J.M. Woollcombe

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter after finding the search warrant invalid.

The trial judge had excised a paragraph from the Information to Obtain (ITO) because it lacked support for the affiant's belief that the suspect was a collector, rendering the warrant invalid.

However, the trial judge admitted the evidence, finding the police conduct was inept but not blatant, and the balance of factors favoured admission.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the Grant framework and dismissed the appeal.

The applicant, charged with two counts of first degree murder and one count of aggravated assault arising from two separate shooting incidents hours apart, applied to sever the counts.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, finding a strong factual and legal nexus between the counts, including the use of the same firearm and an alleged confession linking the two homicides.

The court concluded that the interests of justice required a joint trial, as evidence from one homicide would likely be admissible in the trial of the other even if severed.

The appellant appealed her conviction and sentence for assault arising from an altercation at a shopping mall.

She argued the trial judge erred by inferring her nails caused the complainant's facial injuries, misapprehending her evidence regarding the word 'disengaged', and treating the fact that the parties were strangers as an aggravating factor on sentence.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's inference about the injuries was reasonable, the misapprehension of evidence was peripheral and did not cause a miscarriage of justice, and there was no reversible error in the sentencing analysis.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal for trial on a charge of first-degree murder, arguing the preliminary inquiry justice committed jurisdictional error by relying on insufficient circumstantial evidence of identity.

The reviewing judge found no jurisdictional error, concluding that the preliminary inquiry justice properly engaged in a limited weighing of the evidence, including DNA on a glove, video surveillance, clothing similarities, and association with the co-accused, to determine that a reasonable inference of guilt was available.

The application was dismissed.

During a first-degree murder trial, proceedings were halted for several months due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Upon assessing the jury's availability to resume the trial in the fall, the court conducted individual inquiries with several jurors.

The court discharged two jurors due to undue hardship related to childcare, schooling, and employment concerns exacerbated by the pandemic.

As only nine jurors remained, and the parties did not consent to continue without a jury, a mistrial was declared.

The applicants, facing multiple drug and firearms charges, brought a pre-trial motion alleging various Charter violations during their arrest and the subsequent searches of a vehicle and a residential unit.

The court dismissed the claims regarding arbitrary arrest, search incident to arrest, strip search, and right to counsel, finding the police had reasonable grounds and acted lawfully.

However, the court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant for the residential unit contained materially misleading and inaccurate information.

After excising the misleading details, the court concluded there were insufficient grounds to issue the warrant, resulting in a section 8 Charter breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the firearms and drugs found in the unit under section 24(2), citing the seriousness of the police negligence in drafting the ITO.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought pre-trial motions to edit the videotaped police statements of two co-accused before they were played for the jury.

The moving parties sought to excise references to fears of reprisal, the interviewing officer's opinions on the credibility of another witness, and portions of other witnesses' statements played during the interviews.

The court dismissed most of the requested edits, finding that the passages were necessary to provide context for the accused's responses and that any potential prejudice could be cured by proper limiting instructions to the jury.

A few specific passages lacking probative value and carrying potential prejudice were ordered excised.

The four co-accused, charged with first degree murder, brought an application to be seated at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's box during their trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing courtroom security and the default practice of using the prisoner's box.

The court balanced the security concerns, which required six escort officers if the accused sat at counsel table, against trial fairness considerations, including the need for effective communication between the accused and their counsel during a lengthy trial.

The court granted the application, finding that the accused met their onus and that sitting at counsel table would facilitate communication and ensure the accused were viewed as individuals by the jury.

Following the breakdown of their common law relationship, the parties sought to divide the net proceeds from the sale of their jointly owned home.

The applicant claimed an unequal division based on unjust enrichment for paying the mortgage, while the respondent's father claimed repayment for a $6,000 loan and the cost of home renovations he performed.

The court dismissed the unjust enrichment claim, finding the parties had agreed to share expenses according to their means.

The court ordered the $6,000 loan to be repaid from the joint proceeds but found the home renovations were a gift, rebutting the presumption of a resulting trust.

The net proceeds were divided with specific adjustments for initial contributions, closing costs, and legal fees.

The accused was charged with importing heroin, conspiring to import heroin, possession of heroin for the purpose of trafficking, and conspiring to possess heroin for the purpose of trafficking.

The charges arose from a controlled delivery of a package containing heroin concealed in mascara tubes.

The court found that the circumstantial evidence proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the package contained a controlled substance and that it came from outside Canada.

The accused was found guilty of importing heroin and possession for the purpose of trafficking, but acquitted of the conspiracy charges due to insufficient evidence of an agreement with others.

The offender was found guilty by a jury of manslaughter for his participation in a group attack that resulted in the victim's death by blunt force trauma.

The sentencing judge determined the facts of the offence, finding that the offender used a branch as a weapon and participated in beating the defenceless victim.

After weighing aggravating factors, including the brutal nature of the attack, against mitigating factors such as the offender's supportive family and lack of premeditation, the court imposed a sentence of 6.5 years.

The offender received 399 days of credit for pre-sentence custody, lockdown conditions, and strict bail conditions, leaving a remaining sentence of 5 years and 149 days.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittals for impaired driving and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80.

The trial judge had found a section 9 Charter breach due to a lack of reasonable grounds for arrest and excluded the breath samples under section 24(2).

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal on the over 80 charge, finding the trial judge's reasons were insufficient to explain why the officer lacked reasonable grounds or why the evidence was excluded, thereby foreclosing appellate review.

A new trial was ordered for the over 80 charge, while the acquittal for impaired driving was upheld.

The appellant appealed her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing her s. 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The appeal court upheld the trial judge's calculation of defence delay, noting that defence counsel was unavailable for 17 blocks of trial dates offered by the court.

The net delay fell below the presumptive ceiling, and the appellant failed to demonstrate a sustained effort to expedite the proceedings or that the case took markedly longer than it reasonably should have.

The appeal was dismissed.