party's affidavit.

The appellant, Juan Guillermo Gutierrez, appealed three orders from the Superior Court of Justice: a finding of civil contempt, a 30-day imprisonment sentence, and a full indemnity costs award of $563,485.00.

The contempt finding stemmed from his interference with a court-appointed receiver by signing a false declaration in Guatemala to initiate a criminal complaint against the receiver's representatives.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all three appeals, affirming the lower court's jurisdiction based on a "real and substantial link" to Ontario, upholding the contempt finding due to intentional breach of the receivership order, confirming the 30-day sentence as fit given the egregious nature of the contempt and lack of remorse, and upholding the full indemnity costs award due to the seriousness of the conduct and the financial burden placed on the judgment creditor.

The County of Simcoe appealed a trial judgment finding it 100% liable for catastrophic injuries sustained by Melinda Wasylyk in a motor vehicle accident caused by hazardous road conditions.

The County argued the trial judge erred in finding the road in disrepair, in her causation analysis, and in finding no contributory negligence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the road was in disrepair due to ice and snow, that these conditions caused the accident, and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, deferring to the trial judge's factual assessments.

This appeal concerned the appropriate remedy for a party who deliberately accessed the opposing party's privileged information.

The application judge had struck the appellant's Notice of Appearance, barred them from filing evidence, and ordered the Partition Application to proceed undefended.

The appellant argued that this remedy was unpleaded, unproven, and that lesser remedies were available.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's decision.

The court found no error in applying the three-part test for unauthorized access to privileged documents, particularly given the appellant's failure to rebut the presumption of prejudice or propose effective alternative remedies.

The plaintiffs initiated a defamation and civil conspiracy action against multiple defendants, including Tamina Eapen.

Ms. Eapen brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim against her, arguing it disclosed no reasonable cause of action and was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court found that the Statement of Claim failed to plead material facts against Ms. Eapen, particularly regarding the elements of defamation and civil conspiracy, and therefore struck the claim against her.

However, given the plaintiffs were self-represented, the court granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim.

The motion to dismiss the claim as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process was adjourned pending the amended claim.

Costs were awarded to Ms. Eapen.

The moving parties sought to strike two expert reports and their references from the appeal book and compendium (ABCO) and the responding party's factum, arguing they were not evidence at trial.

The court, citing precedent, found that while the reports were not formally entered as exhibits, they were provided to the trial judge as aides memoire and should have been marked as lettered exhibits, thus forming part of the appeal record.

The motion was allowed in part, directing the responding party to amend the descriptions of the reports in the ABCO and factum to clearly state their non-evidentiary status.

The Receiver sought costs of a contempt motion against the respondent on a full indemnity basis.

The respondent had been found in civil contempt for breaching an appointment order and sentenced to 30 days' imprisonment.

The court awarded costs on a full indemnity basis, finding the respondent's conduct egregious and highly disrespectful to the court and its appointed officer.

The quantum was fixed at $563,485, with a minor reduction for time spent on irrelevant facts.

The Receiver brought a contempt motion against the respondent for breaching an appointment order by interfering with the Receiver's exclusive authority and supporting a criminal complaint against the Receiver's representatives in Panama.

Having previously found the respondent in civil contempt, the court determined the appropriate penalty.

Finding that the respondent's conduct was a blatant and deliberate breach that undermined the court's authority, and that a fine would be insufficient for deterrence, the court ordered the respondent to be imprisoned for 30 days.

In a Commercial List receivership arising from judgment enforcement, the receiver moved for contempt after the respondent swore a declaration used to support a criminal complaint in Panama challenging the receiver's replacement of directors of a Panamanian subsidiary.

The court held it had jurisdiction because the alleged misconduct had a real and substantial link to Ontario, including the Ontario receivership order, the Ontario corporation in receivership, and the enforcement of an Ontario judgment.

Applying the civil contempt framework, the court found the appointment order was clear and unequivocal, the respondent knew of it, and he intentionally breached it by purporting to act for the debtor and by supporting foreign proceedings against the receiver without leave.

The court declined to find criminal contempt because the notice of motion did not provide sufficient particulars.

This is an appeal from a summary judgment order where the motion judge found that a personal guarantee was a continuing guarantee applicable to a subsequent amended loan agreement.

The appellants, the personal guarantors, argued that the guarantee was not continuing and that the latest loan agreement extinguished their obligations.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, affirming that the guarantee was a continuing one and that the liabilities under the final loan agreement were "in connection with" the previous agreement, thereby maintaining the guarantors' liability.

The court also upheld the deferential standard of review for contractual interpretation.

The plaintiffs sued the defendants for defamation over negative online reviews regarding window installation.

Faced with an anti-SLAPP motion, the plaintiffs attempted to discontinue the action.

The court held that the statutory stay under s. 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act was triggered when the defendants delivered a requisition to attend Civil Practice Court, rendering the discontinuance ineffective.

Applying the Pointes framework, the court found the reviews related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiffs failed to show there were no valid defences, and the action was a SLAPP suit brought for an improper purpose.

The action was dismissed, and the plaintiffs were ordered to pay $164,186.76 in full indemnity costs and $2,500 in damages.

The plaintiffs sought to add two radiologists as defendants to a medical malpractice action after the presumptive expiry of the limitation period, claiming they only recently discovered the claim through expert advice.

The proposed defendants brought a motion to compel disclosure of the identities of the plaintiffs' consulting experts and all communications with them, which the plaintiffs resisted on grounds of relevance and litigation privilege.

The court held that by relying on the experts' advice to explain the delay in discovering the claim, the plaintiffs impliedly waived privilege over the experts' identities and certain notes of conversations with them, as fairness required the proposed defendants to be able to test the plaintiffs' evidence on discoverability.

However, other requested documents remained protected by privilege or were irrelevant.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action against the developers of a cancelled pre-construction condominium project, alleging breach of contract and bad faith in invoking an early termination condition.

Following a settlement meeting and document review, the parties agreed to a without-costs discontinuance.

The court approved the consent motion to discontinue the action under section 29 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, finding that the discontinuance would not prejudice the putative class members, who had not yet been notified of the proceeding and could still pursue individual claims before the expiry of the limitation period.

The defendants brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a defamation action brought by the plaintiffs.

The defamation claim arose from an article published by the defendants, insolvency professionals, commenting on public receivership proceedings.

The court found that the defendants' expression related to a matter of public interest.

The plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that their claim had substantial merit or that the defendants had no valid defence, particularly regarding the defence of justification (truth) and responsible communication.

The court also found that the plaintiffs did not provide sufficiently credible evidence of serious harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendants' freedom of expression.

The motion was granted, and the action was dismissed.