B. Marshall

The Applicant sought costs following a successful motion to dispense with the Respondent's signature on a land transfer and the dismissal of the Respondent's cross-motion to set aside a previous order.

The Applicant had made a Rule 18 offer to settle that mirrored the court's ultimate decision.

The court awarded the Applicant costs on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of the offer and on a full indemnity basis thereafter, fixing the amount at $9,654.

The appellant, a 50% shareholder in a corporation, brought an oppression application against his brother, the other 50% shareholder, regarding the sale and lease-back of the corporation's real estate.

The appellant appealed two motion decisions: one dismissing his claim for a certificate of pending litigation (CPL) and another denying an injunction to halt the sale.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that the shareholder dispute did not give rise to an interest in land to support a CPL, and that the motions judge made no palpable and overriding error in applying the RJR-MacDonald test to deny the injunction.

The court noted the purchaser could rely on the indoor management rule and the appellant's claim was readily quantifiable in damages.

The applicant union and respondent university sought the Board's approval for an alternative dispute resolution procedure to resolve approximately 650 challenges to the inclusion of certain persons in the proposed bargaining unit under section 1(3)(b) of the Labour Relations Act.

The procedure involved the appointment of a Vice-Chair to assist the parties and make rulings that would constitute settlements.

The Board approved the procedure, finding it fell within its authority under section 103(2)(h) of the Act to authorize a Vice-Chair to inquire into a matter and report back to the panel.

The appellant challenged a municipal by-law that set a permit fee for soil removal based on the volume of soil removed.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the enabling statute, which authorized the municipality to 'fix a fee for the permit', only permitted a flat fee and did not authorize a variable fee based on the measure of activities conducted.

The appeal was allowed and the by-law was quashed.