Catherine A. Korte

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision that time-barred her application for a catastrophic impairment designation.

The LAT found the two-year limitation period expired because the appellant received the denial letter on the day it was written.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding the LAT erred in law by making a material finding of fact without evidence and by reversing the onus of proof onto the appellant to show when the letter was received.

The matter was remitted to the LAT for a new hearing.

The appellant, an environmental clean-up worker, suffered impairments from toxic exposure while cleaning up a chemical spill caused by a fatal collision between two trucks.

He applied for statutory accident benefits, which were denied on the basis that the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the SABS.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal upheld the denial, finding that while the use of the vac-truck met the purpose test, it did not meet the causation test as the toxic substances, not the vehicle, directly caused the injuries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LAT made no errors of law in its articulation or application of the purpose and modified causation tests.

The applicant was injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought a psychological assessment, which the insurer denied on the basis that the Minor Injury Guideline (MIG) applied.

At arbitration, the Arbitrator found the MIG unconstitutional under s. 15 of the Charter without making any factual findings about the applicant's condition or whether the MIG actually precluded his benefits.

The Director's Delegate overturned this decision, holding that constitutional issues cannot be decided in a factual vacuum.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applicant's judicial review, affirming that the Arbitrator erred by deciding the Charter issue without a proper factual foundation.

The appellant, an out-of-province insurer, appealed an arbitrator's decision finding that the priority provisions in s. 268 of the Insurance Act applied to it for a motor vehicle accident that occurred in Ontario.

The appellant argued that applying the Ontario legislation would have an extra-jurisdictional effect.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, applying the reasonableness standard of review.

The court held that because the accident occurred in Ontario and the appellant had signed a Power of Attorney and Undertaking (PAU), it was bound by the priority provisions of the Insurance Act.

This case involves an appeal from an arbitrator's decision in an insurance priority dispute.

The arbitrator found that an employer (insured by Old Republic) made a vehicle available for an employee's regular use at the time of an accident, requiring Old Republic to pay statutory accident benefits.

The employee, a short-haul truck driver, was injured while driving his mother-in-law's car to work, but had permission to sleep in a company truck the night before a haul.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed Old Republic's appeal, affirming the arbitrator's decision.

The court also clarified that correctness is the appropriate standard of review for such priority decisions where there is no significant factual issue to be decided.