Sandra Welch

The Children's Aid Society brought a temporary care hearing concerning the placement of two young children who were taken to a place of safety after their mother passed away.

Two competing plans for permanent care were presented: one by the children's maternal aunt residing in Georgia, and another by a police officer who responded to the initial call and his spouse.

The Society supported the maternal aunt's plan.

The court evaluated both plans, finding them both to be of high quality.

Ultimately, the court determined that it was in the children's best interests to be placed in the temporary care and custody of their maternal aunt, emphasizing the statutory preference for placement with a relative and the familial continuity she could provide.

In a status review application proceeding on consent, the Children's Aid Society sought to terminate a supervision order and grant joint custody of a nine-year-old child to the maternal grandparents residing in New Brunswick.

The court considered whether it had jurisdiction to make the custody order given the child's residence outside Ontario.

The court found statutory authority under s. 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act and concluded the child remained habitually resident in Ontario.

The court granted joint custody to the grandparents with reasonable access to the mother.

The Children's Aid Society sought a disposition order following a finding that two young children were in need of protection due to severe neglect, unsanitary living conditions, and parental substance abuse.

The mother sought the return of the children to her care, with the support of the maternal grandmother.

The court found that the mother and grandmother had failed to demonstrate any meaningful rehabilitation or ability to integrate parenting instruction, and that returning the children would expose them to an unacceptable risk of harm.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the younger child with no access order, and granted custody of the older child to the paternal grandmother, finding these dispositions to be in the children's best interests.

A temporary care and custody hearing under s. 51 of the Child and Family Services Act considered the placement of three children following their apprehension from the mother.

The Society maintained a neutral position between the father and the maternal grandmother as potential caregivers for the two younger children, while the eldest child had been residing with the grandmother.

The court evaluated the best interests of the children, including sibling relationships, stability, caregiving capacity, and the least disruptive placement.

It found the father capable of safely caring for the two younger children and concluded that the grandmother’s responsibility for the eldest child’s significant needs made placement of all three children with her less appropriate.

Temporary care and custody of the two younger children was granted to the father, while the eldest child remained with the grandmother, all subject to Society supervision and access arrangements.

In a child protection proceeding, the applicant society sought summary judgment under Rule 16 of the Family Law Rules.

A preliminary issue arose regarding whether courts hearing such motions may exercise the expanded fact‑finding powers available under Rule 20.04(2.1) and (2.2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure following the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Hryniak v. Mauldin.

The court held that Rule 16 does not confer jurisdiction to weigh evidence, assess credibility, or draw inferences in the same manner as the civil rules because the legislature has not amended the family rules to provide those powers.

The Hryniak “cultural shift” applies only to the extent of interpreting existing jurisdiction broadly, but it does not create new fact‑finding powers absent legislative authorization.

Accordingly, summary judgment motions in family and child protection matters under Rule 16 are limited to determining whether a genuine issue requiring a trial exists based solely on the evidentiary record.

The applicant sought a four-month extension of society wardship for a nine-year-old child who had been in care for nearly 29 months.

All parties consented to the extension.

The court raised the issue of whether section 70(4) of the Child and Family Services Act permitted an extension that would exceed the 30-month statutory maximum for a child over six years old.

After reviewing conflicting case law on whether section 70(4) should be interpreted liberally to allow multiple extensions or strictly as a finite ceiling, the court held that the legislation imposes a strict maximum of 30 months for a child six or older.

The court granted only a one-month extension to reach the 30-month limit and declined the requested four-month extension.

The Children's Aid Society apprehended a young child due to severe concerns of medical child abuse (Munchausen Syndrome by Proxy) by the mother.

On a motion for temporary care and access, the parents sought the return of the child to their care and expanded access, while the Society sought directions on access and the distribution of a parenting capacity assessment.

The court found credible and trustworthy evidence of risk of harm and ordered the child to remain in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother.

The court granted a gradual expansion of access, allowing limited unsupervised access for the father, provided the mother is never left alone with the child.

The court also ordered the distribution of the assessment to specific medical and childcare providers.