Child protection

The applicant children's aid society sought costs of $10,094.86 following its successful defence of a motion brought by the respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The parents argued that no costs should be awarded against them to avoid deterring parents from defending against state intervention.

The court found this to be a rare and exceptional circumstance warranting a costs award against the parents, as they had brought an ill-conceived motion with no reasonable prospect of success following their own breach of a court order.

The court ordered the parents to pay costs of $2,500.

The child welfare agency sought to proceed with a child protection trial but was unable to complete its trial directions due to the youth's new criminal charges and the agency's inability to obtain the youth's records from the Youth Court under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Superior Court of Justice adjourned the trial and provided a detailed analysis of the intersection between child welfare proceedings and youth criminal justice privacy provisions.

The court concluded that the agency has a right of access to the records under section 119 of the YCJA, although the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to make the access order.

The parents in an active child protection proceeding brought a motion to vary a temporary supervision order to permit the mother and children to relocate to Alberta to reside with the father, or alternatively, to transfer the proceeding to an Alberta court.

The father had moved to Alberta for employment after being charged with serious sexual offences involving a former foster child, which had prompted the initial supervision order requiring him to be supervised around the children.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father's voluntary move did not constitute a compelling change in circumstances justifying relocation prior to trial, and that the parents failed to provide evidence that the Alberta child welfare agency had been served or consented to a transfer.

The child protection agency brought a motion regarding the care of two young children during an adjournment period.

The agency initially sought a supervision order placing the children with the father, but the court found that a supervision order would not adequately protect the children due to recent breaches of safety plans, domestic violence, and substance abuse concerns.

The court ordered that the children be placed in the temporary care and custody of the agency on a without prejudice basis.

The mother brought a motion in a child protection proceeding seeking a temporary order to place the child with former kin caregivers.

The child had been placed with the father, but the father was recently incarcerated and denied bail.

The children's aid society sought to keep the child in the care of the father's partner.

Applying the augmented best interests test for an Indigenous child, the court found that placement with the kin caregivers was more stable and in the child's best interests, despite historical concerns regarding the kin's ability to foster the child's cultural identity, which could be mitigated through supervision and education.

The children's aid society brought a motion for a temporary supervision order to place a four-year-old Indigenous child in the care of the mother pending trial.

The child had been residing with a non-relative kin caregiver for approximately two years.

The court applied the federal Act respecting First Nations, Inuit and Métis children, youth and families, noting its paramountcy over provincial legislation and its priority of placement for parents.

Finding that the mother had made significant progress in mitigating child protection concerns and that a return to her care was in the child's best interests, the court granted the motion and ordered the child placed with the mother subject to society supervision.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a supervision order on an interim basis to allow the father and the child to relocate to southwestern Ontario.

The applicant had already facilitated and funded the move without prior judicial authorization.

The court granted a temporary, without prejudice order allowing the child to remain with the father in the new location, but strongly criticized the applicant for bypassing judicial oversight and failing to ensure the self-represented parents and the child's counsel were properly involved before the move.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a child, seeking to suspend the father's parenting time due to allegations of sexual abuse.

The society initially withheld the specific allegations and evidence from the parents and the Court, citing an ongoing police investigation.

The Court held that the society had no legal basis to withhold relevant evidence, emphasizing that fundamental fairness, the legislative framework, and Charter principles require full and early disclosure.

The Court strongly cautioned against proceeding ex parte or withholding evidence to protect a police investigation, noting the severe consequences of child protection proceedings.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for an interim order to change the child's care and custody pending a status review application.

The child had been placed with the paternal grandparents under a final order.

The Society sought to return the child to the mother under supervision.

The court found that the mother was not yet ready for unsupervised care and that the grandparents and mother had recently agreed to a comprehensive joint parenting plan through mediation.

The court held that the child's best interests did not require a temporary change in placement and dismissed the motion.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment in a status review application, seeking to place the child in the permanent care and custody of his great aunt and uncle.

The maternal grandmother, who previously had custody, opposed the motion and sought the child's return to her care.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the child continued to need protection due to the grandmother's unaddressed mental health challenges and delusional beliefs.

