Andrew Heal

The plaintiff brought an action in negligence, nuisance, and trespass against her neighbours and the City of Vaughan, alleging that construction activities on the neighbours' property altered the grading and caused water to flow onto her property, resulting in damages.

The claims against the municipal defendants were settled during trial.

The court dismissed the remaining claims against the neighbour, finding that the plaintiff failed to prove causation.

Expert evidence established that the water problems were actually caused by the plaintiff's own landscapers, who had flattened the common swale and altered the grading on her property, preventing proper drainage.

The court found no negligence or unreasonable interference by the neighbour.

The plaintiffs' home was flooded twice due to a cast iron water main breaking in front of their driveway.

They sued the City of Vaughan for negligence and nuisance.

The City argued its failure to replace the water main was a policy decision exempt from liability under the Municipal Act.

The court found the City's inaction was an operational decision, as it failed to follow its own internal barometer for replacing water mains with a history of breaks.

The City was found liable for negligence, and the plaintiffs were awarded agreed-upon damages of $480,000.

Following reasons on several construction lien motions relating to a subway station project, the successful lien claimant sought partial indemnity costs exceeding $82,000.

The responding parties challenged the amount as excessive and attempted to dissect the bill of costs without producing their own costs outlines as required under Rule 57.01(6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court emphasized that costs fixing is not an item-by-item assessment and that reasonable expectation and indemnity principles govern the exercise.

The absence of a costs outline from the objecting party undermined its argument for reductions.

The court fixed costs largely as claimed, awarding partial indemnity costs plus additional costs for preparing submissions.

The defendant municipality appealed a master's order granting leave to amend a statement of claim to add additional plaintiffs and new causes of action relating to a municipal waste services tender process.

The municipality argued the proposed claims were statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002 because the discoverability date arose when the first tender was cancelled.

The court held that it was arguable the first and second tenders formed a single continuous procurement process, meaning the claim might not have been discoverable until the cancellation of the second tender.

Because the proposed amendments were not clearly statute-barred and therefore not plainly impossible of success, the master's decision permitting the amendments was upheld.

A subcontractor filed a construction lien arising from specialized grouting and monitoring work performed in connection with the Toronto-York subway extension beneath a university building.

The general contractor moved to discharge the lien, arguing the work occurred on a railway right-of-way and that the university was not an “owner” under the Construction Lien Act.

The court rejected these arguments, holding the university qualified as an owner because the work was requested, controlled, and directly benefitted its property.

The lien was therefore validly preserved by registration on title.

The court also held that the subcontract’s broad arbitration clause required the underlying payment dispute to proceed to arbitration and stayed the lien action while refusing to add the transit authority as a third party.

Following dismissal of the defendants’ Rule 21 motion to strike the claim, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiffs sought costs, arguing the motion was unreasonable and unsupported by authority, while the defendants contended the motion raised a novel legal issue and that no costs should be ordered.

Applying s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court considered proportionality, complexity, and the results achieved.

The court rejected the argument that the motion was patently unreasonable but held that the successful parties were entitled to costs.

Partial indemnity costs of $16,500 were awarded to the plaintiffs.

The defendants brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a determination before trial that the plaintiffs’ claim against a surety under a performance bond could not exceed the bond amount and requesting that the action be stayed or limited accordingly.

The dispute arose from a subcontract for compensation grouting work on the Toronto‑York Spadina Subway Extension project.

The plaintiffs alleged that the subcontractor’s breaches caused extensive delay damages and that the surety’s conduct, including alleged inaction and misrepresentation following default, exposed it to liability beyond the bond amount.

The court held that it was not plain and obvious that the plaintiffs’ claim had no reasonable prospect of success, particularly where the pleadings alleged conduct by the surety potentially giving rise to liability beyond the bond cap.

As the legal question was unsettled in Canadian jurisprudence and factual issues remained disputed, the motion was dismissed.

The City of Vaughan appealed a decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment, arguing that s. 20(1)(a) of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act provided complete immunity against the plaintiffs' $151 million claim for malfeasance and negligence.

The plaintiffs alleged the City deliberately delayed their zoning applications, causing them to lose the opportunity to develop their land before retroactive legislative amendments made the development impossible.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs' cause of action and some damages accrued prior to the legislative amendments, meaning statutory immunity did not completely bar the claim.

The court also reduced the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs award from $169,156.30 to $119,156.30.

Sure Fresh Foods Inc. appealed a decision of the Chicken Farmers of Ontario (CFO) refusing to review and adjust a levy imposed by the Chicken Farmers of Canada (CFC) for failing to meet market development commitments.

The CFO raised preliminary objections regarding timeliness, jurisdiction, and collateral attack.

The Tribunal found the appeal was timely and that it had jurisdiction to review CFO decisions, but concluded the appeal was an impermissible collateral attack on the CFC's levy decision, which had already been unsuccessfully appealed to the National Farm Products Council.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claims against a solicitor and other defendants, as well as the award of substantial indemnity costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility regarding the solicitor.

