Laskin J.A.

The appellant, detained under the Ontario Review Board for over 30 years, appealed the Board's disposition continuing his detention at St. Joseph's Healthcare.

He argued the Board erred in refusing an adjournment, relying on hearsay evidence, failing to address his sleep deprivation, and refusing a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the adjournment issue moot and no basis to interfere with the Board's substantive decisions, though it noted the Board erred in its approach to the adjournment request and urged it to address the sleep deprivation issue at the next review.

The appellant appealed his conviction for a drug-related offence.

The Crown's case relied on the appellant placing a bag in a car, which was later found to contain drugs after being in a motel room for over two hours.

The Court of Appeal found the verdict unreasonable, as there was no evidence regarding who had access to the bag while it was in the motel room.

The trial judge erred by looking for evidence that the contents had changed, rather than requiring the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that they had not changed.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The respondents, Canadian citizens living in the United States for more than five years, challenged the constitutionality of provisions in the Canada Elections Act that prohibited them from voting in federal elections.

The application judge found the provisions violated section 3 of the Charter and were not saved under section 1.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that while the provisions infringed section 3, they were demonstrably justified under section 1.

The majority found the pressing and substantial objective was to preserve the social contract between citizens' obligation to obey the law and their right to elect lawmakers, and that the five-year limit was a minimally impairing and proportionate means of achieving this objective.

The appellant, previously found not criminally responsible for criminal harassment and other offences, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing her detention.

She argued she was entitled to an absolute discharge as she only posed a risk of minimal harm.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the Board's disposition was reasonable and supported by the evidence, though it encouraged the Board to explore community integration at her upcoming annual review.

The appellant judgment creditor sought to enforce its judgment by having the sheriff sell the respondents' mortgaged property.

The sheriff required a mortgage discharge statement, which the mortgagee bank refused to provide without the respondents' consent, citing PIPEDA.

The respondents failed to attend examinations in aid of execution.

The appellant brought a motion to compel the mortgagee to produce the statement, which was dismissed based on binding precedent.

On appeal, a five-judge panel of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The majority held that the mortgage discharge statement was sensitive personal information under PIPEDA, and the respondents could not be deemed to have impliedly consented to its disclosure to a judgment creditor.

The majority affirmed that the proper procedure to obtain the statement without consent is to seek an order for the examination of the mortgagee under Rule 60.18(6)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which would satisfy the court order exemption in PIPEDA.

The appellant appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board that revoked his transfer to a less secure hospital and maintained him at a secure facility.

The Board's decision was based on the appellant's surprise attack on a co-patient, which changed his risk profile.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion reasonably supported the revocation and that maintaining the appellant at the secure facility was the least onerous and restrictive disposition.

The respondent, an assistant manager at Wal-Mart, was constructively dismissed after enduring months of abusive and demeaning treatment from her supervisor.

When she complained to Wal-Mart management, they deemed her complaints unsubstantiated and threatened her with reprisal.

At trial, a jury awarded substantial compensatory, aggravated, and punitive damages against both the supervisor and Wal-Mart.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the findings of liability and the compensatory and aggravated damages awards, finding that the supervisor intentionally inflicted mental suffering and Wal-Mart breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing.

However, the Court significantly reduced the punitive damages awards against both defendants, concluding that the original amounts were not rationally required to achieve the goals of punishment, denunciation, and deterrence in light of the high compensatory awards.