Chris Webb

The appellant appealed from a judgment denying certiorari to quash an order committing him to trial on charges of first-degree murder and participating in a criminal organization.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's refusal to grant certiorari.

The preliminary inquiry judge properly considered the evidence and correctly determined that the Crown had met the minimal threshold required to justify committal.

The reviewing court's task was solely to consider whether there was any evidence upon which the committing justice could form an opinion that the evidence was sufficient to put the accused on trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for dangerous driving causing death after driving his vehicle off a dock as a prank, resulting in the drowning of a passenger and a dog.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's admission of prior discreditable conduct, finding it relevant to the dangerous driving charge.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the appellant's statements to police or his credibility.

The sentence of two years less a day and a five-year driving prohibition was upheld, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that his s. 7 Charter rights were breached due to missing initial disclosure statements from complainants and the late disclosure of the police file after the jury's guilty verdict.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the missing and late-disclosed materials were of marginal relevance and did not impact the right to a fair trial.

The appellant also argued that a delay in hearing his appeal, caused by issues obtaining transcripts, breached his Charter rights.

The Court dismissed this argument, finding no prejudice or abuse of process.

The appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of operating a vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 milligrams.

At trial, a toxicologist testified that based on the appellant's reported consumption, an average person would have registered below the legal limit, but a slow eliminator could register over the limit.

The trial judge convicted the appellant, and the summary conviction appeal judge dismissed the appeal.

On further appeal, the Court of Appeal held that expert evidence relying on population averages, without establishing the appellant's actual elimination rate, is impermissible speculation and does not constitute evidence tending to show the appellant's blood alcohol was below the legal limit.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Crown appealed a conditional sentence imposed for sexual assault following a jury trial.

The Court of Appeal held the sentence was manifestly unfit given the gravity of the offence, the offender's abuse of authority, the complainant's unconsciousness, and his failure to stop when she objected.

A custodial sentence was clearly required, and the court stated that a penitentiary term would have been appropriate.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted and the sentence was varied to 18 months' incarceration.

The appellant was charged with murder and convicted of manslaughter by a jury.

The trial judge sentenced the appellant to 15.5 years in prison, finding that the appellant knew the gun was loaded.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence, as an accomplice's testimony could support the conclusion that the appellant believed the gun was unloaded.

Given the gravity of the offence, the appellant's young age, and lengthy pre-trial custody, the Court of Appeal varied the manslaughter sentence to 12 years.

A concurrent sentence for robbery was not varied.

The appellant appealed a conviction for assault causing bodily harm arising from multiple fractures suffered by his two-month-old child.

He argued that the trial judge misapprehended the medical and timing evidence and that, at most, the facts supported criminal negligence causing bodily harm because parental implied consent to caregiving force had not been vitiated.

The court rejected both arguments, holding there was evidence supporting the finding that the appellant caused the injuries within the charged period and that the force used was not for legitimate caregiving purposes and was, in any event, clearly excessive.

The court held that implied parental consent is strictly limited to force used for the child's care and within ordinary parental norms.

The conviction was affirmed.