The court also rejected the claim against the other defendants, noting that any vendor's lien was extinguished when the bank exercised its security.

The award of substantial indemnity costs was upheld due to the appellant's attack on the respondent's character.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his motion to quash a disciplinary charge for delay.

The appellant had subsequently pled guilty to the charge and served the penalty.

The Commission held that the appeal was not moot, but that the appellant had waived his right to appeal by pleading guilty without reserving his right to challenge jurisdiction.

In the alternative, the Commission found that the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act commenced when investigators obtained independent witness statements, providing a sufficient body of factual information to create a reasonable belief of misconduct.

As the Notice of Hearing was served within six months of that date, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision finding no de facto expropriation effected by an open space by-law.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that there was no de facto expropriation.

The Court declined to consider whether the respondent had the power to require dedication of the Woodlot as a condition to site plan approval, as the issue was not raised in the pleadings or below.

The Court also found no basis in the pleadings for an allegation of malfeasance of public office.

A police constable was acquitted of criminal charges and subsequently faced discipline proceedings under the Police Services Act for the same conduct.

The hearing officer, appointed by the Chief of Police, stayed the discipline proceedings as an abuse of process.

The Chief, who has no statutory right of appeal, sought judicial review of the decision.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the stay.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the Chief does not have standing to seek judicial review of a decision made by his own delegate, as the Chief and the hearing officer are synonymous under the Act.

The appeal was allowed and the hearing officer's decision was reinstated.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed the penalty of dismissal imposed after he pled guilty to two counts of discreditable conduct and was found guilty of one count of corrupt practice.

The misconduct involved importing khat while returning from Kenya, attempting to use his police status to avoid customs scrutiny, and lying to officials.

The Commission found that the Hearing Officer properly balanced the relevant factors, including the serious nature of the misconduct, the damage to the police service's reputation, and the lack of rehabilitation potential, and upheld the penalty of dismissal.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction for neglect of duty, arguing that the Notice of Hearing was served outside the six-month limitation period under section 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent argued the appeal itself was out of time under section 70(1).

The Commission found that the appeal was filed in a timely manner because the appellant never received written notice of the hearing officer's ruling on the limitation period motion.

However, the Commission also found that the Notice of Hearing was served within the six-month limitation period, as the period commenced when the designated complaints investigator received the appellant's notes and formulated the opinion that misconduct had occurred.

The conviction for neglect of duty was confirmed.

The appellant police officer appealed a conviction for neglect of duty, arguing that the disciplinary proceedings were barred by the six-month limitation period under section 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent argued the appeal itself was out of time under section 70(1).

The Commission held that the Notice of Hearing was served within the six-month limitation period, which commenced when the investigator received the officer's notes and formulated the opinion that misconduct occurred.

The Commission also held that the appeal was timely because the officer never received proper written notice of the hearing officer's decision on the limitation motion.

The conviction for neglect of duty was confirmed.

The appellant police officer appealed a disciplinary conviction for neglect of duty, arguing that the Notice of Hearing was served outside the six-month limitation period under section 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

The respondent argued the appeal itself was out of time under section 70(1).

The Commission held that the appeal was timely because the officer never received written notice of the hearing officer's ruling on the limitation motion.

However, the Commission dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding that the six-month limitation period commenced when the designated investigator received the officer's notes and formulated the opinion that misconduct occurred, making the Notice of Hearing timely.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his application to stay disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued the proceedings were commenced outside the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

Following the dismissal of the stay application, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding it was brought outside the 30-day appeal period under s. 70(1) of the Act, which began running from the date of the stay decision, not the final disposition.

Furthermore, the negotiated plea constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.

In obiter, the Commission noted that the six-month limitation period begins when the Chief's designates possess sufficient factual information, not when the final report is received.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his application to stay disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued the proceedings were commenced outside the six-month time limit under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

Following the hearing officer's decision, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding it was brought outside the 30-day appeal period under s. 70(1) of the Act, which began running from the date of the hearing officer's decision, not the ultimate disposition.

Furthermore, the negotiated plea constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.

In obiter, the Commission noted that the six-month limitation period begins when the Chief's designates possess sufficient factual information, not when the final report is received.

The appellant police officer appealed a hearing officer's decision dismissing his application to stay disciplinary proceedings for discreditable conduct.

The appellant argued the proceedings were commenced outside the six-month limitation period under s. 69(18) of the Police Services Act.

Following the hearing officer's decision, the appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to a reduced charge.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding it was brought outside the 30-day appeal period under s. 70(1) of the Act, which began running from the date of the hearing officer's decision, not the ultimate disposition.

Furthermore, the negotiated plea constituted a waiver of the right to appeal.

In obiter, the Commission noted that had the appeal been timely, it would have found the hearing officer erred in law regarding the commencement of the limitation period.