C. Rudnicki

The offender was found guilty by a jury of attempting to import one kilogram of cocaine and attempting to possess it for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown sought a three-year custodial sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered extensive social context evidence detailing the offender's experiences with anti-Black racism, poverty, and systemic disadvantages.

Finding that her moral culpability was reduced by her minor role as a courier and her significant rehabilitative efforts, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

The accused, facing a retrial for sexual assault and extortion, brought an application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to adduce three categories of evidence regarding the complainant's sexual activity.

The court held that evidence of non-consensual activity during the making of a video was inadmissible due to issue estoppel from a prior acquittal and as discreditable conduct.

Evidence of prior consensual sexual encounters was also excluded as it lacked sufficient probative value for the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

However, the court permitted cross-examination on the complainant's allegation that she was coerced into having sex with the accused's friends, finding it relevant to her credibility.

The offender was convicted of counselling to kidnap and extort his former lawyers, whom he blamed for financial losses.

He recruited an accomplice, purchased a shotgun and ammunition, and provided the accomplice with the lawyers' details and money.

The court found the targeting of justice system participants and the purchase of a firearm to be significant aggravating factors.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody and house arrest, resulting in a net sentence of 2 years and 8 months.

The applicant sought to exclude evidence (a firearm and ammunition) found in his home, alleging breaches of his s. 8 and s. 9 Charter rights.

The court found the police had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the applicant based on confidential informant information and surveillance, dismissing the s. 9 claim.

While the court found the search warrant was validly issued, it held that the police breached s. 8 by entering and 'freezing' the applicant's residence without a warrant, as there were no exigent circumstances.

However, applying the Grant test under s. 24(2), the court concluded the evidence should not be excluded because the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder of his son, brought an application to exclude a video found on his cell phone.

The police searched the phone incident to arrest without a warrant.

The court found the search violated section 8 of the Charter because there was no urgency to justify searching the phone before obtaining a warrant.

However, applying the Grant framework under section 24(2), the court admitted the evidence, finding the breach was minor, the privacy intrusion was minimal, and the video was highly reliable and crucial to the truth-seeking function of the trial.

The court also dismissed the argument that the video's prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value.

The accused, charged with the first-degree murder of his son, sought to exclude video-taped statements made to police on the basis that they were involuntary and obtained in violation of his Charter rights.

The accused argued that prior unrecorded interactions with police tainted the subsequent video-taped statements, and that police failed to properly advise him of his jeopardy for culpable homicide.

The court dismissed the application, finding no sufficient temporal or contextual connection between the unrecorded and recorded statements to taint the latter.

The court also held that the accused was not under genuine suspicion for murder at the time of the interviews, meaning the initial caution for failing to provide necessaries of life was adequate.

The statements were ruled voluntary and admissible for cross-examination.

The five accused, charged with fraud and conspiracy related to a multi-million dollar tax avoidance scheme, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 44 months.

The court dismissed the delay application, finding the delay justified by the exceptional complexity of the case, which involved voluminous disclosure and multiple accused, as well as transitional exceptional circumstances under the Jordan framework.

The court granted an adjournment for three accused to retain counsel but denied a severance application by the remaining two accused, emphasizing the strong presumption in favour of joint trials for alleged co-conspirators.