The court granted the society's motion, placing the child with the kin caregivers and ordering limited access for the grandmother via text communication.

Following the withdrawal of a status review application by the child protection society, the respondent foster parents, maternal grandmother, and First Nation band sought costs against the society.

The court reviewed the principles for awarding costs against a child protection agency, noting that costs are only appropriate if the society acted in a patently unfair or indefensible manner.

The court found that the society's actions in bringing the application to address access issues and a breakdown in the foster placement were reasonable based on the information available at the time.

The requests for costs were dismissed.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of two children, aged 7 and 2, following allegations that the mother's former partner sexually abused the 7-year-old.

The mother and paternal grandmother opposed the motion, seeking the children's return to their care.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the children were at risk of harm if returned to the mother or placed with the paternal grandmother, citing their failure to protect the children and abide by previous supervision conditions.

The court ordered the children to remain in the temporary care of the Society, with access at the Society's discretion.

The respondent grandmother brought a motion to strike the applicant step-grandfather's application for contact with their grandson.

The respondent argued the issue was res judicata due to a prior child protection order granting her custody.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding the applicant was not a party to the child protection proceeding and the Children's Law Reform Act explicitly allows for contact applications following such orders.

The court ordered the biological parents to be added as respondents but declined to order the applicant to pay child support.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment in a child protection application, seeking a final order granting joint decision-making responsibility of an Indigenous child to the mother and her former partner.

The father opposed the motion, arguing for shared decision-making and raising concerns about the child's exposure to her First Nations heritage.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and concluded that the proposed order was in the child's best interests, noting the history of domestic violence and the proposed caregivers' commitment to fostering the child's cultural identity.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

The applicant children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that a 4.5-year-old child with autism spectrum disorder be placed in extended society care, with reduced access for the parents.

The parents opposed the motion, seeking to have the child placed in their care or to adjourn for updated parenting capacity assessments.

The court applied the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings and found that there were genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the father's parenting plan and both parents' access.

The court noted that the existing parenting capacity assessments were outdated and that the COVID-19 pandemic had impacted the parents' ability to progress.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and the matter was ordered to proceed to trial.

The Children's Aid Society brought a temporary care hearing concerning the placement of two young children who were taken to a place of safety after their mother passed away.

Two competing plans for permanent care were presented: one by the children's maternal aunt residing in Georgia, and another by a police officer who responded to the initial call and his spouse.

The Society supported the maternal aunt's plan.

The court evaluated both plans, finding them both to be of high quality.

Ultimately, the court determined that it was in the children's best interests to be placed in the temporary care and custody of their maternal aunt, emphasizing the statutory preference for placement with a relative and the familial continuity she could provide.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended the child at birth and sought a finding that the child was in need of protection.

After the Society closed its case at the adjudicative stage of the trial, the father brought a motion for a non-suit, arguing the Society failed to establish a prima facie case.

The court dismissed the non-suit motion, finding that the father's impulsivity, history of domestic violence, inconsistent access visits, and inability to control his emotions posed a real risk of physical and emotional harm to the child.

The court concluded the child was in need of protection and directed the matter to proceed to the dispositional stage.

The applicant Society brought a motion for temporary care of a newborn child who was apprehended at birth due to concerns regarding the respondent mother's unmedicated paranoid schizophrenia.

The mother opposed the motion, arguing she could safely parent the child without medication and seeking a graduated return.

The court found that the mother's deteriorating mental health, refusal to follow medical advice, and recent aggressive behaviour posed a risk of harm to the child that could not be adequately addressed by a supervision order.

The court granted the Society's motion for temporary care, with the child to be placed with the paternal grandparents.

The defendants requested a review of the plaintiffs' statement of claim under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs' action sought damages against various entities involved in a prior child protection proceeding that resulted in their children becoming Crown wards.

The court found that the action was an impermissible attempt to relitigate issues already decided in the child protection proceeding.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as an abuse of process.

The father appealed a trial decision that made his child a Crown ward and denied him access.

The trial judge found that the father failed to meet the statutory test under s. 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act, as he could not demonstrate that continued access would be beneficial and meaningful to the child, nor did he provide evidence that access would not impair future adoption opportunities.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's decision.