David Hager

The plaintiffs brought two motions in a shareholder dispute.

The first motion sought to dismiss the action against certain bankrupt corporate defendants and their counterclaim, which was granted on consent with prejudice and without costs.

The second motion sought leave to amend the statement of claim against the remaining defendants to add an oppression remedy claim and further particulars.

The remaining defendants opposed the amendments, arguing the oppression claim was untenable and that some claims were derivative in nature.

The court granted leave to amend, finding that the proposed amendments were not doomed to fail and that an oppression claim could co-exist with breach of contract and derivative claims.

The plaintiffs were awarded partial indemnity costs of $10,000.

The appellant employer appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent employee $9,002.09 in termination pay following a constructive dismissal.

The employee had been temporarily laid off and did not return when recalled, having found new employment.

The trial judge found the employment contract displaced the termination provisions of the Employment Standards Act to the employee's benefit.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's interpretation of the employment contract.

The plaintiff, a mechanical engineer with 12 years of service, was laid off by the defendant.

He sued for constructive dismissal, seeking 8 weeks' salary in lieu of notice as per his employment contract, which referenced the Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA).

The defendant argued that the lay-off was temporary under the ESA and did not trigger termination pay, and that the plaintiff failed to resign within a reasonable period after the constructive dismissal as required by the ESA.

The court found that the employment contract, containing an "entire agreement" clause, displaced the ESA's provisions regarding temporary lay-offs and resignation requirements for constructive dismissal, except for the expressly incorporated notice period.

Judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for 8 weeks' salary in lieu of notice.

The plaintiff brought a motion regarding discovery issues in a constructive dismissal action.

The primary remaining issue was whether the plaintiff and the third party, whose interests were aligned against the defendant, should be permitted to review each other's examination for discovery transcripts before being examined themselves.

The court found a real possibility of collusion and tailoring of evidence given their close relationship and aligned pleadings.

The court ordered that the plaintiff and third party be excluded from knowing each other's discovery evidence until both examinations were completed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent $25,000 for breach of contract.

The central issue was the interpretation of a termination provision in their memorandum of understanding, which required one year's notice.

The appellants argued the notice was conditional on an agreement with the Toronto District School Board (TDSB).

The Divisional Court upheld the Deputy Judge's finding that the one-year notice requirement was not a condition precedent dependent on a TDSB agreement, but rather a commercially reasonable term.

The appeal was dismissed.

In this wrongful dismissal action, the defendant employer renewed a motion seeking production of a limited set of personal email messages related to the plaintiff's part-time real estate business, answers to refused discovery questions, and a further attendance for discovery.

The court held that the renewed request materially differed from an earlier unsuccessful motion because the request was narrower, compliance would be far less onerous, and amended pleadings now made the requested emails clearly relevant to specific allegations of dishonesty and breach of duty.

The court rejected res judicata and issue estoppel, emphasizing that relevance is defined by the pleadings and that amended pleadings changed the question to be decided.

Applying proportionality, the court found the limited production reasonable in light of the now more substantial claim and granted the requested relief.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal an order removing their counsel due to an appearance of impropriety and prohibiting them from retaining another specific counsel.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's conclusion that the appearance of impropriety required the protection of public confidence in the administration of justice.

Costs were awarded to the respondent trustees on a partial indemnity scale.

Following the release of reasons for decision, the respondent sought costs of the appeal on a partial indemnity basis against the appellant.

The Court of Appeal amended its previous costs order, which had awarded no costs, to award the respondent $15,000 in partial indemnity costs, taking into account the novelty of the issue and the fact that costs were only sought against the appellant.

The appellant appealed an order recognizing and implementing a U.K. court order that authorized a meeting of creditors for a scheme of arrangement.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in relying on the Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments (U.K.) Act, as the U.K. order was not a final judgment for the payment of money and the appellant was not served with the originating process.

However, the Court upheld the recognition order based on the common law rules of private international law, finding that the lack of finality was not a bar to recognition and that the real and substantial connection test was met.

Following an appeal, the court received written submissions to fix costs on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellants requested no costs be awarded, which the court rejected.

The court reviewed the costs claimed by the respondents—the Interim Receiver, Cominco Ltd., and Yukon Energy Corporation—and found some of the claimed fees to be excessive.

The court fixed the costs for each respondent at reduced amounts, inclusive of disbursements and applicable GST.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's finding that he was not constructively dismissed.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge's interpretation of the employment contract, which entitled the employer to reduce the appellant's salary and commissions on proper notice.

The changes did not constitute a termination and did not trigger the Employment Standards Act.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellants, unsecured creditors, appealed orders sanctioning a plan of arrangement under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) and awarding costs against them.

The plan effectively eliminated any recovery for unsecured creditors, as the secured claims (over $60 million) far exceeded the maximum estimated value of the debtor's mining assets ($19.9 million).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's acceptance of the asset valuation or his conclusion that the plan was fair and reasonable.

The Court also upheld the costs award, noting the appellants' opposition lacked a realistic basis.

The appellants challenged a trial judgment ordering the winding up of a corporation and joint venture arising from a deadlocked commercial dispute over an apartment building.

The appeal also attacked findings of fiduciary breach, incidental damages, the scheme for distribution of remaining assets, and a solicitor-and-client costs award.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge's credibility findings, acceptance of evidence that the property sold at fair market value under power of sale, and conclusions on fiduciary misconduct were amply supported by the record.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The complainant alleged that the union breached its duty of fair representation under section 69 of the Labour Relations Act by failing to notify him of a meeting where his discharge grievance was dropped, and by failing to present medical evidence of his mental illness.

The union admitted the breach.

The Board ordered the grievance to proceed to arbitration.

The Board declined the complainant's request for sole carriage of the grievance, finding that the union's potential liability for damages did not warrant removing its normal role, but ordered that the complainant have a say in selecting the arbitrator and that joint counsel be retained.