Henderson J.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from an order dismissing the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment on liability.

The defendants argued that the motions judge erred by declining to summarily dismiss the action against them during the plaintiffs' motion.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the summary judgment process is discretionary and does not require a judge to resolve all issues.

The court also held that the motions judge did not err in requiring the defendants to bring a formal cross-motion for summary dismissal to ensure fairness to the plaintiffs.

Following a successful appeal from a Small Claims Court decision, the personal defendant sought costs for six different steps in the proceeding, including two trials, two appeals, and two motions.

The Divisional Court awarded the personal defendant a total of $8,700 in costs payable by the plaintiff, while leaving the costs award against the corporate defendant intact.

The accused brought a pre-trial Charter application alleging breaches of ss. 8 and 9, arguing that police lacked reasonable grounds for his arrest and that the Information to Obtain (ITO) for search warrants was insufficient.

The investigation began with a weak tip from a confidential informant, which led to police surveillance revealing a pattern of short, secretive interactions indicative of mobile drug trafficking.

The court found that the totality of the circumstances, particularly the surveillance evidence, provided objectively reasonable grounds for the arrest.

After excising one misleading statement from the ITO, the court concluded the remaining information was sufficient to justify the search warrants, dismissing the application.

The appellant, a personal guarantor of a corporate debt, appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him liable for the debt.

The trial judge had found that a part payment made by the corporate debtor extended the limitation period against both the corporation and the guarantor.

On appeal, the Superior Court held that the causes of action against the debtor and the guarantor were separate and distinct.

Under the Limitations Act, 2002, a part payment only extends the limitation period against the person making the payment or their agent.

Since there was no evidence the guarantor made a part payment or acknowledged the debt, the limitation period against him had expired.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment against the guarantor was set aside.

Following an unsuccessful motion for summary judgment by the moving defendants, the successful plaintiffs and co-defendants sought their costs.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, finding the motion was neither frivolous nor vexatious but was exceedingly complex.

The court excluded the plaintiffs' disbursements for expert reports, determining that those reports were necessary for trial in any event and should be assessed by the trial judge.

Total costs of $16,234.68 were awarded to the plaintiffs and $8,243.83 to the co-defendants.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim at trial, the successful defendant sought costs on a substantial indemnity scale, relying on an offer to settle for a dismissal without costs.

The court held that the offer amounted to an offer to capitulate and did not engage Rule 49.10.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity scale, fixed at $35,873.11, taking into account the modest complexity of the claim and the plaintiff's late abandonment of an intentional interference with economic relations claim.

Following a trial where the plaintiffs were granted judgment against the individual defendant for the return of a deposit on a residential home, the court determined the costs of the proceeding.

The court found that the plaintiffs' offer to settle did not engage Rule 49.10 because it contemplated payment by both defendants, whereas the corporate defendant was successful in having the claim against it dismissed.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiffs on a partial indemnity scale fixed at $28,586.15, payable by the individual defendant.

The Crown brought a pretrial motion to admit the opinion evidence of two police officers as expert witnesses in a trial involving drug trafficking and criminal organization charges.

The first officer was proposed as an expert in drug trafficking and slang, which the court admitted fully, finding the evidence reliable and necessary.

The second officer was proposed as an expert on outlaw motorcycle gangs, specifically the Outlaws and the Black Pistons.

The court found the second officer qualified to testify on the general history and culture of outlaw motorcycle gangs, but excluded his opinion on the specific culture of the Black Pistons and the ultimate issue of whether they constituted a criminal organization, due to his limited specific experience with that group.

The plaintiffs entered into an oral agreement with the defendant builder to purchase a newly constructed home and paid a $150,000 deposit.

Prior to closing, disputes arose regarding a zoning by-law breach related to a deck and the extent of the home warranty to be provided.

The plaintiffs repudiated the agreement and sought the return of their deposit, while the defendant claimed the deposit was forfeited.

The court found that the defendant breached the agreement regarding the warranty, entitling the plaintiffs to lawfully repudiate and recover their deposit.

In the alternative, the court held that even if the repudiation was unlawful, the plaintiffs would be entitled to full relief from forfeiture because the deposit amount was entirely disproportionate to the defendant's actual losses.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring the injured plaintiff to attend a further defence medical examination with an addiction psychiatrist in a motor vehicle personal injury action.

The motions judge had granted the defendant’s request for the additional examination on the basis that the plaintiff’s marijuana use and addiction issues were central to the litigation and that expert evidence from a specialist would assist the court.

On the leave motion, the court considered Rule 62.02(4) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and whether a conflicting decision justified granting leave.

The court found that the broad discretionary approach taken by the motions judge conflicted with the narrower approach articulated in prior authority governing further defence medical examinations.

Leave to appeal to the Divisional Court was therefore granted.

