John D. Campbell

In a guardianship application under the Substitute Decisions Act concerning the alleged incapacity of an elderly business owner, the applicant sought an order sealing the court file.

Corporate respondents involved in related automotive businesses also sought a confidentiality order allowing them to file documents with the court without disclosing them to certain co‑respondents, or alternatively an “eyes‑only” order limiting disclosure to counsel.

The court held that a sealing order was appropriate under s. 137(2) of the Courts of Justice Act given the sensitive medical, personal, and commercial information involved.

However, the requested confidentiality order preventing disclosure to opposing parties was rejected as contrary to fundamental principles of civil procedure and natural justice.

The court instead extended the deemed undertaking rule to protect confidential information while maintaining ordinary disclosure obligations between parties.

The applicant insurer paid its $200,000 policy limits to the plaintiffs in a motor vehicle accident claim against its insured.

The insurer then brought an application for a declaration that it had no continuing duty to defend the insured.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Standard Automobile Policy contains ambiguities regarding defence costs, section 245(b) of the Insurance Act clearly requires the insurer to bear the cost of defending the insured without any limitation tied to the policy limits.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment granted on a $400,000 promissory note given to the respondent vendor on the closing of a real estate transaction.

The appellants sought to set-off claims against the note, but the motion judge only permitted two conceded claims to go to trial and granted summary judgment for the balance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's conclusion that there were no genuine issues for trial regarding the other set-off claims, nor in his decision not to stay enforcement of the judgment pending the trial of the counterclaims.

The appellant was dismissed without cause from his employment as a senior vice-president and part-owner of the respondent company.

The trial judge awarded 5 months' pay in lieu of notice and fixed the share repurchase trigger date at the end of the notice period.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal increased the notice period to 9 months, finding the trial judge overemphasized short service and underemphasized the character of employment and availability of similar employment.

The Court also allowed the cross-appeal, holding that the share repurchase trigger date was the date of termination, not the end of the notice period.

Finally, the Court adjusted the trial costs order, finding that a second settlement offer revoked the first.

The appellant employer appealed a trial decision awarding a wrongfully dismissed employee damages for the loss of pension benefits that would have accrued during his 22-month notice period.

The employer argued that the terms of the pension plan limited accrual of benefits to periods of active employment and explicitly denied the right to damages for lost benefits.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the employee had a common law right to damages for breach of contract, and the language of the pension plan was not sufficiently clear and unequivocal to limit or take away that right.

The appellant landlord appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding a Tribunal order that sections 105(1) and 108 of the Tenant Protection Act apply to the respondents' land lease homes.

The landlord argued that applying these sections to permanent structures would lead to an absurd result, as they could not be sold without assigning the land lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the sections apply to land lease communities and confirm a tenant's proprietary right to sell their home.

However, the Court clarified that while a landlord cannot refuse consent to an assignment in principle when a home is sold, the landlord retains the right under section 17 to reasonably withhold consent to a specific assignee.

In an addendum on costs following an appeal, the Court of Appeal for Ontario reviewed additional written submissions from the parties regarding the costs of the trial.

The Court was not persuaded to alter the trial judge's original disposition of costs.

The plaintiff, a real estate agent, was wrongfully dismissed and subsequently defamed by his former employer on two separate occasions.

The trial judge awarded damages for defamation but failed to distinguish between the first slander, which was statute-barred, and the second actionable slander.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the global damages award and substituting an award of $10,000 for the actionable slander.

The Court upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs order, which denied costs to a successful co-defendant and required the unsuccessful defendant to pay the plaintiff's entire costs, due to the defendants' failure to make timely documentary disclosure.

The plaintiff's cross-appeal regarding reimbursement of advertising fund contributions was dismissed.

The appellant landlord appealed a decision of the Ontario Rental Housing Tribunal finding that the respondents' homes were 'land lease homes' in a 'land lease community' under the Tenant Protection Act, 1997.

The respondents had purchased their homes and entered into 99-year land leases.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the respondents were 'owners' of their dwellings within the meaning of the Act, as the agreements shifted the primary obligations of ownership to them and explicitly stated the buildings remained their property during the lease term.

The court also confirmed that common use elements are not a prerequisite for a land lease community.

The cross-appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for breach of contract regarding the sale of a tavern.

The cross-appellant argued that the respondent acted as a self-appointed agent, breached a fiduciary duty, and that the contract was unenforceable due to the maxim ex turpi causa non oritur actio.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the cross-appeal, finding that the respondent acted on his own behalf with authority, owed no fiduciary duty as there was no agreement to relinquish self-interest, and that the contract did not involve any illegal or immoral act defrauding a third party.