Domestic violence

The appellant father appealed a trial decision dismissing his Hague Convention application for the return of the parties' three children to Michigan and assuming jurisdiction under section 23 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

The trial judge found that the father did not have custody rights at the time of removal and that returning the children to Michigan without their primary caregiver mother, who lacked immigration status to return, would expose them to a grave risk of harm from the abusive father.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of the risk of harm or her decision not to defer to the Michigan court.

The offender pleaded guilty to arson with disregard for human life, uttering death threats, break and enter, and disobeying a court order, all committed against his separated spouse.

The court considered the offender's mental health issues and guilty pleas as mitigating factors, but weighed them against the highly aggravating domestic context and the planned nature of the arson.

The court imposed a global sentence of 77 months in custody, reduced to 23 months net after pre-sentence custody credit, followed by three years of probation.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including assault and assault with a weapon against his pregnant wife, and received a suspended sentence.

Facing certain deportation, he applied to extend the time to appeal his convictions and sentence, arguing his pleas were procedurally flawed and uninformed regarding immigration consequences, and alternatively sought a conditional discharge.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the procedural irregularity caused no prejudice, the appellant was fully informed of the immigration consequences before pleading guilty, and a conditional discharge would be contrary to the public interest given the serious domestic violence involved.

The accused was tried on 15 counts of domestic violence-related offences, including sexual assault, assault with a weapon, forcible confinement, and uttering threats against his former partner.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, ultimately rejecting the accused's testimony and accepting the complainant's evidence as truthful and compelling.

The accused was found guilty on 13 counts.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary care and custody order regarding two children, aged 12 and 14 months.

The children had been removed from the mother's care following incidents of domestic violence and substance abuse, and placed with relatives.

The mother sought the return of the children.

The court found that the parents had repeatedly breached voluntary services agreements and that there was a risk of harm to the children if returned to the mother's care.

The court ordered that the children remain in their current placements.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter for the beating death of his wife.

The court considered the severe aggravating factors, including the domestic nature of the violence, the brutality of the attack, and the offender's lack of genuine remorse.

Mitigating factors were limited to harsh pre-sentence custody conditions, including triple-bunking and loss of in-person visits due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court determined a fit sentence was 9.5 years imprisonment, reduced to 1684 days after applying credit for pre-sentence custody.

During a trial for second-degree murder, the Crown sought to adduce evidence of the defendant's prior discreditable conduct toward his deceased wife.

This included hearsay statements the deceased made to her sister about the defendant's abusive behaviour.

The court ruled the statements admissible under the principled approach to hearsay.

Necessity was established by the declarant's death, and threshold reliability was met based on the inherent trustworthiness of the statements, given the close relationship between the sisters, the deceased's reluctance to complain, and corroborative evidence from the deceased's daughter.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder following the death of his wife, who died from blunt force trauma resulting in a lacerated liver.

The accused claimed he acted in self-defence and that the fatal injuries were accidental.

The court rejected the accused's testimony as a fabrication, finding that he inflicted the severe beating that caused her death.

However, due to the accused's significant intoxication and the lack of evidence regarding how the assault unfolded, the court found a reasonable doubt as to whether he had the specific intent required for murder.

The accused was found not guilty of murder, but guilty of manslaughter.

The Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order placing the child in the deemed custody of the respondent father, with parenting time for the respondent mother.

The mother opposed the motion, seeking the child's return to her care, and objected to the admissibility of unsworn reports from the child's treating psychologist.

The court held that the psychologist was a participant expert whose unsworn reports were admissible on a summary judgment motion.

Finding no genuine issue requiring a trial, the court granted the motion, placing the child in the father's custody with decision-making responsibility, and ordered parenting time for the mother.

The accused pled guilty to assault causing bodily harm against his intimate partner and breach of recognizance.

The court considered the severe nature of the assault, the accused's lack of prior record, his low risk of reoffending, and the impact of stringent pre-sentence bail conditions and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The accused was sentenced to 90 days of intermittent jail for the assault, followed by a 12-month conditional sentence for the breach, and probation.

The Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that the child was in need of protection and an order placing the child in the custody of his paternal aunt and uncle.

The mother consented to a protection finding based on emotional harm but opposed findings based on physical harm and the proposed access disposition.

The court granted summary judgment, finding the child in need of protection due to the mother's unresolved substance abuse and domestic violence issues.

The court ordered custody to the kin care providers with specified minimum access for the mother, leaving further expansion of access to the caregivers' discretion.

The father brought a motion to enforce a Nigerian custody order and seek the return of the parties' two children to Nigeria after the mother unilaterally moved them to Ontario.

The mother brought a cross-motion for temporary custody, arguing the children would face serious harm if returned due to country conditions and alleged past domestic violence.

The court recognized the Nigerian order under s. 41 of the Children's Law Reform Act, found the children were wrongfully removed, and concluded the mother failed to establish a risk of serious harm under s. 23.

The father's motion was granted and the children were ordered returned to Nigeria.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' probation for two counts of failing to comply with a recognizance in a domestic context.

He argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately consider the principle of restraint and his rehabilitation, seeking a conditional discharge due to potential employment and immigration consequences.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no error in principle and that a suspended sentence was appropriate given the repeated breaches of court orders.

The applicant father applied to move the primary residence of the parties' two children from the respondent mother's home to his own.

The mother had unilaterally relocated with the children and the environment in her home was described as high-conflict and stressful.

Relying heavily on the investigation and evidence provided by the Office of the Children's Lawyer, which indicated the children preferred to live with their father and that the mother had engaged in coaching, the court found it was in the children's best interests to reside primarily with the father.

The application was allowed.

The Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the deemed custody of their maternal aunt.

The father opposed the motion, seeking a finding under a different subsection and an order placing the children in foster care.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the children in need of protection due to the father's substance abuse, domestic violence, and failure to protect them from sexual abuse.

The court gave significant weight to the children's strong and consistent wishes to remain with their aunt and ordered deemed custody to her, with access to the father and paternal grandparents subject to the children's wishes.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary sole custody of the parties' three-year-old child after the respondent father unilaterally removed the child from her care following an altercation.

The father argued he established a new status quo and sought interim sole custody with supervised access for the mother.

The court found that a status quo cannot be established by unilateral self-help and that the father's actions raised serious questions about his parenting judgment.

Relying on evidence from the Children's Aid Society, the court granted temporary sole custody to the mother with a specified parenting schedule for the father.

The respondent father brought a motion to vary a temporary access order to increase his parenting time with the parties' two children, aged 16 and 11.

The mother opposed the motion, citing a history of domestic violence and the children's expressed fears.

Relying on Voice of the Child reports, the court declined to force the 16-year-old to attend access against her will, noting her age and right to withdraw from parental control.

The court also dismissed the father's request to increase access to the 11-year-old, finding that the maximum contact principle was outweighed by the child's best interests and need for security.

The accused, charged with multiple domestic violence offences including assault and forcible confinement, brought an O'Connor application seeking third-party records relating to the complainant.

The requested records included extensive banking, cell phone, and social media data.

The court found that the request was overly broad and amounted to a fishing expedition.

However, the court ordered a limited temporal scope of banking records to be produced for a stage two review, as they were potentially relevant to the complainant's credibility regarding text messages allegedly sent by the accused from her phone.

The accused was charged with sexual assault, assault, and uttering threats against his former partner.

The charges arose from two separate incidents: an argument over their child's shoes that the complainant recorded on her cell phone, and a subsequent incident where the accused forced his way into her apartment and sexually assaulted her.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility, rejecting the accused's evidence and accepting the complainant's version of events.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, noting that the complainant's post-offence contact with the accused did not undermine her credibility when viewed in the context of domestic abuse dynamics.

The offender was convicted of assault causing bodily harm, attempted murder, and forcible confinement against his intimate partner.

The court applied the Kienapple principle to stay convictions for uttering threats and assault, but declined to stay the forcible confinement conviction.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for domestic violence, the court sentenced the offender to a global term of 6 years imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.