Following a successful motion under Rules 20 and 21 resulting in the summary dismissal of an action, the moving defendants sought costs against the plaintiff.

The court considered the complexity of the issues, including arguments under the Regulated Health Professions Act, 1991 and the Health Professions Procedural Code concerning the regulatory authority of the professional college.

The court found the hours and rates of counsel generally reasonable but reduced the bill to account for duplication between two lawyers and travel time.

Partial indemnity costs were fixed with additional HST and disbursements.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the total amount within 30 days.

The moving parties sought to strike the plaintiff’s statement of claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b), dismiss the action as an abuse of process under Rule 21.01(3)(d), or obtain summary judgment under Rule 20.

The claim alleged that a medical regulatory body conducted a bad‑faith investigation into physicians working at the plaintiff’s clinic, causing economic loss.

The court held the pleading was sufficient to allege misfeasance in public office, though not intentional interference with economic relations.

However, on the summary judgment record the plaintiff produced virtually no evidence establishing unlawful conduct or bad faith.

The court concluded there was no genuine issue requiring a trial and dismissed the action.

In a pre‑trial motion in a murder prosecution, the accused sought to exclude statements made to child protection workers while he was incarcerated.

The defence argued the workers were persons in authority and that the Crown could not prove voluntariness, alleging breaches of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court held the Family and Children’s Services workers were not persons in authority because they were acting solely in their child protection role and had no influence over the criminal prosecution.

As a result, the confessions rule and Charter arguments did not apply to the statements.

However, portions of the interview discussing bail, criminal record, and possible plea resolution were excluded as irrelevant and potentially prejudicial.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought a pretrial motion challenging the admissibility of multiple statements made to police during a missing-person investigation.

The defence argued the statements were involuntary and obtained in breach of ss. 7 and 10(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms because the accused was not cautioned and not informed of his right to counsel.

The court held that during the early stages of the investigation the accused was merely a person of interest in a missing-person case and not a suspect.

By the second police interview, however, the investigation had shifted to a homicide inquiry and the accused was a suspect who should have been cautioned.

The court found most statements voluntary and admissible, but excluded the portion of the second interview involving discussion of a polygraph and subsequent related statements.

In a pretrial motion in a first degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit expert toolmark evidence relating to damage on a bathtub wall in the accused’s residence.

The proposed expert opinion suggested the mark was consistent with damage caused by a saw or serrated knife and was relied upon by the Crown to support a theory of attempted dismemberment in the bathtub.

The court applied the admissibility framework for expert evidence from R. v. Mohan, as refined in R. v. Abbey and White Burgess Langille Inman v. Abbott and Haliburton Co. The court found no evidentiary foundation supporting the Crown’s dismemberment theory and concluded the expert evidence had little or no probative value while posing significant prejudicial risk.

The evidence was therefore excluded.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion on a status review application, seeking a final order granting custody of two children to their maternal great aunt and uncle.

The children's mother and maternal grandmother opposed the motion, seeking custody or placement with supervision.

The court found that the children had flourished in the care of their great aunt and uncle for three years and that there was no realistic possibility of an outcome other than a custodial order in their favour.

Summary judgment for custody was granted, but the issue of access was directed to trial.

In a parenting and support dispute following the breakdown of a short common‑law relationship, both parents sought sole custody of their young child.

The court rejected joint custody due to the parties’ inability to cooperate and a pattern of aggressive conflict between them.

Applying the best interests factors under s.24 of the Children’s Law Reform Act, the court found that the child had lived in a stable environment with the mother since birth and that she was better able to act in the child’s best interests during conflict.

Sole custody was granted to the mother with significant access to the father structured to align with his parenting time with children from a prior relationship.

The court also ordered table child support, rejected the father’s claim of undue hardship under the Child Support Guidelines, ordered retroactive support, required life insurance security, and awarded limited lump‑sum spousal support.

The appellant appealed an Ontario Court of Justice order that terminated his obligation to pay child support for one child as of April 30, 2010.

He argued that the motion judge erred by refusing to revisit arrears determined in an earlier order, declining to hear submissions about a change in income, and failing to terminate support earlier.

The court held that the motion judge properly refused to reopen issues determined in the earlier order, which had not been appealed and was deemed correct at the time it was made.

The court further found there was no evidence of a change in income warranting reconsideration and that the decision to terminate support after the child’s first two years of post-secondary studies was within the judge’s discretion.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding him liable for $10,000 for the negligent installation of ceramic tiles in the respondent's home.

The appellant argued the trial judge made erroneous findings of fact regarding the visibility of floor joists and the cause of the cracking tiles.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding that the appellant breached his duty to discuss the adequacy of the floor joists with the homeowner was supported by the evidence and not clearly wrong.