fair trial

The self-represented applicants, charged with fraud and criminal organization offences, brought Rowbotham applications seeking a stay of proceedings until the Attorney General funded their defence.

The court dismissed the applications, finding the applicants failed to meet all three parts of the Rowbotham test.

Specifically, they had not exhausted their legal aid appeals, failed to provide credible and complete financial disclosure to prove indigence, and did not establish that their right to a fair trial would be materially compromised without counsel given their business experience and the straightforward nature of the allegations.

The applicants, a media company and a journalist, sought to quash or vary a production order requiring them to produce communications with a suspected terrorist, and to unseal the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The court dismissed the applications to quash or vary the production order, finding that the authorizing justice properly balanced the state's interest in investigating serious crimes with the media's right to privacy under the Lessard principles.

The court allowed the application to vary the sealing order in part, permitting access to a redacted version of the ITO, but imposed a temporary publication ban on certain details to protect the fair trial rights of the accused and the integrity of the ongoing investigation.

The applicant sought a Rowbotham order staying a prosecution for importing opium until the Crown funded counsel for trial.

The court accepted that Legal Aid had been denied and that counsel was necessary for a fair trial given the seriousness of the charge, the legal issues, and the applicant's limited English.

However, the applicant failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that he could not afford private counsel or that he had exhausted other available means, including assistance from family or borrowing.

The application was dismissed without prejudice to a renewed application supported by fuller financial evidence.

In a first degree murder appeal arising from a joint trial with antagonistic defences, the appellant's counsel was required to withdraw mid-trial and no replacement counsel could be found despite extensive efforts.

The trial judge refused severance or a mistrial and instead appointed amicus curiae with an expanded mandate.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge asked the wrong question, relied on unsupported considerations, failed to consider highly relevant factors, and thereby unreasonably exercised discretion under the interests of justice standard.

Amicus was not an adequate substitute for counsel in a complex murder trial, and the resulting loss of representation deprived the appellant of a fair trial and caused a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant, who was unrepresented at trial, appealed his conviction on the grounds that he did not receive a fair trial because he misunderstood the concept of wilful blindness and the evidentiary nature of disclosure material.

He also argued the trial judge applied an objective standard to wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the appellant understood wilful blindness, the confusion over disclosure did not impact the trial's fairness, and the trial judge did not err in applying the wilful blindness doctrine given the overwhelming nature of the Crown's case.

In a shareholder and oppression dispute arising from a failed business relationship, the defendants moved to dismiss the action for delay and alternatively sought further discovery relief, while the plaintiff moved to compel answers to discovery refusals.

The court held that the relevant period of delay was approximately two years, not five, and that although prejudice was presumed because the limitation period had expired, the presumption was rebutted and actual prejudice was not proven.

The court also rejected an estoppel argument based on opposing counsel's silence.

The dismissal motion was refused, the plaintiff obtained limited relief on specified refusals and production, and the defendants' cross-motion for further answers and a fresh examination was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge erred by excluding evidence under section 276 of the Criminal Code that the complainant engaged in consensual sex with another man shortly after the alleged assault.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address presented a distorted narrative regarding the complainant's emotional state and loyalty to her boyfriend, making the excluded evidence highly probative to the defence.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and a new trial ordered.