Jameel Madhany

The applicant lawyer sought to set aside an arbitral award that upheld LawPRO's decision to settle a claim against her without her consent.

The applicant argued she was denied procedural fairness under section 19 of the Arbitration Act because the arbitrator refused her request for an adjournment and allegedly forced LawPRO's preferred procedural approach on her.

The court found that the arbitrator properly exercised his discretion in denying the adjournment and that the applicant was not treated unfairly.

The application was dismissed.

The plaintiffs, VoIP service providers, sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant from suspending network carrier services and to allow the migration of telephone numbers without paying port-out fees.

The court determined the requested relief was a mandatory injunction, requiring a strong prima facie case.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the plaintiffs failed to establish a strong prima facie case for breach of contract or intentional interference with economic relations, failed to demonstrate irreparable harm, and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

The court also noted the plaintiffs did not come to court with clean hands due to unpaid invoices.

The applicant lawyer brought a Rule 21 motion to strike the plaintiff’s claim in professional negligence arising from the drafting of an affidavit used in mortgage transactions allegedly connected to a fraud.

The plaintiff alleged the lawyer failed to investigate the truth of statements made by the affiant and thereby facilitated fraudulent mortgages.

The court held the pleadings disclosed no reasonable cause of action because the lawyer owed no duty of care to the plaintiff, had no retainer with the plaintiff, and had no obligation to verify the truth of affidavit contents.

The court further held that commissioning or drafting an affidavit does not constitute a representation by the lawyer that its contents are true.

As the plaintiff conceded no other viable cause of action existed, the claim against the lawyer was struck without leave to amend.

The appellant, acting as power of attorney for his incapacitated father, appealed an application judge's order that released frozen joint funds to the respondent wife, granted her sole authority over a jointly owned Florida property, awarded her $900 per month in spousal support, and ordered the appellant to personally pay $13,500 in costs.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part.

The court upheld the release of the joint funds and the personal costs award based on the appellant's litigation conduct.

However, the court ordered the partition and sale of the Florida property nunc pro tunc, finding the appellant had authority to sever the joint tenancy.

The court also reduced the spousal support award to $300 per month, noting the application judge failed to consider the father's capacity to pay.

Following a successful appeal that certified a class proceeding after the appellant re-cast its case, the court determined the costs of the appeal and the motion below.

The appellant was awarded $45,000 for the appeal as the successful party.

However, because the appellant completely re-formulated its case on appeal, prejudicing the respondent at the motion stage, the court set aside the motion judge's $200,000 costs award to the respondent and ordered that neither party receive costs for the motion below.

The plaintiff appealed the dismissal of its motion to certify a class action against the defendant, which manages Ontario's electronic land registry system.

The proposed class action alleged that the defendant's database constituted copyright infringement of plans of survey.

On appeal, the plaintiff recast its case by revising the class definition and common issues.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the plaintiff could recast its case absent non-compensable prejudice to the defendant.

The court held that the motion judge erred in requiring evidence that two or more persons were desirous of pursuing the claim to satisfy the identifiable class criterion.

The revised class definition and common issues met the certification criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's motion to certify a class action regarding copyright in land surveyors' plans, the parties could not agree on costs.

The successful defendant sought approximately $496,000, while the plaintiff argued for no costs or a maximum of $80,000, citing the novel point of law and public interest involved.

The court found that while the case raised a novel point of law, it did not involve a matter of public interest.

Applying the principles for fixing costs on a certification motion, the court awarded the defendant $200,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes.

The General Manager of OHIP brought a motion to dismiss a physician's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the decision to demand repayment was made under s. 37.1(7) of the Health Insurance Act due to an absence of records, which is subject only to judicial review.

The physician argued the dispute concerned the interpretation of a fee code, granting the Physician Payment Review Board jurisdiction under s. 18.

The Board dismissed the motion, finding that the essential character of the dispute concerned the interpretation of a fee code, and that the General Manager's correspondence satisfied the notice requirements of s. 18.

The Board concluded it had jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

The plaintiff surveying firm sought certification of a proposed class action alleging that the operator of Ontario’s electronic land registry system infringed surveyors’ copyright in registered plans of survey by scanning, storing, and selling digital copies through online portals.

The motion was brought under s. 5 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court held that although a cause of action for copyright infringement was adequately pleaded (with the exception of allegations based on “translation” into digital formats), the plaintiff failed to satisfy the remaining certification criteria.

The proposed class definition was merits‑based and there was no evidence that two or more persons wished to pursue the claim.

The court also found that the proposed common issues were largely individualized, particularly regarding ownership of copyright and consent, and that a class proceeding would not be the preferable procedure.