Anne Marie Frauts

This is an appeal from an order dismissing an action, primarily sounding in defamation, under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation (s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act).

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiff (appellant) had not discharged his burden under s. 137.1(4).

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred in his consideration of the respondents' defences to the defamation claims and in his weighing of the public interest in the expressions against the plaintiff's interest in proceeding.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the plaintiff had established grounds to believe the action had substantial merit and the respondents had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the action to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the impugned expressions.

The appeal was allowed, and the action was permitted to proceed in its entirety.

The plaintiff sought an interlocutory injunction to enforce restrictive covenants against a former sales consultant who allegedly used confidential information to start a competing business.

An interim injunction was already in place on consent.

The court dismissed the application for an expanded interlocutory injunction, finding the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case for relief beyond the existing interim terms, which already enforced the substance of the restrictive covenants.

The moving defendants brought motions to dismiss the plaintiff's action for delay and failure to comply with court orders, and for summary judgment on a counterclaim.

The plaintiff and the defendant by counterclaim failed to file any responding material and did not have counsel appear.

The court granted the motions, dismissing the action, granting summary judgment on the counterclaim for $750,000, and awarding costs against the plaintiff and the defendant by counterclaim jointly and severally due to their abuse of process and delay.

The applicant sought compensation from the Criminal Injuries Compensation Board after being severely injured in an apartment fire intentionally set by an alleged offender who died at the scene.

The applicant suffered smoke inhalation, cardiac arrest, and renal failure, requiring extensive hospitalization and rehabilitation.

The Board found the applicant was a victim of a crime of violence (arson) under section 5(a) of the Act.

The Board awarded the applicant $11,000.00 for pain and suffering.

The appellant employee appealed the dismissal of his motion for partial summary judgment in a wrongful dismissal action.

He argued that the termination provision in his employment contract was ambiguous, failed to oust his common law entitlement to reasonable notice, and violated the Canada Labour Code.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the contractual language clearly rebutted the common law presumption and did not contravene the Code, as it explicitly incorporated statutory minimums if the contractual severance fell short.

In an ongoing human rights application alleging discrimination based on place of origin and citizenship due to the employer's application of ITAR regulations, the Tribunal issued an interim decision on procedural matters.

The Tribunal limited the intervening Union's participation to written and oral submissions, denying its request to call evidence and cross-examine witnesses to avoid undue delay and repetition.

The Tribunal permitted the Canadian Civil Liberties Association to intervene regarding Charter issues.

Finally, the Tribunal ruled that extrinsic evidence from the applicant's former counsel regarding the interpretation of a prior Minutes of Settlement and Release was inadmissible, as the language of the release was clear and unambiguous.

The plaintiff employee brought a summary judgment motion seeking a declaration that termination provisions in an employment contract were unenforceable and did not rebut the common law presumption of reasonable notice.

The employer argued the clause validly limited termination entitlements to the minimum standards under the Employment Standards Act.

The court held that a contractual reference to employment standards legislation was sufficient to incorporate statutory minimum notice requirements and could displace the common law presumption, but found the termination provision nonetheless void because it effectively excluded the continuation of benefits required during the statutory notice period.

As the clause attempted to satisfy all termination entitlements solely through notice or pay in lieu and severance pay, it violated the Employment Standards Act, 2000 and was therefore null and void.

The presumption of reasonable notice at common law was not rebutted and partial summary judgment was granted in favour of the employee.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on place of origin and citizenship, arising from the respondent's application of ITAR regulations which restricted his access to controlled goods.

In this interim decision, the Tribunal addressed several preliminary issues.

The Tribunal declined to strike the applicant's Notice of Constitutional Question at this stage.

The Tribunal granted the union's request to intervene, with the scope to be determined, and granted the Canadian Civil Liberties Association limited intervenor status to address whether the application of ITAR constitutes discrimination under the Code.

The Tribunal also set timelines for responding to a request for production and for submissions regarding a proposed witness.

The appellants brought an action against the respondents, who were compliance officers and directors/officers of an investment firm, alleging negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty related to improvident investments.

The respondents successfully moved to strike the claims against them on the basis that they owed no duty of care to the appellants.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the order to strike, holding that the claims were novel and the determination of whether a duty of care existed required a full factual record applying the Anns/Kamloops test, rather than being decided at the pleadings stage.

The respondent sought an assessment of appeal expenses following the dismissal of the insurer's appeal.

The respondent claimed an hourly rate of $150, while the insurer argued for the legal aid rate of $83.75.

The Director's Delegate found that the issues raised in the appeal were not unusually complicated and applied the legal aid rate of $83.75 per hour.

After reviewing the time spent on research, preparation, and attendance, the Director's Delegate assessed the respondent's appeal expenses at $3,059.52.

The insurer appealed an arbitration decision awarding the respondent additional weekly income benefits and a special award.

The insurer argued the arbitrator erred in law by admitting oral testimony from the respondent's medical expert that went beyond his written reports, causing unfair surprise.

The Director's Delegate dismissed the appeal, finding that the expert's testimony regarding the respondent's medication and physical limitations was a reasonable amplification of his reports and the medical record.

Furthermore, the insurer's counsel did not object to the testimony at the hearing, chose to cross-examine the expert, and did not request an adjournment to call responding evidence, thereby waiving the right to claim procedural unfairness.